HALO SOLUTIONS FIRM S.A.

Special Security Report

Haitian National Police (PNH) Operational Gains and Territorial Reclamation

Reporting Period: December 2025 – February 2026Prepared by: Halo Solutions Firm S.A.

Date: 12 February 2026

Over the past two months, the Police Nationale d’Haïti (PNH) has demonstrated measurable operational momentum against armed criminal networks operating primarily within the West Department, including elements associated with the Viv Ansanm coalition. Through coordinated ground offensives, infrastructure reoccupation, corridor security operations, targeted interdictions, and the integration of drone-enabled strike capabilities, the PNH has shifted from reactive containment to proactive territorial reclamation in multiple high-risk zones. The operational tempo observed between December 2025, and February 2026 reflects improved command coordination, enhanced mobility, expanded special-unit engagement, and a structured doctrine focused on reestablishing state authority across strategic urban and peri-urban terrain.

A significant milestone during this reporting period was the official reopening of the Carrefour de l’Aéroport police sub-station in Delmas, nearly two years after the facility was destroyed during coordinated gang attacks in March 2024. The restoration of this sub-station reestablishes a permanent police footprint along a critical axis connecting Port-au-Prince to Toussaint Louverture International Airport and the broader Delmas corridor. The reactivation of this installation restores operational coverage in a previously contested zone and supports the gradual normalization of commercial and civilian activity. Senior police leadership emphasized sustained deployment and territorial hold rather than short-duration clearance operations.

Concurrently, the PNH intensified offensive operations in entrenched gang strongholds, including Gran Ravin and Martissant 2A. Gran Ravin has long been associated with the Grand Ravine gang led by Renel Destina, also known as “Ti Lapli.” Recent operational reporting indicates sustained pressure against that sector, including drone-enabled suppression actions targeting fortified gathering sites and leadership elements. In Delmas 2 (Tokyo sector), a large-scale special-unit operation targeted a group locally identified as being led by “Chalè,” resulting in reported fatalities and the seizure of firearms, ammunition, and drone equipment. These operations intersect geographically with areas historically influenced by Jimmy Chérizier, known as “Barbecue,” leader of the G9 Family and Allies federation.

On 31 January 2026, coordinated security operations in Tabarre resulted in the reported neutralization of eight-armed individuals. Parallel operations in Croix-des-Bouquets were described as efforts to regain control from the 400 Mawozo network. These engagements were accompanied by the reopening of obstructed road segments and the seizure of automatic weapons.

Weapons interdiction during this reporting window represents one of the most significant operational impacts. PNH units seized at least 33 firearms and approximately 12,259 rounds of ammunition in enforcement operations in Bel-Air, Quartier-Morin, and Cap-Haïtien. Additional seizures in Delmas 2, Tabarre, and Croix-des-Bouquets included M16- and Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and drone equipment. These seizures materially degrade gang logistical sustainment capacity and reduce immediate firepower availability in contested zones.

In Kenscoff, police units repelled a coordinated assault on 8 February 2026 in the Morne Tranchant area without sustaining fatalities. Conservative aggregation of reported figures during the period indicates at least twenty-two reported gang-member fatalities across major engagements, in addition to multiple arrests and large-scale weapons seizures.

These gains are being consolidated under Operation “San Kanpe,” designed to dismantle gang command structures, secure national highways, restore freedom of movement, and reassert state authority in strategic zones including Croix-des-Bouquets, Arcahaie, Tabarre, and central Port-au-Prince.

However, the structural constraints facing the PNH remain severe. During recent testimony before the United States Congress, the U.S. Ambassador and senior diplomatic officials indicated that although the PNH nominal strength is approximately 6,000 officers, only a small fraction of that force is actively engaged in frontline offensive operations at any given time. Approximately 400 specialized units, including SWAT, tactical intervention teams, and mobile response elements, are bearing the brunt of sustained combat operations against thousands of heavily armed gang members across the metropolitan region and expanding corridors.

This force imbalance is operationally decisive. A concentrated core of roughly 400 deployable specialized officers is tasked with countering an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 gang-affiliated individuals nationwide, including several thousand assessed to be combat-experienced and equipped with automatic weapons. As a result, continuous redeployment and rapid rotation cycles have become necessary. Specialized units are frequently withdrawn from newly cleared areas to respond to emergent crises in other departments, particularly along the Route Nationale #1 corridor and in the Artibonite Department. These redeployments create security vacuums and weaken the “hold” phase that is critical for durable territorial stabilization.

