Weekly Report December 30 to January 06, 2026

Haiti’s UN-Mandated Gang Suppression Force: Status of Deployments, Pledged Contributors, and Operational Gaps as of January 2026

As of January 5, 2026, the United Nations–mandated Gang Suppression Force (GSF) remains in a phased deployment and force-generation stage, with a growing but still incomplete roster of contributing countries. The mission is authorized to deploy up to approximately 5,550 uniformed personnel, but actual deployments remain well below that ceiling. Kenya continues to serve as the operational anchor, with several hundred police officers already deployed and engaged in initial operations. Beyond Kenya, a number of states have formally pledged personnel contributions, though many remain pending deployment. Chad has announced one of the largest prospective commitments, reportedly offering up to 1,500 troops, while Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have expressed readiness to deploy units in support roles. Additional African contributors that have publicly indicated participation include Sierra Leone, Burundi, Burkina Faso, and The Gambia, alongside other African states whose pledges have been referenced collectively but not yet broken down publicly by country or unit size. Several Latin American countries have also signaled willingness to contribute forces, although specific troop numbers and timelines have not been finalized.

In parallel, the financial underpinning of the GSF relies on voluntary donor contributions supplemented by UN logistical and administrative support through the UN Support Office in Haiti. Canada has emerged as a leading financial contributor, committing significant funding to support deployment, sustainment, and infrastructure. The Dominican Republic has pledged financial resources and medical support, while Haiti itself has announced both monetary and in-kind contributions, underscoring national ownership of the mission. Despite these commitments, funding gaps remain relative to estimated operational requirements, contributing to the gradual pace of deployment. Overall, while the list of contributing countries continues to expand and reflects broad international backing, the GSF has not yet reached its authorized strength, and its operational impact remains constrained pending the arrival of additional pledged contingents and the closure of key logistical and financial gaps.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. has prepared this assessment based on open-source reporting. It presents a consolidated overview of international commitments, deployments, and support mechanisms associated with the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) authorized for Haiti, with the purpose of supporting donor situational awareness, planning, and gap analysis by clearly distinguishing between pledged, pending, and operationally deployed capabilities.

Multiple international pledges have been made in support of the Gang Suppression Force, encompassing personnel, funding, and equipment contributions. Despite these commitments, operational deployment remains limited, with Kenya continuing to constitute the principal on-ground contributor. The majority of pledged forces have not yet transitioned from commitment to actual deployment. During the reporting period, no mandate amendments, major equipment deliveries, or significant logistics milestones related to the United Nations Support Office in Haiti were confirmed.

The disparity between pledged personnel and deployed forces remains the primary constraint to mission scale-up. Logistics, sustainment, and mobility remain contingent on further UNSOH operationalization. Current security impact is geographically limited and dependent on Kenyan elements and coordination with the Haitian National Police.

Near-term progress will depend on the activation of UNSOH logistics pipelines, national political authorizations, and availability of airlift, basing, and sustainment capacity. No newly confirmed deployment timelines were identified during this reporting period.

Figures reflect publicly reported commitments and may change pending formal UN confirmation. Absence of reporting does not preclude preparatory actions not disclosed publicly.

Force Contributions and Status Matrix

Forces Armées d’Haïti: Historical Legacy, Current Posture, and the Debate Over an Expanded Counter-Gang Role

The Forces Armées d’Haïti (FAd’H) occupy a complex place in Haiti’s history and current security debate. Originating from the revolutionary Armée Indigène that secured Haiti’s independence, the military became a central institution of the state throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, often exercising significant political influence. Following decades marked by coups, political intervention, and human rights abuses, the armed forces were formally disbanded in 1995 as part of a broader effort to professionalize governance and place internal security responsibilities under civilian police authority through the Haitian National Police. This decision fundamentally reshaped Haiti’s security architecture but also left the country without a standing military for more than two decades.

The FAd’H was officially reconstituted beginning in 2017, reviving a national debate over the role and utility of a military force in a country facing chronic insecurity rather than conventional external threats. Since its reinstatement, the FAd’H has remained a relatively small and developing institution, estimated to number in the low thousands, with limited equipment and operational reach. Its mandate has focused primarily on support functions rather than frontline internal security, including protection of selected public infrastructure, engineering and civil-support tasks, disaster response assistance, and symbolic restoration of state authority. The force continues to build its institutional foundations, including doctrine, leadership development, training systems, and logistics capacity.

