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Oct 18, 2025
Executive Summary
This strategic security assessment examines the evolution of Haiti’s principal armed coalitions, G9 an Fanmi e Alye, G-Pèp, and Viv Ansanm, from 2020 through 2025, evaluating their operational control, influence on commerce, and the legal and sanctions exposure facing private-sector entities. It finds that Haiti’s commercial environment remains defined by coercive taxation, kidnappings, and sustained disruption of supply chains. The presence of U.N. and U.S.-sanctioned individuals such as Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier and Vitel’Homme Innocent transforms these conditions from criminal activity into a high-level compliance and security risk. These realities constitute a prolonged force majeure environment, demanding coordinated risk mitigation, transparency, and adherence to sanctions compliance protocols by all corporate actors operating in Haiti.
Introduction and Context
Since early 2020, Haiti’s internal security architecture has collapsed under the weight of armed criminal coalitions that have filled the vacuum left by weakened state institutions. The Haitian National Police (PNH) remains under-resourced and overstretched, while successive governments have struggled to re-establish control over Port-au-Prince and surrounding regions. This vacuum has allowed heavily armed gangs to transform themselves from neighborhood militias into de facto political and economic actors controlling trade, fuel, and humanitarian access. Two primary alliances, G9 an Fanmi e Alye and G-Pèp, emerged from this breakdown and shaped the trajectory of Haiti’s gang crisis. Their later convergence and competition gave birth to the Viv Ansanm coalition, which continues to dictate security conditions across much of the capital. The implications for private-sector operators have been catastrophic, ranging from supply-chain paralysis to direct extortion, hostage-taking, and reputational exposure in international markets.
G9 an Fanmi e Alye
The Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies, commonly referred to as G9 an Fanmi e Alye, was formally established in June 2020 under the leadership of Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, a former officer of the Unité Départementale de Maintien d’Ordre (UDMO). The coalition united nine of Port-au-Prince’s most powerful gangs, including bases in La Saline, Bel Air, Martissant, and Lower Delmas. From inception, the G9 functioned both as a criminal syndicate and as a quasi-political movement, presenting itself as a community defender while systematically extorting private-sector operators, transport companies, and residents.
Chérizier’s forces, imposed taxation on goods entering the Varreux Terminal, one of Haiti’s principal fuel depots, and maintained territorial control through heavily armed checkpoints. Under his direction, G9’s actions were accompanied by public statements positioning the group as an anti-oligarchic force opposing elite economic interests. However, these narratives masked a criminal enterprise that generated millions of dollars in illicit revenue through kidnappings, forced levies, and collusion with corrupt officials.
The U.N. Security Council sanctioned Jimmy Chérizier in October 2022 under Resolution 2653 for acts that threatened Haiti’s peace, security, and stability, including orchestrating targeted attacks, killings, and sexual violence. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) mirrored this designation in December 2022, blocking his assets and prohibiting U.S. persons from conducting transactions with him. Despite these measures, the G9 retained substantial influence through 2023, until infighting and territorial losses to rival factions began to erode its dominance.
G-Pèp Coalition
In reaction to the G9’s consolidation, rival gangs formed a counter-coalition known as G-Pèp (“The People’s Gang”). This alliance coalesced in late 2020 and early 2021 under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Gabriel, alias “Ti Gabriel,” of the Nan Brooklyn gang. G-Pèp positioned itself as a populist counterweight to Chérizier’s bloc but engaged in equally violent and predatory practices. Its operational bases included Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Canaan, and Laboule. G-Pèp specialized in ambushes of fuel convoys and commercial shipments and operated an extensive kidnapping-for-ransom network. The group’s emergence triggered protracted gang warfare across the capital, particularly along the Route Nationale corridors vital for trade between Port-au-Prince, the north, and the south of Haiti. Violence between G9 and G-Pèp factions displaced tens of thousands and rendered key logistics arteries impassable for weeks at a time.
G-Pèp’s structure mirrored the fluidity of Haiti’s criminal ecosystem, with individual commanders retaining autonomy while loosely coordinating through Ti Gabriel. The alliance relied on extortion and informal taxation systems similar to those of the G9, with private-sector truckers, importers, and exporters compelled to pay passage fees. As the conflict intensified, foreign humanitarian and commercial operators were forced to hire private security escorts or abandon shipments entirely. The Haitian state’s inability to intervene solidified gang control as a semi-permanent feature of the national economy.