Rotation cycles are further constrained by limited effective air mobility for rapid insertion and extraction. With portions of the major national road networks to the north, including segments of Route Nationale #1, periodically under gang influence or contested control, ground-based convoy rotations carry elevated risk and require substantial force protection resources. As a result, airlift remains the most secure and operationally viable method for rotating specialized personnel into and out of high-threat zones. While rotary-wing and fixed-wing capabilities exist within the broader security support framework, sustained funding for regularized personnel air rotations remains insufficient. This funding gap directly affects operational tempo, delays reinforcement cycles, increases fatigue among frontline units, and complicates the transition from clearance to durable stabilization across both metropolitan and provincial theaters.

Large portions of the metropolitan Port-au-Prince region remain under gang control or contested influence, including Cité Soleil, Brooklyn, Wharf Jérémie, La Saline, Bel-Air, Simon Pelé, Village de Dieu, Martissant corridors, Carrefour Drouillard, and sections of Laboule and Kenscoff. Along Route Nationale #1 and beyond the capital, instability persists in Canaan, Jerusalem, Onaville, Bon Repos, Croix-des-Bouquets interior sectors, Arcahaie, Cabaret, Montrouis, Saint-Marc, and Gonaïves in the Artibonite Department. The broader Artibonite corridor has experienced sustained armed group consolidation, making it a strategic pressure point for national mobility and supply chains.

Historically, territorial gains by the PNH have proven vulnerable when specialized units are redeployed to address flare-ups elsewhere. The limited force density outside Port-au-Prince exacerbates insecurity in provincial regions. Departments such as Artibonite, the North, and parts of the Centre experience delayed reinforcement cycles, and localized police posts often lack the manpower to sustain independent offensive pressure. This structural overstretch directly affects durability of recent gains.

The prospective deployment and expansion of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), operating under the Multinational Security Support framework, hopefully will be intended to address precisely this force-density gap. If deployed in sustained corridor configurations along Route Nationale #1 through Arcahaie, Cabaret, Montrouis, Saint-Marc, and into Gonaïves, and if reinforced in Canaan, Croix-des-Bouquets, and Ganthier–Fonds-Parisien, GSF presence could stabilize cleared zones and allow specialized PNH units to transition from constant redeployment cycles to structured stabilization operations. However, as of February 2026, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) operating in Haiti remains significantly below its authorized ceiling of approximately 5,500 personnel, with open-source reporting indicating that only about 980 foreign security personnel are currently deployed. Kenya remains the principal troop contributor. Despite multiple international pledges, donor commitments, and the establishment of United Nations support mechanisms intended to enable sustained operations, large-scale force expansion has not materialized. Financial support has likewise been uneven, divided between direct funding streams and indirect assistance, contributing to a persistent gap between political commitments and operational reality. Until and unless the GSF approaches its authorized force strength and achieves sustained deployment density across critical corridors and contested zones, recent territorial gains by the PNH will remain vulnerable to operational overstretch and cyclical reversals.

Operational advances have been reinforced by armored mobility enhancements, maintenance capacity, and international support, including equipment contributions from the Government of South Korea and sustained capacity-building assistance from the U.S. Embassy in Haiti through INL programming. However, absent significant force expansion, improved retention, and sustained multinational augmentation, the current imbalance between approximately 400 specialized frontline officers and thousands of armed gang members will continue to pose a structural limitation on long-term stabilization.

Attribution and Verification Note: Force figures and structural assessments referenced herein are based on publicly reported testimony and official statements provided before the U.S. Congress, supplemented by local press reporting and PNH communications summaries. Fatality, arrest, and seizure figures reflect minimum incident-specific numbers reported at the time of publication.

In aggregate, while recent PNH operations demonstrate meaningful tactical success, the strategic environment remains constrained by manpower limitations and operational overstretch. The durability of gains in Port-au-Prince, along Route Nationale #1, and within the Artibonite Department will depend on sustained reinforcement, improved force density, and coordinated multinational deployment. Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that without structural expansion of frontline capacity; clearance gains will remain vulnerable to cyclical reversals driven by necessary redeployments across multiple theaters.