Weekly Report September 30 to October 07 2025

Haiti at a Crossroads, The Promise and Peril of the New U.N. Gang Suppression Force

Haiti once again finds itself under a Chapter VII mandate of the United Nations. The Security Council’s decision on September 30, 2025, to authorize the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) reflects a renewed international determination to confront escalating insecurity that threatens both Haiti’s stability and regional peace. Supported by a newly established U.N. Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), the GSF aims to deliver a stronger, faster, and more coordinated international response to gang violence that has paralyzed the country.

A New Mission with a Broader Mandate

The GSF represents a substantial departure from the earlier Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), which struggled to achieve traction due to limited manpower, delayed deployment, and fragmented logistics. Comprising approximately 5,500 personnel from partner nations including Canada, Kenya, El Salvador, Guatemala, and The Bahamas, the GSF is empowered to conduct intelligence-driven operations to dismantle heavily armed groups, protect key infrastructure, and reestablish freedom of movement in gang-controlled zones.

Unlike previous missions that relied primarily on coordination with the Haitian National Police (PNH), the GSF is authorized to act independently, when necessary, while still supporting and strengthening local law enforcement. This dual structure reflects a more flexible operational model designed to deliver results in complex urban environments such as Port-au-Prince, Cité Soleil, and Carrefour.

The addition of UNSOH provides critical logistical depth. It will oversee the deployment of armored vehicles, manage supply lines, and establish forward operating bases at strategic points such as airports, seaports, and energy facilities. These logistical reinforcements are intended to correct the shortcomings that hampered earlier missions, which often operated without reliable resupply networks or adequate infrastructure.

What the GSF Means, and How It Differs

The creation of the GSF signifies a stronger, more assertive phase of international engagement in Haiti’s security crisis. The mission’s Chapter VII mandate grants it legal authority to conduct targeted, intelligence-based operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs that have terrorized civilians and undermined state authority.

The transition from MSS to GSF demonstrates recognition that previous “support-only” frameworks failed to address the scale of Haiti’s armed group problem. The GSF, by contrast, combines military precision with law enforcement strategy. It aims to neutralize gang command structures, restore state presence in critical corridors, and protect vital national assets.

Reasons for Optimism

Despite the complex security environment, the GSF offers tangible reasons for hope.

• Stronger Legal Backing and Accountability. Operating under Chapter VII provides the GSF with legitimate authority for decisive action. U.N. oversight through UNSOH also enhances transparency and operational accountability.

• Enhanced Logistics and Sustainability. UNSOH delivers the logistical backbone that earlier missions lacked, including supply, transport, maintenance, and medical support. This foundation increases mission endurance and operational tempo.

• Civilian Protection and Institutional Reinforcement. The mandate prioritizes safeguarding civilians, supporting reintegration of former combatants, and fortifying Haitian institutions, goals extending beyond direct combat.

• Regional and Multinational Commitment. With political and material backing from CARICOM, the OAS, and neighboring states, the mission carries broader legitimacy and a foundation for burden-sharing.

• A Stronger Deterrent Effect. The GSF’s independence and arrest authority send a clear signal to criminal groups that impunity will no longer be tolerated.

  
  

For the first time in years, a mission in Haiti combines legal authority, international coordination, and logistical strength under a unified framework capable of producing measurable results.

Persistent Risks in Rapid Deployment

Significant risks, however, could challenge the GSF’s effectiveness if not carefully managed.

• Logistical and Mobility Constraints. Gang-controlled roadways, damaged bridges, and limited transport corridors complicate movement of personnel and supplies. Without secure routes, the mission’s rapid deployment could stall.

• Troop Readiness and Interoperability. Rapid timelines may pressure contributing nations to deploy units without full training or standardized equipment, risking operational friction.

• Command and Coordination Ambiguities. The hybrid structure, combining police and military components, demands precise chains of command to avoid confusion or human rights concerns during joint operations.

• Sustainability and Political Transition. Lasting stability will require a political framework that addresses corruption, strengthens governance, and restores functional institutions. Without it, military success will be temporary.

• Public Trust and Legitimacy. After decades of foreign intervention, Haitian citizens remain skeptical. The GSF must demonstrate that its goal is to empower, not replace, Haitian sovereignty.

