Weekly Report December 09 to December 16 2025

Planned Multinational Security Force for Haiti: OAS Confirms Commitments From 18 Countries

The Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Albert Ramdin, announced on Friday that eighteen countries have committed to contributing security personnel to a new multinational force intended to support anti-gang operations in Haiti. This initiative is expected to replace the current UN-supported multinational security mission, which has produced mixed operational results since its deployment.

According to Ramdin, the proposed force will operate under a unified regulatory and command framework, a requirement that has contributed to delays in finalizing the mission’s structure. He emphasized that interoperability, standardized rules of engagement, and common operating procedures are central to the design of the force.

The planned deployment is expected to reach a total strength of approximately 5,500 personnel, consistent with a roadmap developed with significant involvement from the United States. The force is envisioned as a phased deployment rather than a single surge, allowing for gradual scaling and coordination with Haitian authorities.

Ramdin visited Haiti earlier this week and described the security situation as grave. Armed criminal groups continue to conduct killings, sexual violence, kidnappings, and widespread looting, exploiting weak state institutions and longstanding political instability. Haiti remains the poorest country in the Americas and continues to face severe humanitarian and governance challenges.

The country has not held national elections in nine years and is currently governed by transitional authorities. These authorities have recently announced plans to organize legislative and presidential elections in the summer of 2026, contingent on improvements in security and administrative capacity.

Ramdin noted that while his movements during the visit were limited, his ability to travel to Port-au-Prince demonstrated that the transitional government remains operational and retains a degree of institutional control in the capital.

Deployment of the new multinational force is expected to occur in stages. An initial contingent of approximately 1,000 security personnel could deploy as early as January, subject to final logistical and political conditions. Roughly half of the total force is projected to be deployed by April 1, 2025, coinciding with the planned establishment of a United Nations office to provide coordination and support functions for the mission.

African countries are expected to play a prominent role in the force, alongside contributions from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Several Latin American countries have also indicated their willingness to participate, reflecting a broad, though complex, multinational commitment.

In parallel, Kenya recently deployed an additional contingent of approximately 100 police officers to Haiti as part of the existing international security mission. Despite these reinforcements, assessments to date indicate that the current mission has achieved limited and uneven results, underscoring the challenges of restoring security in a highly fragmented and gang-dominated operating environment.

Haiti: Security Deployment and Electoral Milestones Timeline (2024–2026)

October 2023

• United Nations Security Council authorizes the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS/MSSM).

• Mission framework established to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) in counter-gang operations.

June 2024

• Initial MSS/MSSM deployment begins under Kenyan leadership.

• Early operational focused on securing critical infrastructure and limited urban areas in Port-au-Prince.

• Operational impact assessed as constrained by force size, mandate limitations, and persistent gang control.

December 2025

• OAS Secretary General Albert Ramdin confirms commitments from 18 countries to participate in a new multinational security force intended to replace the current mission.

• Planned force strength announced at approximately 5,500 personnel.

• Deployment roadmap aligned with U.S.-led planning and international coordination mechanisms.

January 2026 (Projected)

• Initial deployment phase of approximately 1,000 security personnel, subject to final political, logistical, and regulatory approvals.

• Objective: reinforce security presence, stabilize priority zones, and prepare for expanded deployment.

• Transitional authorities continue preparatory discussions on electoral sequencing, contingent on security improvements.

April 1, 2026 (Projected)

• Approximately 50 percent of the planned multinational force deployed.

• Establishment of a United Nations coordination office to support command, logistics, and oversight functions.

• Anticipated shift from limited containment operations toward broader territorial stabilization in coordination with HNP.

  
  

Mid–Late 2026

• Expanded multinational security footprint expected across key urban corridors and selected provincial areas.

• Security gains, if realized, intended to enable voter registration planning, electoral logistics assessments, and limited political mobilization.

• Transitional authorities expected to formalize an electoral calendar, pending security benchmarks.

  
  

Early 2026

• Target period for near-full operational capacity of the multinational force, depending on troop contributions and sustainment.

• Focus on maintaining security conditions necessary for nationwide electoral operations, including campaign activities and polling logistics.

  
  

Summer 2026 (Announced Objective)

• Legislative and presidential elections planned by transitional authorities.

• Elections contingent upon minimum security thresholds, functional electoral administration, and sustained international support.

• Multinational force expected to provide indirect security support, while primary responsibility remains with Haitian institutions.