Viv Ansanm Era
By mid-2024, as internal fractures weakened both G9 and G-Pèp, a new umbrella coalition emerged under the name “Viv Ansanm” (“Live Together”). This alliance incorporated remnants of both prior blocs along with elements of 400 Mawozo, Kraze Baryè, and other independent groups. Leadership figures such as Jimmy Chérizier and Vitel’Homme Innocent, himself sanctioned by OFAC in 2023 for kidnapping and transnational criminal activity, played key roles in the new structure. Viv Ansanm established control over large swaths of Port-au-Prince, including the airport corridor, Route Nationale 1, and sections of Croix-des-Bouquets. The group instituted a quasi-tax regime on imports, exports, and fuel shipments, collecting protection money from both public and private transporters. Despite the partial deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) in mid-2024, the coalition has adapted, employing ambush tactics and local collaborators to maintain influence. The coexistence of sanctioned actors within its hierarchy underscores the intersection of Haiti’s domestic instability with international compliance frameworks.
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designations and Private-Sector Implications
On May 2, 2025, the U.S. Department of State officially designated Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended. These designations mark a historic policy shift, extending the counter-terrorism framework into Haiti’s criminal landscape and formally classifying both coalitions as transnational terrorist entities. According to the State Department, Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif “pose a direct threat to the security of U.S. nationals and to regional stability in the Western Hemisphere.” The decision reflects mounting evidence that these groups engage in systematic kidnappings, targeted killings, and obstruction of humanitarian aid while maintaining cross-border arms and ransom networks.
The legal ramifications for the private sector are immediate and far-reaching. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, it is a federal crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to a designated FTO. “Material support” includes money, goods, services, transportation, or any other tangible or intangible benefit, whether direct or indirect. Civil penalties can exceed $330,000 per transaction, while criminal penalties can reach $1 million in fines and up to 20 years imprisonment for willful violations. Importantly, coercive or compelled payments to FTO-controlled actors, such as “safe-passage fees,” “checkpoint tolls,” or “security contributions” may still constitute violations if they confer benefit to the organization.
The designations also expand due-diligence and sanctions-screening requirements for banks, insurers, and multinational corporations. U.S. and allied financial institutions must block transactions involving Viv Ansanm or Gran Grif, and correspondent banks are likely to terminate relationships with firms unable to demonstrate strict compliance. Multilateral lenders and development agencies may suspend funding to contractors or grantees operating in areas under these groups’ influence. The cumulative effect is to heighten the risk of de-banking, funding suspensions, and insurance withdrawal, particularly for firms with exposure along the airport corridor, Varreux Terminal, or the Croix-des-Bouquets and Martissant axes.
For private-sector operators, the designations convert what was previously a complex security environment into a legally defined terrorism-support risk domain. Documentation of coercion, immediate notification to authorities, and transparent financial reporting are now essential compliance defenses. Companies must reassess all logistical chains, supply-routes, and service contracts to ensure that no payments, direct or indirect, reach FTO-designated actors or their affiliates. The May 2025 designations signal a new enforcement era in Haiti, one in which the intersection of counter-terrorism law and commercial survival will define the operating landscape for the foreseeable future.
Control of Corridors and Road Networks (2020–2025)
Throughout this five-year period, armed coalitions exerted control over the most critical transportation arteries of the Haitian Republic, transforming mobility into a transactional and dangerous enterprise. The following represent the principal corridors affected:
1. Route Nationale No. 1 (RN1) – Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haïtien:G-Pèp and Viv Ansanm factions have repeatedly blockaded the stretch from Croix-des-Bouquets through Bon Repos, Canaan, and Cabaret, controlling entry and exit from the capital toward the north. Intermittent ambushes and toll demands have effectively disrupted fuel and goods deliveries to Artibonite and Cap-Haïtien. The Pont-Sondé and Montrouis sectors have seen prolonged gang activity and anti-government demonstrations, particularly from 2023–2025.
2. Route Nationale No. 2 (RN2) – Port-au-Prince to Les Cayes:The Martissant corridor, long dominated by G9-aligned factions, remains one of Haiti’s deadliest passages. Control of this artery between Fontamara and Carrefour has repeatedly halted traffic to the southern peninsula, cutting off humanitarian and commercial access to Les Cayes, Jacmel, and Miragoâne. The corridor has remained effectively closed for most of 2021–2024 due to constant clashes.
3. Route Nationale No. 3 (RN3) – Port-au-Prince to Hinche and Mirebalais:Gang activity in Laboule 12, Furcy, and Kenscoff, particularly under Ti Makak (killed) and Kraze Baryè, has rendered travel to the Central Plateau dangerous. The mountainous routes, once an alternate access to the north, have been subject to kidnappings and vehicle hijackings, constraining agricultural transport.
4. Airport Corridor – Delmas to Mais Gate:Control of the Toussaint Louverture International Airport access route has strategic importance. Viv Ansanm factions based in Delmas 2, Solin, and Carrefour Aviation have intermittently blockaded the corridor, threatening both diplomatic and commercial operations. Extortion of airport workers and cargo handlers has been documented through 2024–2025.