• Financial Dependence. Funding remains largely voluntary. Interruptions in donor support could compromise logistics and morale midway through the operation.

  
  

These challenges do not negate the mission’s potential, but they underscore the importance of coordination, discipline, and long-term vision.

Where Haiti Stands Today

Haiti stands at a critical juncture. The GSF is not merely a continuation of past efforts, it reflects a structural evolution toward decisive, intelligence-based intervention supported by robust logistics. Its design corrects some of the most persistent flaws of the MSS, including lack of cohesion, equipment shortages, and unclear authority.

Yet the country remains politically fractured, with weak governance, limited control over national territory, and continued economic despair. Unless the GSF’s security gains are coupled with credible political reforms, institutional rebuilding, and social investment, Haiti could once again face a cycle of temporary stabilization followed by relapse.

For many observers, the GSF represents Haiti’s best opportunity in over a decade to reclaim stability, provided it is paired with sustained Haitian leadership and ownership of the reform process.

A Moment of Decision

Haiti’s future now depends on how the Gang Suppression Force is implemented and sustained. The GSF embodies both opportunity and risk, offering a chance to restore security and rebuild state authority, while also testing the limits of international intervention. Its success will rest on transparency, regional unity, and genuine collaboration between the U.N., Haiti’s institutions, and its people.

If the mission can create the breathing space for governance reform, credible elections, and long-term security sector development, it could mark the beginning of Haiti’s recovery. If not, it risks joining the long list of international efforts that began with resolve but ended without transformation.

Haitians Grieve Drone Strike as Global Outcry Mounts

On October 4, residents of Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince gathered for a solemn funeral for eight civilians, including children, killed in a drone strike on September 20. The attack, reportedly aimed at a suspected gang leader, struck deeply into a crowded residential area, triggering anger, fear, and profound grief.

Eyewitnesses say nine people died and 17 were wounded, many of them women and children. Mourners told of chaos and panic when a passing bird was mistaken for a drone, causing people to flee in terror. One mother, unable to face the coffin of her daughter, and another who lost multiple family members in front of their home, are emblematic of the deep personal losses felt across the community.

Broad Diplomatic and Institutional Condemnation

The drone strike did not go unanswered on the international stage. A range of diplomatic missions, human rights institutions, and international organizations issued condemnations and calls for accountability.

United Nations and Human Rights Council: U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk condemned the use of explosive drones as “disproportionate” and “likely unlawful,” calling on Haitian authorities to immediately halt their deployment pending an investigation. Türk urged the establishment of an independent inquiry under the auspices of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), with the participation of regional and local civil society organizations.

United States and Canada: Both governments released statements expressing concern over civilian deaths and calling for transparency regarding drone operations. The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince urged Haitian authorities to “ensure the protection of civilians and respect for human rights” in all security operations. Canada’s Foreign Minister, Mélanie Joly, demanded a “credible investigation that identifies those responsible and prevents future incidents,” while warning against the use of private contractors outside established international frameworks.

European Union: The EU Delegation to Haiti expressed solidarity with the victims and reminded Haitian authorities that the use of armed drones in populated areas “poses unacceptable risks to noncombatants.” EU representatives joined the call for a transparent, internationally monitored investigation and encouraged coordination with the United Nations Mission for the Protection of Civilians.

Organization of American States (OAS): The OAS Permanent Council convened an emergency session on October 5 to discuss the incident. Its Secretary General, Luis Almagro, demanded immediate disclosure of any contracts involving foreign private military actors and proposed that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) dispatch a fact-finding delegation to Haiti.

CARICOM and Regional Partners: Jamaica, The Bahamas, and Barbados—members contributing to the upcoming U.N. Gang Suppression Force—jointly condemned the strike and expressed concern that unregulated drone activity could jeopardize the legitimacy of the multinational mission. CARICOM issued a communiqué emphasizing the need for “strict oversight and coordination between Haitian authorities, international partners, and the U.N. command structure.”

Human Rights and Civil Society Groups: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) in Haiti all called for a full moratorium on the use of armed drones until international standards are established. RNDDH demanded reparations for victims’ families and medical assistance for the injured.

Amid these calls, Haiti’s transitional government has not publicly confirmed responsibility or disclosed whether the drone system used in the strike was operated by Haitian security forces or private contractors under contract with foreign firms.