  
  

Analytical Note (Non-Attributional)

The success of the electoral timeline is structurally dependent on sustained improvements in security, force interoperability, and Haitian institutional capacity. Delays in deployment, fragmentation of command structures, or insufficient force density would likely impact the feasibility of elections within the announced timeframe.

Gang Suppression Force Accelerates: Broad International Commitments and Haiti’s First Financial Contribution Signal Shift Toward Elections

At a high-level meeting to operationalize the Gang Suppression Force held on December 9, 2025, at the Canadian Mission to the United Nations, participating states announced substantial troop, capability, and financial commitments to reinforce international security support to Haiti. Multiple countries pledged military, engineering, and police personnel, with the strongest contributions coming from African partners. Chad offered up to 1,500 soldiers, alongside commitments from Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Burundi, Bangladesh, and others. Kenya confirmed continued participation to ensure a full transition to the new force, which will be predominantly military in composition and is expected to include mobile ground units, an air component, and maritime capabilities.

Key financial support was also confirmed. Canada committed an additional USD 40 million to the trust fund, alongside personnel contributions and an enhanced focus on the protection of women and youth. The United States reiterated increased political and operational backing, emphasizing the active and offensive nature of the mission. The Dominican Republic pledged support valued at approximately USD 10 million and confirmed continued access to its hospital facilities for medical evacuations. Collectively, new pledges are expected to provide more than 3,500 additional personnel as part of a broader force planned at approximately 5,500 members.

For the first time, the Republic of Haiti will make a direct financial contribution to an international security mission supporting operations on its territory, estimated at USD 50 million, partially in kind. Participants underscored that the Gang Suppression Force is not a traditional peacekeeping operation but a targeted effort against organized armed groups. A clear consensus emerged that restoring public security is a prerequisite for organizing credible elections and returning to constitutional order, alongside parallel efforts to strengthen the Haitian National Police, advance disarmament initiatives, and expand youth reintegration programs.

International partners characterized the current mobilization as unprecedented, inviting states to finalize commitments by February 2026. In parallel diplomatic engagements, leaders reaffirmed that sustained international coordination, under joint U.S. and Canadian leadership, is essential to securing territory, restoring state authority, and enabling the electoral process. The Gang Suppression Force, established by a UN Security Council resolution in October 2025 with a twelve-month mandate and a UN support office for logistics and financing, is intended to create the security conditions necessary for elections planned for 2026, while Haiti advances police recruitment, infrastructure rehabilitation, and force modernization to ensure durable stabilization.

European Union Imposes Targeted Sanctions on Former Haitian Officials and Criminal Group

The European Union has imposed new sanctions on former Haitian President Joseph Michel Martelly, as well as former senators Youri Latortue and Rony Célestin, for violations of human rights. The individuals are accused of having armed and financed criminal gangs for political purposes.

According to a statement issued by the Council of the European Union on December 15, 2025, former parliamentarian Rony Célestin, who has previously been implicated in criminal and smuggling activities, is also described as being “responsible for orchestrating the murder of journalist Nehemie Joseph, who had exposed his illegal activities and acts of corruption.”

The sanctions also target the criminal gang known as 5 Segond, based in Village-de-Dieu, Port-au-Prince. This group is linked to a range of criminal activities, including theft, rape, kidnapping, murder, piracy, extortion, obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and trafficking in arms and narcotics.

The Council of the European Union specified that the designated individuals and entities are subject to an asset freeze. “It is prohibited for persons and entities within the European Union to make funds, financial assets, or economic resources available to them, either directly or indirectly,” the statement noted. In addition, the sanctioned individuals are subject to a travel ban within European Union member states.

The Council further recalled that Michel Martelly and former parliamentarians Youri Latortue and Rony Célestin had previously been sanctioned by the United States and Canada for their alleged involvement in criminal activities and corruption in Haiti.

Analytical Assessment: Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions on Haitian Criminal Gangs

Based on comparative research, open-source reporting, and long-term field observation in Haiti, Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that targeted international sanctions have limited practical impact on Haitian criminal gangs and do not materially degrade their operational capacity, leadership structures, or territorial control.

This assessment applies equally to recent European Union sanctions, including the December 2025 designation of the 5 Segond gang based in Village-de-Dieu, Port-au-Prince. While the designation reflects international acknowledgment of the group’s role in serious criminal activity, available evidence suggests it is unlikely to result in measurable operational disruption absent parallel domestic enforcement actions.