International partners have played a central role in supporting the reconstitution and professionalization of the FAd’H. Mexico has trained multiple cohorts of Haitian military personnel under bilateral cooperation agreements, France has provided instruction through its forces in the Caribbean, particularly in Martinique, and Colombia has offered training support and advisory engagement as part of broader security cooperation with Haiti. These partnerships reflect a shared emphasis on discipline, technical competence, and institutional development rather than rapid expansion into combat-oriented internal security roles. More broadly, several countries engaged in Haiti’s stabilization efforts have expressed support for strengthening national security institutions, including the military, as part of a longer-term strategy to reduce reliance on international forces.

The question of whether the FAd’H should assume a larger role in confronting armed gangs remains highly sensitive and contested. Most proposals under discussion envision an expanded but carefully delimited role, centered on relieving pressure on the Haitian National Police rather than replacing it. These roles include securing critical infrastructure and state facilities, supporting border and coastal security, providing engineering and logistical support, and contributing to disaster response and national resilience. Direct involvement in law enforcement and urban counter-gang operations is generally viewed as a longer-term prospect, contingent on substantial improvements in training, oversight, command-and-control, and legal frameworks. As a result, the future of the FAd’H is widely understood to depend less on rapid operational expansion than on sustained professionalization, strong civilian oversight, and clear institutional boundaries, reflecting lessons drawn from Haiti’s own history and the concerns of both domestic and international stakeholders.

Targeted Police Operation in Bel-Air Disrupts Gang Logistics and Firepower

The Haitian National Police conducted a targeted security operation in the Bel-Air neighborhood that resulted in a significant degradation of armed gang capabilities, according to an official press release. The operation focused on the armed group operating under the leadership of an individual known as Jamesley and yielded the seizure of a substantial cache of weapons and equipment, as well as the killing of multiple gang members.

On Tuesday, December 30, 2025, specialized units of the Haitian National Police, supported by the Task Force, entered Bel-Air with the explicit objective of disrupting the group’s logistical and operational hub. Police authorities report that several members affiliated with the group were killed during the intervention, and the residence associated with the gang leader was destroyed.

The seized materiel underscores the group’s elevated lethality and organizational capacity. Recovered items included handguns, among them 9 mm and .22 caliber pistols, some counterfeit, assault weapons such as an M16 rifle and a counterfeit Kalashnikov-type rifle, submachine guns, and three 12-gauge shotguns. Authorities also confiscated a Mavic-type drone, reportedly intended to support gang operations through aerial reconnaissance.

In addition, police recovered several thousand rounds of military-grade ammunition, notably 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm cartridges, along with magazines, radios, batteries, and other logistical support equipment. Bladed weapons, including a machete and an axe, were also seized. The entire arsenal was inventoried, documented, and certified by the Armament Service of the PNH Logistics Directorate in accordance with established procedures.

Police officials characterized the operation as a major tactical success. By depriving the armed group of a substantial weapons stockpile and dismantling its logistical base, authorities assessed that its operational capacity has been significantly reduced. The action is presented as part of a broader strategy to reassert state control over areas previously dominated by armed groups.

Bel-Air is a densely populated, historically significant neighborhood in central Port-au-Prince that has, over the past decade, become one of the capital’s most persistently contested security environments. Its proximity to the political and administrative core of the city has made it strategically attractive to armed groups seeking territorial leverage, control of movement corridors, and access to extortion and illicit taxation revenues. Since at least 2020, Bel-Air has experienced recurrent episodes of large-scale violence linked to organized gangs, including mass killings, arson, and forced displacement, most notably during the period commonly referred to as the Bel-Air massacres. In the post-2021 security vacuum following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, gang consolidation accelerated, and Bel-Air was absorbed into broader coalition dynamics, including alliances such as Viv Ansanm. Armed groups operating in the neighborhood have exercised de facto control through intimidation, checkpoints, surveillance, and coercive governance, severely constraining civilian life and limiting state presence. As a result, Bel-Air has become emblematic of the wider urban security crisis in Port-au-Prince, where sustained gang dominance has eroded public authority and normalized armed control over densely populated communities.

In its statement, the Haitian National Police reaffirmed its determination to sustain and intensify operations nationwide. The search for Jamesley, who remains at large, continues to be a priority. The stated objective remains the systematic dismantling of gang structures in order to restore public security, social stability, and the authority of the State.

Downtown Port-au-Prince: Armed Groups Establish New Illegal Toll Amid Ongoing Police Operations

On January 6, 2026, armed individuals affiliated with the criminal coalition known as “Viv Ansanm” established a new illegal toll post along Rue du Magasin de l’État in downtown Port-au-Prince. This development occurred as a police operation, launched on Wednesday, December 31, 2025, continued in the Bel-Air neighborhood. The persistence of such activity underscores the ongoing challenge that insecurity poses to law enforcement authorities.