Role of Private Military Contractors and Erik Prince

Compounding the controversy are reports that Haiti’s transitional authorities have engaged the services of Erik Prince, the founder of the private military company formerly known as Blackwater, to provide tactical and aerial support against armed groups. Sources familiar with the arrangement claim that Prince’s security team has supplied drones and operators as part of a counter-gang initiative launched earlier this year.

The use of private military contractors has drawn particular criticism from diplomats and human rights advocates, who argue that outsourcing lethal operations blurs lines of accountability and risks violations of international humanitarian law. The European Union, Canada, and the United Nations have all warned that if private companies were involved in the September 20 strike, those responsible could face sanctions under international arms control regimes.

Specific Calls Going Forward

The international community has outlined a clear set of demands to prevent further tragedies and restore public confidence in Haiti’s security operations:

• United Nations (OHCHR and Security Council): Immediate suspension of all offensive drone operations in civilian areas, the establishment of an independent inquiry commission, and publication of findings within 90 days.

• OAS and IACHR: Creation of a special oversight mechanism to monitor the conduct of Haitian and foreign forces engaged in counter-gang operations.

• U.S. and Canada: Conditioning future security assistance and funding on compliance with international humanitarian standards and transparency in the use of private contractors.

• CARICOM and Regional States: Development of a joint code of conduct for participating nations in the upcoming Gang Suppression Force, ensuring all operations adhere to human rights norms.

• Civil Society Coalitions: The RNDDH and local advocacy groups are pressing for reparations, trauma counseling, and reconstruction aid for affected families, funded through international humanitarian channels.

• European Union: Drafting a resolution at the European Parliament to review the role of foreign contractors in conflict zones and the regulation of combat drone exports to fragile states.

  
  

A Test for Haiti’s Credibility

The drone strike in Cité Soleil has become a defining test for Haiti’s fragile transitional government and its international partners. The combination of unverified military actions, civilian casualties, and the shadow of private contractors threatens to undermine the legitimacy of upcoming security operations under the new U.N. Gang Suppression Force.

The coming weeks will reveal whether these international calls for accountability lead to tangible reform—or whether Haiti’s cycle of impunity, secrecy, and violence will continue unchecked.

Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras Gangs in Haiti

Haiti’s central corridor, particularly the Artibonite Department, has become the epicenter of organized armed activity led by two dominant criminal groups: Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras (KSR). Both have evolved from local militias into sophisticated, revenue-driven entities exerting territorial control, conducting kidnappings, extortion, and large-scale attacks that directly challenge state authority.

According to Halo Solutions Firm S.A. field intelligence assessments, these groups’ overlapping zones of influence along Route Nationale 1 (RN1) have transformed interdepartmental travel and logistics into high-risk operations. Their actions have disrupted national commerce and severely restricted humanitarian access across the northern corridor.

U.S. Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

On May 2, 2025, the U.S. Department of State designated Gran Grif, along with its affiliated movement Viv Ansanm as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The U.S. Department of the Treasury simultaneously listed Gran Grif under its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) registry. These measures prohibit all U.S. persons and entities from providing material support or services to the gang, freeze any assets under U.S. jurisdiction, and render affiliated individuals inadmissible to the United States. The designation formally acknowledges Gran Grif’s transition from a domestic armed group to an international terrorist entity engaged in destabilizing state institutions and threatening regional security.

Gran Grif

Gran Grif, led by Luckson Elan (“General Luckson”), is one of the most powerful and violent criminal organizations in Haiti. The gang maintains a hierarchical command structure, controls large portions of the Artibonite Department, and enforces dominance through massacres, kidnappings, and assaults on police and UN-backed forces.

It levies illegal tolls on RN1 and nearby routes, displaces civilian populations, and is responsible for an estimated 80% of all civilian deaths in Artibonite since 2022. The group’s violence includes the Pont-Sondé massacre of 2024, where over 100 civilians were killed, and systematic attacks on security forces and infrastructure.

Gran Grif’s activities are designed to assert territorial sovereignty, undermine the Haitian state, and control trade and transport routes linking the capital to northern regions. Its influence has expanded toward Saint-Marc and the northern approach to Bedorèt and Plaisance, creating spillover risks for passenger and freight convoys.