Haitian gangs operate almost exclusively within a cash-based, informal, and localized economy. Their revenue streams are locally generated and typically derived from kidnapping for ransom, extortion, territorial taxation, fuel diversion, port-related theft, and control of informal trade corridors. As a result, asset freezes and financial prohibitions imposed by external jurisdictions, including those applied by the European Union against 5 Segond, do not significantly affect gang liquidity or financial resilience.

Sanctions mechanisms are most effective when targets rely on international banking systems, regulated trade, or cross-border commercial structures. These conditions are largely absent in the operational model of Haitian gangs, including 5 Segond.

Supporting sources:United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in the CaribbeanInternational Crisis Group, Haiti’s Gangs: Financing, Arms, and Territorial ControlGlobal Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Crime and the Informal Economy in Fragile States

Sanctions have minimal effect on arms procurement and logistical sustainment for Haitian gangs. Weapons, ammunition, fuel, and communications equipment are typically obtained through informal regional trafficking routes, diversion from domestic stockpiles, or illicit maritime and land-based supply chains. These networks operate independently of sanctioned jurisdictions and are not reliant on regulated financial intermediaries.

The European Union’s designation of 5 Segond does not materially constrain these supply chains, as the group’s logistical ecosystem is primarily domestic and regional, functioning outside formal markets subject to EU regulatory reach.

Supporting sources:UN Panel of Experts on Haiti, Final Reports on Arms Trafficking and Security ConditionsSmall Arms Survey, Firearms and Armed Violence in HaitiCaribbean Financial Action Task Force, Illicit Flows and Informal Trade Networks

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. finds no consistent evidence that international sanctions alter the behavior, authority, or internal cohesion of Haitian gang leadership. Leaders of groups such as 5 Segond rarely maintain assets, residency, or travel patterns linked to European Union member states. Consequently, travel bans and asset freezes have limited deterrent or coercive value.

In some cases, public designation may unintentionally elevate a gang’s domestic profile, reinforcing perceptions of power or resilience within controlled neighborhoods rather than diminishing local influence.

Supporting sources:International Peace Institute, Sanctions and Armed Groups in Fragile StatesUN Development Programme, Governance Vacuums and Criminal Authority

The effectiveness of sanctions is fundamentally constrained by weak domestic enforcement capacity. Without arrests, prosecutions, asset seizures, or sustained security operations inside Haiti, international sanctions, including those targeting 5 Segond, do not translate into operational pressure on the ground. Sanctions are not self-enforcing and depend on complementary national and regional law enforcement action, which remains structurally limited in the Haitian context.

Supporting sources:UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Security and Rule of Law ReportsWorld Bank, Institutional Fragility and Violence in Haiti

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. concludes that targeted sanctions against Haitian criminal gangs, including the European Union’s recent designation of the 5 Segond gang, function primarily as diplomatic and signaling instruments. They do not materially affect gang financing, armament, leadership decision-making, or territorial dominance. Absent coordinated domestic law enforcement action, judicial capacity, regional arms interdiction, and sustained security operations, sanctions alone remain insufficient as an effective gang suppression tool in Haiti.

Ballistic Impact on Dominican Republic–Registered Piper Aircraft

On 14 December 2025, a Piper aircraft bearing registration HI944, which is registered in the Dominican Republic under the authority of the Instituto Dominicano de Aviación Civil (IDAC), sustained damage consistent with a suspected ballistic impact. Photographic evidence shows a puncture and localized deformation on the airframe. Reporting indicates that the affected area corresponds to the location of the fuel bladder on this aircraft type, which raises immediate airworthiness and safety concerns due to the potential risk of fuel leakage, internal structural compromise, or latent damage not visible during a cursory inspection.

According to the information provided, the aircraft departed Port au Prince from Runway 10, used most of the runway prior to liftoff, and immediately turned north, flying over the Croix des Bouquets area at an altitude assessed to be below 1,000 feet. At the time of departure, a police operation was reportedly ongoing in that area. Standard risk mitigation procedures commonly employed by operators in Port au Prince involve conducting a wide right 360-degree maneuver while climbing and crossing the runway, with the objective of reaching an altitude above 2,000 feet prior to entering designated red zones. In this instance, the pilot reportedly did not follow that protocol, resulting in extended low-altitude exposure over a known high-risk area.