5. Industrial and Port Access Roads:The Varreux Terminal, Thor 10, and Wharf Jérémie areas, located within the La Saline and Cité Soleil zones, have been subjected to repeated armed takeovers by both G9 and Viv Ansanm affiliates. Control of these sectors directly impacts the importation of fuel, building materials, and humanitarian goods. Similarly, the Shada and Carrefour maritime approaches have faced sporadic interdictions by armed groups targeting customs transporters.
6. Northern Border Corridors – Ouanaminthe and Dajabón:While less militarized, the northern frontier routes linking Ouanaminthe and the Dominican Republic have been periodically affected by G-Pèp-aligned gangs extorting CODEVI industrial convoys. Strikes and wage protests have compounded these security risks, occasionally forcing temporary closures of the industrial park.
These cumulative blockades have effectively fragmented Haiti’s national logistics grid. Each corridor operates under a variable mix of gang control, informal toll systems, and sporadic state counter-operations, producing chronic uncertainty for commerce, humanitarian relief, and diplomatic missions.
Sanctioned Actors and International Measures
The U.N. and allied governments have sanctioned several individuals central to Haiti’s gang landscape. Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier was designated under UNSCR 2653 (2022) and by the U.S. and Canadian governments for human rights abuses, killings, and obstruction of humanitarian aid. Vitel’Homme Innocent, leader of the Kraze Baryè gang and a key Viv Ansanm member, was sanctioned by OFAC in 2023 for orchestrating the kidnappings of U.S. citizens and facilitating transnational arms trafficking. Johnson André, known as “Izo,” leader of the 5 Segond gang, was also sanctioned by Canada for violent crimes and destabilizing activities. Jean-Pierre Gabriel (“Ti Gabriel”) of Nan Brooklyn, though not yet formally designated by the U.N., remains under investigation by international authorities. These sanctions not only criminalize direct financial interaction but also create derivative compliance exposure for any entities indirectly benefiting these networks through payments or logistical arrangements.
Legal and Regulatory Framework
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2653, all member states are required to freeze assets, restrict travel, and prohibit the provision of funds or economic resources to designated individuals and entities. For U.S.-connected businesses, compliance extends through Executive Order 13224 and Title 18, Section 2339B of the U.S. Code, which prohibits the knowing provision of material support to foreign terrorist or sanctioned organizations. Even inadvertent or coerced payments to sanctioned actors, such as “safe passage fees” or “tolls,” may fall under the scope of these laws if funds transit through U.S. financial systems. This creates a complex environment for Haitian and international businesses forced to navigate areas under gang control. The standard of intent may offer limited protection, but documentation of coercion, immediate reporting, and the absence of voluntary benefit remain crucial to legal defense. Companies failing to observe due diligence could face asset seizures, sanctions penalties, or reputational de-risking by international banks.
Economic and Operational Impact on the Private Sector
The stranglehold of gang coalitions on logistics corridors has produced an unprecedented economic contraction. Port-au-Prince’s primary access routes, Martissant (RN2), Croix-des-Bouquets (RN1), and the airport corridor have repeatedly fallen under the control of armed groups. Businesses face escalating insurance costs, disrupted supply chains, and difficulty securing staff and cargo. Maritime operators have reduced service, and air carriers have curtailed flights due to safety concerns. The economic toll extends to foreign exchange liquidity, with U.S. dollar flows constrained by heightened banking scrutiny. Several international institutions now categorize Haiti as a “force majeure jurisdiction,” acknowledging that violence constitutes an unavoidable impediment to performance. These realities have turned compliance from a legal formality into an operational survival mechanism. Firms that maintain transparent reporting, secure banking channels, and pre-approved communication with diplomatic missions have shown greater resilience amid these challenges.
Institutional Classifications and De Facto Force-Majeure Treatment
In Haiti, the concept of force majeure has become a defining condition for commercial and operational activity, as persistent insecurity, gang control of key infrastructure, and chronic political instability have rendered normal business performance impossible in many sectors. Under international law and the ICC Force Majeure Clause (2003), a force majeure event is one that is unforeseeable, beyond the control of the parties, and prevents the fulfillment of contractual obligations despite reasonable efforts to mitigate. In the Haitian context, widespread violence, blocked transportation routes, port closures, and sustained disruption of supply chains meet these criteria, effectively constituting a continuous force majeure environment.