Kokorat San Ras (KSR)

KSR, led by Ferdens Tilus (“Meyer”), operates primarily in rural parts of Artibonite, including Lacroix-Périsse, Estère, and Marchand-Dessalines. It is smaller and less militarized than Gran Grif but equally dangerous due to its focus on kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, and road ambushes.

KSR functions as a decentralized network of criminal cells with mobility and adaptability as its main assets. It has carried out numerous attacks on local communities and infrastructure, including the destruction of the Marchand-Dessalines police station in September 2025. The gang frequently establishes illegal checkpoints on RN1 and Departmental Road 11, demanding “tolls” from drivers and targeting civilians for abduction.

Recent operations in Bassin Bleu and Gonaïves demonstrate KSR’s capacity for coordinated, multi-location attacks involving kidnapping, arson, and property destruction. Its pattern of behavior shows a consistent objective: financial gain through extortion and ransom.

Comparative Analysis

Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras share many operational similarities but differ in scale and intent.

• Gran Grif operates as a militarized organization with ambitions of territorial control and governance by fear.

• Kokorat San Ras, by contrast, functions as a network of extortionists and kidnappers whose motives are primarily economic.

  
  

While Gran Grif’s influence is centralized and political, KSR’s structure is fragmented and profit-driven. Both gangs’ overlapping zones along RN1 and Departmental Road 11 have destabilized Artibonite’s economy and placed travelers, humanitarian personnel, and private operators at continuous risk.

Implications for Transportation and Security

Both gangs severely disrupt mobility in Haiti’s transport corridors. RN1, the country’s main north–south artery, is frequently targeted through ambushes, barricades, and extortion checkpoints.

Passenger buses, such as the Rotation Tours vehicle attacked near Bedorèt on October 3, 2025, remain vulnerable, especially in rural transition zones between Nord and Artibonite. These routes are often used by gangs to conduct opportunistic kidnappings, rob travelers, and assert control over key chokepoints.

Field data gathered by Halo Solutions Firm S.A. indicate that the majority of road-based abductions and extortion incidents in northern Haiti now occur within 30 kilometers of RN1 intersections under intermittent gang influence. The persistent insecurity has led to economic paralysis in Saint-Marc, Liancourt, and Gros-Morne, and triggered population displacement from contested zones. Without reinforced coordination between the Haitian National Police (PNH) and the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM), civilian travel will remain unsafe.

Strategic Outlook

• Gran Grif is expected to consolidate its control in Artibonite, strengthen its command structure, and continue resisting joint PNH and multinational operations.

• Kokorat San Ras is likely to intensify kidnapping and extortion to recover from recent police raids and maintain its revenue streams.

Both groups pose a sustained threat to state authority and economic activity. Their overlapping zones of control and occasional coordination could result in increased violence if not countered through coordinated intelligence, targeted strikes, and disruption of financial networks.

Gran Grif represents a strategic threat to Haiti’s sovereignty through militarized territorial expansion and control of major transportation corridors.Kokorat San Ras remains a tactical threat that directly endangers civilians, expatriates, and travelers through opportunistic kidnapping and extortion.

Mitigation will require persistent intelligence-driven operations, strengthened joint patrols along RN1 and DR11, and interagency collaboration between Haitian and international partners. Reinforcing logistical security for humanitarian and commercial convoys will be vital to restoring freedom of movement and economic stability.

Rising Unrest in Saint-Marc as Armed Civil Groups Force School Closures

Severe tension gripped the city of Saint-Marc in the Lower Artibonite region on October 6, 2025, as armed self-defense brigades, joined by residents from Pont-Sondé, ordered the closure of all schools. The groups, citing frustration over unchecked gang violence in nearby communes such as Pont-Sondé and Liancourt, demanded that authorities take decisive action against the gangs Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras. Claiming that it was unjust for Saint-Marc to function normally while neighboring towns remain paralyzed by insecurity, the brigades declared their intent to awaken “collective awareness” and pressure the government into restoring order.