The suspected damage was identified after the aircraft landed in Cap Haïtien following the Port au Prince departure on the morning of 14 December 2025. Despite the discovery of the damage, the aircraft was subsequently flown again from Cap Haïtien to Port au Prince with passengers onboard. Continued passenger operations following the identification of suspected ballistic damage, particularly in proximity to the fuel bladder, introduce elevated safety and duty-of-care concerns if a comprehensive inspection and formal release to service by certified maintenance personnel did not occur prior to departure.

The aircraft has been locally confirmed as part of the fleet operated by Trogon Airways, a Haiti-based domestic operator that has recently entered the local aviation market. While operational control is attributed to Trogon Airways, the aircraft itself is not Haitian-registered. Registration confirms the aircraft is Dominican Republic registered and therefore subject to IDAC oversight for registration, airworthiness, and continuing maintenance requirements. Any commercial passenger operations conducted outside the Dominican Republic would normally require appropriate operational permissions, insurance coverage, and coordination with the relevant host-state civil aviation authority.

This incident occurred within a broader security environment in which aviation operations in and around Port au Prince remain subject to elevated risk due to ongoing law enforcement activity and the presence of armed groups in surrounding areas. Low-altitude departures and routing decisions in such conditions materially increase exposure to ground-based fire and misidentification risk, underscoring the importance of strict adherence to established threat-mitigation flight procedures.

Aircraft Ground Collision at Cap-Haïtien International Airport, 12 December 2025

On December 12, 2025, a ground collision occurred on the runway at Cap-Haïtien International Airport involving an aircraft operated by Trogon Airways and an aircraft operated by HAS Airlines. No serious injuries were reported among flight crews or ground personnel. Material damage to the aircraft was reported.

Preliminary information and witness accounts indicate that the incident occurred during ground movement operations, specifically during taxiing and aircraft positioning on the runway or ramp area. Available information suggests that standard ground coordination and traffic management procedures were not effectively executed at the time of the incident. The aircraft involved were reportedly maneuvering in a constrained area of the airfield when the collision occurred.

The aircraft operated by Trogon Airways had recently been authorized to conduct operations in Haiti. Details regarding the scope, timing, and conditions of this authorization have not yet been publicly clarified. Both aircraft were reportedly under the guidance of airport ground personnel during taxi and parking operations.

The incident follows an increase in aircraft activity at Cap-Haïtien International Airport in recent months, as the airport has served as a primary hub for domestic and limited international operations. This increased activity has placed additional operational demands on airport infrastructure, air traffic coordination, and ground handling services.

The National Airports Authority (AAN) and the National Civil Aviation Office (OFNAC) are the competent authorities responsible for airport operations and civil aviation oversight, respectively. As of this report, no official determination of cause has been issued. Any assessment regarding human factors, training levels, regulatory compliance, or authorization processes remains subject to formal investigation by the relevant authorities.

This incident underscores the importance of effective ground movement coordination, clear communication between flight crews and airport personnel, and adherence to established civil aviation procedures, particularly in environments experiencing increased traffic density. Further information is expected following completion of the official investigation and release of findings by the appropriate aviation authorities.

PNH Increases Security Measures Following Intelligence Warning of Potential Threats to IDP Sites in Port-au-Prince

The Haitian National Police (PNH) has received information from its intelligence services indicating a potential threat targeting camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Port-au-Prince, with particular concern for sites located in the Bois-Verna area. The reported threat involves the possible use of improvised incendiary devices and explosives in the coming days.

In response to this information, the PNH has initiated immediate precautionary measures. Security deployments have been reinforced, and heightened vigilance has been implemented in and around IDP camps to deter any hostile actions and ensure the protection of displaced populations.

Armed Group Activity in Montrouis: Canaan Gangs, Civilian Killing, and Expanding Security Risks Along National Route 1

Armed groups commonly referred to as the Canaan gangs, currently operating in and around the Montrouis area, continue to pose a significant security threat to local communities and transit corridors. These groups enforce control through violence and intimidation and operate outside any formal legal framework. Their activities are increasingly concentrated along the Arcahaie–Montrouis–Saint-Marc corridor, a strategically important section of National Route 1 linking Port-au-Prince with the Artibonite department.

Earlier this week, a serious incident attributed to these armed groups resulted in the killing of Marie-Ange Legrand, a 25-year-old civilian employed as a cleaning staff member at the Arcahaie police station. According to available reporting, she was abducted while traveling toward Saint-Marc to cash a check. Her body was later discovered burned near the public high school in Montrouis. The incident has generated widespread concern and underscores the heightened vulnerability of civilians traveling through the area.