Multiple official export-credit agencies and leading trade-credit insurers currently treat Haiti as prohibitively high risk, resulting in an absence of cover that, in practice, functions as a force-majeure environment for many cross-border transactions. The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) lists Haiti as “off-cover” for all tenors, the UK Export Finance (UKEF) states “no cover available,” Allianz Trade rates Haiti D4 (High Risk), and Atradius assigns it the highest-risk band. These stances effectively render Haiti a de facto force-majeure jurisdiction, restricting access to trade credit, export insurance, and dollar liquidity. For the private sector, this means heightened contractual uncertainty and reliance on documentation to prove impossibility of performance under violent conflict conditions.
Sanctions Violations and Penalties for Private-Sector Actors Private-sector entities operating in Haiti face escalating exposure to sanctions violations under U.S., Canadian, and U.N. frameworks. Under the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regime, violations of Executive Order 13224 and Title 18, Section 2339B can result in civil penalties exceeding $330,000 per transaction or twice the amount of the underlying transaction, whichever is greater. Criminal penalties include fines up to $1,000,000 and imprisonment of up to 20 years for willful violations. Corporate officers may face personal liability if they authorize, facilitate, or fail to prevent prohibited payments to sanctioned individuals or entities. Beyond direct fines, secondary exposure arises through correspondent banking de-risking: banks may terminate relationships with firms suspected of indirect facilitation of sanctioned actors.
Additionally, companies implicated in violations may face suspension from multilateral funding programs and be added to exclusion lists by development banks or procurement agencies. Compliance failures are thus not only legal but existential, threatening corporate solvency and access to the global financial system.
Strategic Outlook and Mitigation
The outlook for 2025 suggests a protracted security crisis. The MSSM’s incremental advances may secure isolated zones but are unlikely to re-establish full commercial mobility without parallel political stabilization. Viv Ansanm’s hybrid model, combining criminal taxation with political leverage, will continue to challenge conventional counter-gang operations. For the private sector, the strategic imperative lies in adopting layered compliance and risk mitigation systems. Companies should establish real-time incident reporting mechanisms, conduct continuous sanctions screening, and ensure that all payments within Haiti are traceable and documented. Coordination with diplomatic entities, insurance providers, and financial institutions should be maintained to preserve access to U.S. dollar settlements and correspondent banking. Additionally, corporate social responsibility programs that support local communities and PNH coordination can serve as stabilizing mechanisms and demonstrate good-faith engagement in a high-risk jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Between 2020 and 2025, Haiti’s gang phenomenon has evolved from fragmented street violence into a structured system of territorial governance. The rise of G9 an Fanmi e Alye, the counter-formation of G-Pèp, and the consolidation of Viv Ansanm have entrenched criminal control over trade and movement, effectively redefining the boundaries between state and non-state authority. The presence of sanctioned figures such as Jimmy Chérizier and Vitel’Homme Innocent at the core of these networks places the Haitian private sector squarely within the purview of international compliance regimes. Companies must therefore balance humanitarian necessity and operational continuity against the legal risks of inadvertent engagement with designated actors. Transparency, documentation, and adherence to sanctions obligations remain the only sustainable means of mitigating exposure. The Haitian crisis exemplifies the convergence of security failure, economic desperation, and international law enforcement, making Haiti one of the most complex operating environments in the Western Hemisphere.
Endnotes
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2653 (2022), S/RES/2653, establishing sanctions measures on individuals threatening peace and stability in Haiti.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), “Treasury Sanctions Haitian Gang Leader Jimmy Chérizier,” December 9, 2022.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), “Treasury Sanctions Haitian Gang Leader Vitel’Homme Innocent for Kidnapping of U.S. Citizens,” November 3, 2023.
Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), “Canada Imposes Sanctions on Haitian Gang Leaders,” December 2023.
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM), Situation Updates 2024–2025.
U.S. Code Title 18, §2339B, Providing Material Support to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Executive Order 13224 (as amended), Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Engaging in or Supporting Terrorism.
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Force Majeure Clause 2003, standard for determining impossibility of performance under violent conflict conditions.
U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM), Country Limitation Schedule, August 22, 2024.
UK Export Finance (UKEF), Cover Policy Indicators, October 3, 2025.
Allianz Trade, Country Risk Rating – Haiti (D4), June 2025.
Atradius, Country Risk Map 2025.
U.S. Department of State, Haiti Travel Advisory (“Do Not Travel”), 2025.
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Designation of Haitian Gang Coalitions Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” May 2, 2025.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations List, updated May 2025.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Executive Order 13224, as amended — Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Engaging in or Supporting Terrorism, 2025.
Reuters, “U.S. Designates Haitian Gang Alliance Viv Ansanm a Transnational Terrorist Organization,” May 2, 2025.
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), “DOS Designates Two Haitian Groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” May 2025.
U.S. Code, Title 18 §2339B, Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.