Businesses, banks, and schools quickly shut down amid fear of escalation, leaving the city effectively immobilized. Barricades made of trucks continue to block National Route 1 near Pont-Sondé, halting transport between the north and south of the country. Public transportation vehicles remain stranded, further deepening the area’s economic paralysis. As citizen patrols take to the streets, the population remains anxious, fearing an imminent clash between armed gangs and the local self-defense groups demanding state intervention.

U.S. Exposes TikTok Accounts of Haitian Gang Leaders in Digital Pressure Campaign

On October 3, 2025, the United States released a statement on Haiti’s worsening security situation that included screenshots from the alleged TikTok accounts of gang leaders Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier and Lanmò San Jou, head of the 400 Mawozo gang. This move, seen as a subtle but deliberate diplomatic signal, underscores Washington’s growing use of digital intelligence to counter gang influence. By publicizing these images, U.S. authorities are warning both the gang leaders and their online followers that their digital activities are being closely monitored. Social media platforms long used as tools of propaganda, intimidation, and recruitment have now become evidence of the gangs’ exposure to international scrutiny.

The statement also condemned the gangs’ false portrayal of themselves as peace-seeking actors while continuing to commit killings, property destruction, and widespread destabilization. It denounced their use of women and children as human shields and reaffirmed support for the newly formed Gang Suppression Force (FRG), a joint operational unit between the Haitian National Police and international partners. Backed by UN Security Council Resolution 2793 (2025), the FRG will receive steady funding, trained personnel, and robust authority to combat armed groups. By revealing the gang leaders’ social media presence without direct confrontation, Washington signaled that the fight against Haiti’s insecurity now extends beyond the streets—into the digital space where influence and perception are equally strategic.

U.S. Calls on Haiti’s Transitional Council to Present Clear Electoral Roadmap Amid Heightened Pressure

The United States has intensified its diplomatic pressure on Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), urging its members to move beyond rhetoric and deliver a concrete political and electoral plan. During a public discussion on October 4, 2025, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Henry T. Wooster, joined by Senior Adviser Mike Hankey, emphasized that “political positions are not for life,” calling on the CPT and other officials to present a transparent timeline for elections and an orderly transition of power. Speaking from Port-au-Prince following his return from Washington, Wooster made clear that the U.S. expects the Haitian leadership to “fulfill their role by providing Haitians with the opportunity to elect their leaders for the first time since 2016.”

Wooster’s remarks came days after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2793 (2025), authorizing the creation of the Gang Suppression Force (FRG) and the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (BANUH). The Chargé d’Affaires highlighted that this decision represents a major advancement in international support for Haiti’s security and governance challenges. The newly authorized 5,500-member multinational force, composed of troops and police from several contributing nations, will work alongside the Haitian National Police (PNH) to dismantle armed groups that have terrorized communities and paralyzed national institutions. Wooster reiterated that this initiative is not just about restoring order but about “taking Haiti’s future back from the hands of terrorists.”

In closing, the U.S. diplomat stressed that Haiti must take the lead in resolving its intertwined political and security crises, noting that the current instability has regional consequences extending beyond its borders. He affirmed that Washington stands ready to collaborate closely with the CPT, the Haitian government, and international partners to operationalize the Gang Suppression Force as swiftly as possible. “We are encouraged,” Wooster said, “to see a growing coalition of voices across the Americas and beyond standing with the Haitian people.” His comments signal that the United States expects tangible progress, not only in restoring security but also in advancing toward credible, democratic governance.

U.S. Urges Swift Deployment of U.N.-Backed Gang Suppression Force in Haiti

The United States is pushing for the rapid deployment of the newly authorized U.N. Gang Suppression Force (FRG), approved by the Security Council on October 2, 2025, as part of an international strategy to stabilize Haiti. Michael Hankey, Communications Adviser at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, said that Washington’s intention is for “a very rapid deployment,” while acknowledging that implementation will depend on coordination among participating countries, including Canada, Kenya, El Salvador, Guatemala, and The Bahamas, identified as part of the permanent partner group.

While the urgency reflects the deteriorating security situation, experts caution that a “very rapid deployment” could face logistical and operational challenges. Haiti’s limited infrastructure, ongoing gang control of key roadways, and the lack of secure supply routes could complicate the arrival and movement of personnel and equipment. Additionally, the rapid insertion of multinational forces without full integration with Haitian National Police (PNH) command structures may risk confusion, duplication of efforts, or even operational friction. There are also concerns about the readiness of troop contingents, rules of engagement, and the mission’s ability to maintain a unified command under U.N. oversight.