The term “Canaan gangs” does not refer to a single unified organization but rather to multiple armed factions that originated in or around the Canaan settlement north of Port-au-Prince and have since expanded westward. These groups operate through decentralized command structures, with control exercised locally over specific neighborhoods, road segments, and access points. Alliances among these factions remain fluid and subject to frequent change.

Open-source reporting and field observations most frequently associate Jeff “Gwo Lwa” Larose with armed group activity originating from the Canaan zone. He is commonly cited in connection with kidnapping, extortion, and territorial control along National Route 1. In addition to this figure, multiple mid-level commanders reportedly oversee localized operations, though their identities are less consistently documented due to ongoing fragmentation, internal disputes, and shifting leadership dynamics.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that the expansion of Canaan-based gangs into the Montrouis–Arcahaie–Saint-Marc axis has been facilitated by limited state presence, constrained law-enforcement capacity, and the economic and logistical importance of the corridor. The area serves as a critical route for passenger travel, fuel distribution, and commercial goods moving between Port-au-Prince and northern departments. Armed group activity in this zone has included kidnappings for ransom, extortion of transport operators, armed checkpoints, targeted killings, and disruption of civilian and commercial movement.

As of this reporting, no official information has been released regarding arrests or enforcement actions related to the killing of Marie-Ange Legrand. The incident highlights the continued geographic expansion of armed group activity beyond Port-au-Prince and the growing exposure of civilians and public-sector workers to violence in contested and under-secured areas.

Leadership attribution within the Canaan gangs remains fluid and subject to rapid change. Arrests, territorial shifts, and internal disputes regularly alter command structures. Any identification of individuals should therefore be considered indicative rather than definitive and reflective of reporting at the time of assessment.

U.S. Justice Department Secures Conviction in International Firearms Trafficking Case

On December 11, 2025, the United States Department of Justice announced the conviction and sentencing of Jonathan Rafael Ortega Martinez in connection with an international firearms trafficking conspiracy. Ortega Martinez was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison for his role in smuggling more than 1,000 illegal firearms from Florida to the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The case was prosecuted in federal court and represents a significant enforcement action targeting illicit weapons flows in the Caribbean region.

The investigation and prosecution were conducted through a coordinated effort involving the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and INTERPOL, among other partners. U.S. authorities stated that the case underscores their commitment to working with regional and international counterparts to combat transnational crime, disrupt illegal arms trafficking networks, and support broader efforts to enhance regional security, including for Haiti.

Viv Ansanm as a Political Actor: Analytical Observations on Recent International Crisis Group Reporting

A recent report published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) examines how Haiti’s dominant gang coalition, Viv Ansanm, is increasingly using populist rhetoric, historical symbolism, and digital communication to present itself as a political interlocutor rather than solely a criminal organization. The report argues that the coalition, publicly led by Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, is seeking political recognition, dialogue with authorities, and ultimately protection from prosecution, including amnesty. Observations by Halo Solutions Firm S.A. broadly align with this framing, particularly regarding the shift from localized criminal activity toward coordinated actions aimed at influencing state authority and national-level political dynamics.

The report offers a useful contribution by highlighting that the current threat environment extends beyond street-level violence to include efforts to contest state legitimacy and shape public narratives. It situates gang behavior within Haiti’s prolonged political transition and institutional weakness, noting how armed groups exploit governance vacuums to reposition themselves as alternative power centers. The focus on messaging, symbolism, and claims of social justice reflects an observable pattern in which armed groups seek to normalize their presence, reduce local resistance, and create space for dialogue or negotiation.

At the same time, several analytical limitations warrant caution. Coalition coherence may be overstated, as Viv Ansanm remains a fluid alliance of factions with varying interests and discipline levels. Messaging attributed to the coalition can reflect the objectives of individual leaders rather than a unified strategy. In addition, populist outreach activities, such as limited distribution of resources or symbolic service provision, do not necessarily indicate genuine political transformation; in Haiti’s context, such actions often function as tactical tools to manage local compliance and stabilize revenue or recruitment.

While the report correctly identifies amnesty as a central objective underlying gang messaging, it is less clear whether this reflects a sustained political project or short-term survival calculations driven by law-enforcement pressure and international sanctions. Without demonstrable pathways translating rhetoric into institutional influence, such as measurable control over political processes or administrative structures, the practical impact of this repositioning remains uncertain.

Overall, the report provides a timely framework for understanding how armed groups in Haiti are adapting to political uncertainty and attempting to reshape their legitimacy. Its strength lies in identifying narrative warfare and political signaling as emerging risk vectors, while its limitations highlight the need for continued monitoring of operational behavior, alliance stability, and concrete indicators of political penetration before drawing conclusions about long-term transformation.

Fire at Dumornay Public Market Destroys Vendor Livelihoods as Merchants Call for Government Assistance

A major fire swept through the Dumornay Public Market in Delmas 33, a northeastern suburb of Port-au-Prince, between the night of December 10 and the morning of December 11, 2025, destroying dozens of vendor stalls, storage areas, and large quantities of merchandise. The blaze caused extensive material losses for small traders who depend on informal commerce for their livelihoods. As of this reporting, no official cause for the fire has been identified.

According to witnesses, the fire began around 10:00 p.m. and continued to spread into midmorning despite the intervention of firefighting units, which reportedly faced significant access constraints. Vendors cited the market’s narrow corridors and lack of access roads as factors that hindered emergency response. Clothing stalls, food depots, cosmetic workshops, rice warehouses, and other small businesses were completely destroyed. By daylight, the site consisted largely of charred structures, twisted metal, and scattered debris, with isolated areas still smoldering.

In the aftermath, affected merchants issued a public appeal to authorities, requesting urgent assistance and clarity on plans to repair and reopen the market. Vendors stated they had given the government a 72-hour deadline to respond, warning that protests, including possible roadblocks along Delmas Road, could follow if no action is taken. Several merchants noted that this was not the first fire at Dumornay Market and pointed to a broader pattern of recurring market fires across Haiti that leave traders without compensation or recovery support. As of December 11, no government officials had visited the site, issued a public statement, or announced an investigation or damage assessment.

Lequotidien509 Reports on Laurent Saint-Cyr’s Extensive Travel as Debate Grows Over Its Impact on the Transition

According to Lequotidien509, Laurent Saint-Cyr, Counselor-President of Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), has spent a significant portion of his mandate abroad as the transition approaches its scheduled end on February 7, 2026. As of mid-December 2025, more than 70 percent of his 184-day mandate had elapsed, with at least eight official international trips publicly documented, alongside other travel reportedly undertaken without detailed official communication. The outlet notes that Saint-Cyr’s repeated absences often coincided with moments when the CPT was expected to decide on major issues, leaving other members, particularly Leslie Voltaire, to assume decision-making responsibilities amid persistent internal tensions within the Council.

Lequotidien509 reports that the frequency, cost, and transparency of these trips have drawn growing criticism, especially in the context of Haiti’s acute security crisis, stalled electoral process, and deteriorating public services. The publication emphasizes the absence of regular public reporting on the objectives, outcomes, and tangible benefits of these missions, as well as the lack of a clear governance record as the mandate nears its end. In the outlet’s framing, Saint-Cyr’s travel has become a symbol of a transition perceived by many as opaque, externally focused, and disconnected from urgent domestic priorities.

At the same time, observers note that international engagement at the presidential-council level is often defended by supporters as necessary to maintain diplomatic visibility, sustain international attention on Haiti’s security crisis, and preserve external support for stabilization efforts. This perspective, however, is not advanced in Lequotidien509’s reporting and remains part of the broader public debate. As the transition enters its final weeks, the central question remains whether such travel has meaningfully advanced Haiti’s security and governance objectives or whether it will be remembered primarily as a point of contention in an already fragile political process.

Security Forces Conduct Joint Operation in Kafou Konbit Amid Ongoing Insecurity in Kenscoff

On Friday, December 12, 2025, units of the Haitian National Police (PNH) and soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) carried out a joint security operation in Kafou Konbit, within the commune of Kenscoff. According to information released by police authorities, the operation was conducted in response to persistent security concerns in the area linked to the presence and movement of armed groups.

The operation focused on clearing key roadways to enable targeted interventions against armed elements reported in the sector. Several specialized police units were deployed alongside FAd’H personnel. Authorities did not indicate the participation of the Gang Suppression Force (FRG) in this operation. At the time of reporting, no official assessment or operational results had been communicated, although the Police Communications Directorate (DICOP) released images showing joint patrols and coordinated movements by the forces involved.