The FRG follows the transition from the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM), which began operations in mid-2024. The new force, authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, is expected to consist of approximately 5,500 personnel with combined police and military components specializing in urban combat and stabilization. Its primary objectives will be to neutralize gang networks, protect critical infrastructure, and support Haitian law enforcement operations. However, questions persist about troop sustainment, the duration of deployment, and the long-term political framework for restoring security governance once the mission concludes.

The United States has also escalated its campaign against organized crime by designating Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), a move that enables financial sanctions and international cooperation targeting these groups. Hankey reaffirmed that the U.S. will maintain an aggressive public information campaign to expose the destructive effects of gang violence and to promote reward programs for information leading to the capture of Haiti’s most wanted criminals.

U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Henry T. Wooster said the mission would operate under a “stronger and more flexible mandate,” emphasizing that success will rely heavily on logistics. He described the U.N. Support Office (UNSO) as the “cornerstone” of operational capacity, responsible for armored vehicle support, resupply chains, and the establishment of forward operating bases at key strategic points such as airports, ports, and energy facilities. However, analysts note that the effectiveness of the UNSO will depend on timely funding commitments, coordination among diverse troop-contributing nations, and the security of transportation corridors that remain contested by heavily armed groups.

Wooster urged regional partners to contribute personnel and political backing, describing the crisis in Haiti as “the gravest in the Western Hemisphere.” He warned that the very survival of the Haitian state is at stake, citing the collapse of governance and the spread of lawlessness. Despite Washington’s confidence that hemispheric cooperation through the OAS and CARICOM will bolster the mission, significant uncertainties remain over command unity, force protection measures, and the broader question of how to transition from international intervention to sustainable Haitian-led security.

Haiti Expands Police Recruitment Amid Deep Gaps and High Attrition

On October 5, Haiti launched the 35th class of the National Police (PNH) with 892 new cadets, the largest intake in years, during a ceremony attended by the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), senior government officials, and diplomatic representatives from the United States and Canada. The United States reaffirmed its support for training recruits to strengthen Haiti’s response to violent gangs, noting that it has financed and assisted three previous classes of 700 to 750 cadets each.

While this expansion represents progress, it must be considered within the context of Haiti’s severe law enforcement shortfall. The PNH currently has roughly 15,500 officers, including about 1,700 women, equating to around 1.3 officers per 1,000 inhabitants. For a population of approximately 11 to 12 million, Haiti would require at least 22,000 to 24,000 officers to meet the international minimum standard of two officers per 1,000 citizens. Comparable nations such as Costa Rica, Panama, and Jamaica maintain police-to-population ratios above this threshold, supported by higher budgets, retention incentives, and better institutional capacity.

Haiti’s need is more urgent due to the scale of insecurity and gang control across Port-au-Prince and other urban centers. Unlike many countries in the region, large sections of Haiti’s capital remain beyond full government authority, and its police officers face extreme risks. Gangs routinely target law enforcement personnel, resulting in numerous casualties each year. Attrition rates remain high as officers resign, flee the country, or simply abandon their posts because of low pay, exhaustion, and lack of protection. In some recent periods, hundreds of officers have resigned within months, citing threats to their lives, financial hardship, and disillusionment with leadership.

In addition to violent targeting, the Haitian National Police suffers from morale and management challenges. Many officers believe their efforts are undervalued and that promotions are driven by political or personal influence rather than performance. Others describe a lack of adequate equipment, vehicles, and communication systems that limits their operational effectiveness. The combination of under-resourcing and personal risk creates a cycle of burnout and departure that undermines force stability.

The addition of nearly 900 new recruits is therefore a welcome step, but it is not sufficient to reverse Haiti’s policing crisis. To approach even the lower end of acceptable ratios, the country must double its current active strength and sustain annual recruitment at this scale for several consecutive years. Recruitment alone will not be enough; retention, welfare, medical care and professionalization must be central to reform. Policies to strengthen the PNH should include improved salaries, housing assistance, medical coverage, and support for families of officers killed in service.