Police officials stated that the operation forms part of a broader series of actions aimed at reestablishing state control in areas affected by insecurity. Armed groups reportedly entered the commune of Kenscoff in January 2025, and despite multiple operations announced since then, significant portions of the area remain under their influence. The continued presence of these groups has resulted in considerable material damage and civilian casualties, underscoring the ongoing security challenges facing the commune.

Canada and OAS Donate Off-Road Motorcycles to Haitian National Police

On Saturday, December 13, 2025, the Haitian National Police (PNH) received a shipment of off-road motorcycles donated by Canada and the Organization of American States (OAS), according to a statement issued by the police communications directorate. The handover ceremony took place in Tabarre, with the participation of the Director General of the PNH, the Canadian Ambassador to Haiti, and a representative of the OAS. Authorities indicated that the equipment is intended to improve police mobility and enhance operational effectiveness, particularly during field operations.

The donation has prompted public discussion regarding its potential impact. While the PNH already possesses armored vehicles, sustained success against armed gangs remains limited, leading some observers to question how the addition of motorcycles will influence broader security efforts.

Armed Attack in Léogâne: At Least Two Killed in Opak, Including a CASEC Official

An armed attack struck the locality of Opak, in the 7th communal section of Léogâne, on Thursday, December 11, 2025, leaving at least two people dead, including Eugène Cinéaste, a serving CASEC member and a widely respected local figure, according to information provided by residents.

Following the killing of the local elected official, terrorist elements reportedly set fire to his residence. Several other homes were also destroyed during the attack, forcing many farmers to flee their houses and abandon their land to escape the violence.

Léogâne, December 13, 2025. Local residents denounced the absence of an effective response from law enforcement authorities, whom they say have so far been unable to contain the advance of terrorist groups in the area. The attack has heightened fears that Léogâne could fall into broader insecurity, similar to other communes already affected by armed violence.

Since the fall of Gressier in May 2024, the city of Anacaona has remained under sustained pressure. In February 2025, armed elements attempted to advance as far as the locality of Flon before being repelled by the Haitian National Police with support from local brigadiers. Despite that setback, threats have continued through sporadic infiltrations and intimidation messages circulated on social media.

Armed Incidents Near U.S. Embassy Culminate in Kidnapping of Four Minors in Tabarre

On Wednesday, December 10, 2025, an armed group carried out a coordinated kidnapping operation at the former premises of the Capitale Coach Line transport company in Tabarre, directly adjacent to the U.S. Embassy. During the incident, four minors, three boys and one girl were abducted. Authorities have not released the identities of the victims.

The building, which had been vacated several months earlier due to worsening security conditions, was being used as temporary shelter by families displaced by gang-related violence. According to information attributed to a police source, the assailants were initially seeking a specific individual. When that person narrowly escaped during the armed intrusion, the perpetrators seized the four children instead.

The abducted minors are believed to be members of displaced families residing at the site. After the kidnapping, the armed group reportedly withdrew from the area without interference, transporting the victims away in a vehicle convoy.

Police Search Conducted at Residence of Port-au-Prince Mayor Ralph Youri Chevry in Juvenat

On Friday, December 12, an intervention by Haitian judicial and police authorities took place early Friday morning at the residence of Ralph Youri Chevry, Mayor and interim executive agent of Port-au-Prince, located in the Juvenat area on the road leading to Canapé-Vert. The operation occurred between approximately 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. and lasted close to three hours, according to on-site reporting.

According to a statement issued by Mayor Chevry, the operation was carried out by the Government Commissioner of Port-au-Prince, Fritz Patterson Dorval, accompanied by armed personnel from multiple units of the Haitian National Police, including specialized units. Mayor Chevry stated that he was awakened by gunfire during the intervention, during which his dog was shot and killed. He further indicated that no search warrant was presented and that no formal notification explaining the purpose of the operation was provided at the time.

Mayor Chevry reported that one member of his security detail was arrested and later released in Delmas, and that no charges were brought against him during or after the operation. He also stated that several items were removed from the residence, including firearms assigned to his security detail, a Galil AC 22 (Taurus), a T4, and an AR-15, as well as a communication radio, ammunition, and a surveillance drone.

The Mayor referenced Article 24.1 of the 1987 Constitution, which affirms the inviolability of the home, and noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure requires judicial authorization and a warrant for searches. He stated that he cooperated calmly during the operation and that any necessary clarifications would be addressed through legal channels with his counsel.

Separately, local media reported that agents of the Central Directorate of Judicial Police, including members of the BRI, were present at the scene. At the time of reporting, authorities had not publicly issued an official statement detailing the legal basis or objective of the search.

Armed Violence Drives New Displacement as Humanitarian Needs Deepen in Haiti

Armed group violence forced nearly 9,000 people to flee their homes in Haiti’s Ouest and Artibonite departments during November 2025, according to a report released by the International Organization for Migration on December 15. The agency warned that the humanitarian situation continues to worsen nationwide, with more than 1.4 million internally displaced people now spread across 48 sites, many of which are severely overcrowded and lack adequate living conditions.

During the same period, IOM recorded the forced return of 21,938 migrants to Haiti. The organization provided immediate assistance to returnees and displaced populations, including food, potable water, cash support, hygiene kits, shelter assistance for 830 people, and essential non-food items for more than 14,700 individuals. Health and humanitarian services reached nearly 96,000 people, encompassing water, sanitation and hygiene interventions, medical consultations, psychosocial support, protection services, and training for site coordination and management.

Despite these efforts, IOM emphasized that humanitarian coverage remains critically insufficient. Only about 121,760 people, roughly 8 percent of the more than 1.4 million individuals in need, received assistance. The agency is calling on the international community to urgently increase funding and scale up its response to match the severity and scope of Haiti’s ongoing displacement and humanitarian crisis.

AAN Reports Major Advances in Rehabilitation of Antoine Simon Airport

The National Airport Authority announced on December 15 significant progress in the rehabilitation of Antoine Simon International Airport in Les Cayes, confirming that the works are nearing completion and are intended to enable full operational capacity in the short term. The ongoing redevelopment, launched in September 2025, focuses on improving passenger and air traffic flow while awaiting implementation of the airport’s master plan. Key upgrades include the reconfiguration of check-in counters and security screening areas, the creation of dedicated immigration and customs spaces, the establishment of an international boarding lounge and baggage handling area, the development of a VIP lounge, full air-conditioning of the terminal, and the installation of a remote monitoring room to strengthen airport security. The AAN stated that these measures are practically completed and also recalled that the airport recently received approval from the U.S. Transportation Security Administration, authorizing direct flights between Les Cayes and the United States.

In parallel, additional security and infrastructure enhancements are underway, including the construction of a Road Access and Screening Facility, new gatehouses, a technical surveillance room, perimeter fence sealing, lighting installation, and the relocation of Sunrise Airways’ ticketing and cargo operations, with technical studies for tarmac markings still pending finalization. The AAN also reported the completion of tarmac lighting works at Cap-Haïtien International Airport and noted that construction of a secondary helicopter apron is in its final phase. These projects, according to the authority, are part of a broader national effort to modernize airport infrastructure, positioning air transport as a strategic asset amid ongoing insecurity and as a key driver for improving Haiti’s international image and supporting domestic tourism.

UNICEF Supports Community Policing in Haiti Through Japan-Funded Equipment Donation

With financial backing from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Nations Children’s Fund handed over a batch of office equipment and uniforms to Haiti’s Community Police on December 11, 2025. According to UNICEF, the donation is intended to support the daily operations of community police officers and strengthen their operational capacity in the field, with particular emphasis on child protection and community-based policing activities.

UNICEF stated that the initiative reflects its continued commitment to working alongside the Haitian government and national partners to reinforce mechanisms that protect and promote children’s rights. The organization underscored that enhancing community policing is essential to creating a safer environment for children and supporting access to education amid Haiti’s ongoing security challenges. No specific details were disclosed regarding the quantity or financial value of the equipment provided.

HNP Begins Training of First 886 Recruits Under P4000 Force Expansion Initiative

The Haitian National Police has officially launched the training of the first cohort under the P4000 program, a national initiative designed to recruit and train 4,000 new police officers over an 18-month period. According to a statement published on December 15 on the institution’s official communication channels, the initial cohort comprises 886 aspiring officers who have entered the early phases of their training. Authorities indicated that the program is a key component of the national security strategy aimed at strengthening the operational capacity of the HNP and enhancing public safety across the country.

After the first three weeks of instruction, program officials organized exchange sessions with the trainees to assess their feedback on training conditions, course content, and expectations regarding their future roles within the police force. These discussions are intended to support continuous improvement of the training process and ensure that new recruits are adequately prepared to meet the security challenges facing Haiti.