According to Halo Solutions Firm S.A., meaningful progress will depend on transforming the PNH into a professional, resilient institution capable of maintaining a national presence. This will require stronger leadership, consistent international partnership, and credible efforts to protect officers in the field. Haiti’s law enforcement challenges are structural and long-term, but the 35th class marks a small, necessary step toward rebuilding public confidence and reasserting the rule of law across the country.

Haiti’s Health System on the Brink as Violence Forces Closure of Most Facilities in Port-au-Prince

Port-au-Prince is facing a catastrophic health crisis as escalating violence between armed groups and security forces has forced the closure of most medical facilities across the capital. According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), between 60% and 80% of Port-au-Prince’s hospitals and clinics are now closed or non-operational, leaving millions without access to essential healthcare. Nearly two out of every five Haitians are estimated to be in urgent need of medical attention.

Between January and June 2025 alone, MSF reported treating 13,300 emergency patients, 2,600 survivors of sexual violence, and nearly 2,300 people injured in violent incidents. Alarmingly, children now represent 26% of all victims of violence, more than double the proportion recorded in 2024, with many suffering from gunshot wounds. MSF’s Head of Mission in Haiti, Mumuza Muhindo Musubaho, warned that civilians, including women and children, face daily danger and increasing barriers to reaching the few hospitals still functioning.

Fear of traveling through gang-controlled neighborhoods has become a major deterrent for those seeking treatment. Nearly one in five patients interviewed by MSF said they avoided public transport entirely to prevent being targeted. Meanwhile, repeated armed attacks, looting, and the mass departure of medical personnel have crippled the health network. The MSF trauma hospital in Tabarre has increased its capacity by 50%, yet it remains overwhelmed, with over a quarter of emergency cases linked to violence. The University Hospital of Peace is now the only major public hospital still operating in the capital and is frequently pushed beyond capacity.

The collapse of Port-au-Prince’s health infrastructure has deepened a sense of despair among residents and exhausted the few humanitarian and medical organizations still active in Haiti. As MSF notes, the scale of need now far exceeds available resources, leaving even the most experienced responders feeling overwhelmed by the magnitude of the crisis.

Citizens of Léogâne Unite to Support Local Security and the National Police

In a remarkable show of civic engagement, hundreds of residents of Léogâne gathered peacefully on Monday to express their strong support for the Haitian National Police (PNH) and their determination to preserve local security. The population mobilized around the city’s main streets to voice their desire to keep the area’s only armored vehicle stationed locally, emphasizing its importance in protecting communities from gang incursions.

Residents, carrying signs and tree branches as symbols of unity and resilience, explained that the armored vehicle has played a vital role in maintaining order and deterring armed attacks in several neighborhoods surrounding Léogâne. “This vehicle represents safety for our families,” said one participant, referring to the PNH’s successful efforts to prevent violence from reaching the city. The peaceful gathering reflected both gratitude toward the local police and the population’s wish to ensure that security resources remain where they are most needed.

The movement coincides with renewed efforts by the government to strengthen national security. Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé and CPT advisor Leslie Voltaire recently announced the graduation of nearly 900 new police cadets who will soon reinforce the PNH’s presence across the country. Citizens of Léogâne welcomed this initiative, seeing it as an opportunity to expand security coverage beyond the capital while reinforcing cooperation between the police and local communities.

Despite ongoing challenges linked to arms trafficking and instability in parts of the country, Léogâne’s citizens demonstrated calm determination and a collective spirit. Their message was clear: with the right support and coordination, Haitian communities can play a key role in restoring peace and trust in public institutions. The solidarity shown in Léogâne stands as a positive example of civic responsibility and collaboration between the population and law enforcement in pursuit of a safer Haiti.

OCHA Sounds Alarm as Gender-Based Violence Surges in Haiti

Haiti is facing an alarming rise in sexual and gender-based violence, with more than 6,400 cases reported between January and August 2025, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Of these cases, nearly 3,200 were rapes, meaning that, on average, at least one person is assaulted every two hours. The report also reveals that 15% of victims are minors, highlighting the devastating toll on Haiti’s most vulnerable populations.

Armed groups are responsible for roughly three-quarters of all documented assaults, with displaced persons accounting for 70% of victims. The majority of cases have been concentrated in the West Department, particularly in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where widespread insecurity has left communities exposed to violence and without adequate protection. The situation has been compounded by the breakdown of social services and the closure of medical centers due to insecurity.

Access to emergency care remains critically low. Only one in four rape survivors has been able to receive medical assistance within the vital 72-hour window necessary for post-exposure treatment and prevention, while another quarter have waited more than a month for help. These delays are driven by fear, stigma, lack of transportation, and the near-collapse of local health networks.

The UN and its humanitarian partners continue to provide essential services, including emergency medical care, psychosocial support, legal aid, and temporary shelter for survivors. However, OCHA warns that the national response remains severely underfunded. Of the 19 million U.S. dollars requested for programs addressing gender-based violence in 2025, less than 20% has been received. Without urgent international support, thousands of women and girls will remain without access to lifesaving services and protection.

Major Road Blocked in Artibonite as Residents Demand Action Against Savien Gang

On Monday, October 6, 2025, traffic along National Highway No. 1 (RN1) was completely paralyzed in the Pont-Sondé area of the Artibonite Department, where residents took to the streets to demand immediate government action against the Savien gang. Protesters, visibly determined, blocked the road and vowed to continue their movement until authorities neutralize the group and respond to their grievances, as they did earlier in the Raboto area.

The Savien gang, also known locally as Baz Gran Grif, is one of the most violent criminal organizations operating in the Artibonite Valley. Based in the commune of Savien, near Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite, the group has maintained control over major transportation corridors and rural communities for several years. It is led by Wilkens “Ti Mepri” Louissaint, a gang leader known for orchestrating kidnappings, extortion, and attacks on police patrols and civilians. The gang has also been linked to the Viv Ansanm coalition, which coordinates criminal operations across several regions, including the Artibonite and the capital, Port-au-Prince.

Residents of Pont-Sondé and neighboring communities say the gang’s presence has made daily life unbearable, with widespread fear, frequent armed clashes, and the disruption of trade and agriculture in one of Haiti’s most productive regions. “We can no longer travel safely or send our children to school,” said one protester, expressing frustration at the government’s slow response to the growing insecurity.

Protesters warned that no vehicles would be allowed to pass through the Artibonite toward the North, Northeast, Northwest, or Central departments until the Savien gang is dismantled. They also threatened to close all local government offices if the authorities fail to act. The demonstration reflects the deepening public anger over the state’s inability to contain gang violence, as communities across Haiti demand stronger protection and a more coordinated security response.

Haiti Announces Construction of Three Major Prisons as Part of National Security and Justice Reform Plan

During the official opening of the 2025–2026 judicial year on Monday, October 6, 2025, Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé announced the government’s plan to construct three new large-scale prisons capable of housing up to 15,000 inmates. Speaking in his dual role as Prime Minister and acting Minister of Justice and Public Security, Fils-Aimé stated that the initiative is a central element of the administration’s strategy to confront the ongoing security crisis, which he characterized as an urgent national emergency.

The announcement was made during a ceremony at the Court of Cassation in Champ-de-Mars, Port-au-Prince, marking the beginning of the judicial year. Fils-Aimé explained that these new penitentiary facilities will be built in different regions of the country to ease chronic overcrowding in existing detention centers and improve prisoner management. While specific sites were not officially confirmed, government sources have previously indicated potential construction zones near Cabaret (Ouest Department), Hinche (Centre Department), and Fort-Liberté (Nord-Est Department), locations selected for their strategic accessibility, available land, and proximity to judicial districts lacking adequate correctional infrastructure.

The Prime Minister also detailed broader reforms intended to modernize Haiti’s justice system, including the creation of specialized judicial units, new jurisdictions in Ouanaminthe and Limbé, and the appointment of approximately fifty new prosecutors to reduce case backlogs and accelerate judicial processing. These measures come amid longstanding concerns about prison conditions in Haiti, where facilities operate at nearly triple their designed capacity and thousands of detainees remain in prolonged pretrial detention.

Fils-Aimé emphasized that the prison construction project aligns with his government’s broader effort to restore law and order through institutional reform and reinforced security operations. This includes coordination with the newly authorized Gang Suppression Force, which is replacing the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) as part of an expanded initiative to dismantle criminal networks and reestablish state authority across the country.