Since December 31, sustained exchanges of gunfire, including the use of heavy weapons, have been reported in Bel-Air, reflecting the intensity of confrontations between armed groups and security forces.

Authorities report having achieved limited operational gains, including the neutralization of several armed individuals, notably through the use of drones equipped with explosive payloads. Police further indicate that multiple firearms, some of high caliber, along with thousands of rounds of ammunition, have been seized during recent operations.

Despite these efforts, armed groups have continued to expand their presence in adjacent areas. The installation of the new toll post on Rue du Magasin de l’État brings the estimated number of illegal roadblocks in the vicinity to approximately ten. These checkpoints are reportedly used to extort motorists and disrupt civilian and commercial movement, underscoring the fragile and contested security environment in central Port-au-Prince.

Police Operation in Arcahaie Dismantles Illegal Toll Infrastructure in Bercy

The Haitian National Police conducted a targeted security operation in the commune of Arcahaie, specifically in the locality of Bercy, resulting in the destruction of an illegal toll booth used by armed groups to extort motorists and restrict freedom of movement along a critical segment of the RN1 coastal corridor. The operation took place on Friday, January 2, 2026, and was confirmed by the Directorate of Police Communication. Authorities stated that the structure had been erected by armed individuals as part of a broader effort to impose illicit taxation and assert territorial control along a strategic roadway linking several departments.

During the intervention, police forces completely dismantled the toll installation and seized several high-caliber weapons, including two 5.56 mm M4 rifles and one 7.62 mm Kalashnikov-type rifle, along with multiple magazines. Exchanges of fire occurred between police units and armed individuals present in the area. Police sources reported that several gang members were killed during the clashes, though no official casualty figures were released.

Security conditions in Arcahaie, and in Bercy in particular, reflect the westward expansion of gang influence beyond Port-au-Prince into key transit and coastal zones. Kokorat San Ras has been more consistently linked to Arcahaie-area insecurity, including the Bercy locality, particularly from 2023 onward. Reporting and local security sources indicate that Kokorat San Ras elements have operated along the RN1 coastal corridor, employing tactics such as intermittent roadblocks, illegal toll points, vehicle intimidation, and armed presence to exert influence and generate revenue. In late 2024 and throughout 2025, Kokorat San Ras has also been assessed as operating in coordination with, or under the broader umbrella of, the Viv Ansanm alliance, consistent with a broader pattern of coalition expansion into strategic transportation corridors.

Route Nationale 1 (RN1) is one of Haiti’s most strategically significant transportation arteries, serving as the principal north–south corridor linking Port-au-Prince to the northern departments, including Cap-Haïtien. The route facilitates the movement of people, agricultural goods, fuel, construction materials, and commercial products between the capital region and northern ports and markets, making it essential to national economic continuity and humanitarian access. In the current security environment, RN1 has also become a critical transit route for civilians seeking to exit the country, particularly Haitians traveling from Port-au-Prince toward Cap-Haïtien to access outbound commercial and charter flights amid persistent disruptions at the capital’s airport. As a result, long-distance bus traffic along RN1 has increased, further elevating the route’s strategic value. Armed gangs operating along segments of RN1 have exploited this dependency by establishing illegal checkpoints and toll points, levying payments on buses, commercial vehicles, and private motorists, and intermittently blocking movement to assert control. These practices not only generate revenue for armed groups but also amplify civilian vulnerability, disrupt supply chains, and underscore the broader security and governance challenges associated with maintaining freedom of movement along Haiti’s most critical national roadway.

Local contacts in the Arcahaie area further reported that, despite the January 2 operation, armed groups intermittently blocked sections of the roadway in Bercy on Saturday and Sunday, January 3 and January 4, highlighting the persistence of gang influence and the fragility of short-term security gains. Police authorities emphasized that the operation forms part of an ongoing effort to combat impunity, dismantle illicit revenue mechanisms, and progressively reestablish state authority over national roadways and critical infrastructure.

MOPAL Urges National Unity Amid Worsening Insecurity and Political Uncertainty

As armed groups continue to expand their territorial reach across Haiti, the Mouvman Patriyotik Pou Lavi (MOPAL) has renewed its warnings about the country’s accelerating security and governance crisis. In a statement issued in early January 2026, the movement denounced what it described as the persistent indifference of the international community and the inability of interim authorities to contain the violence destabilizing the country.

According to MOPAL, gangs now exercise effective control over most of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, large portions of the Artibonite and Central Plateau regions, and several strategic national roadways. The organization argues that civilians are living under conditions of coercion marked by massacres, sexual violence, kidnappings, and forced displacement, driving large-scale population movements and deepening social and humanitarian distress. While acknowledging the UN-authorized multinational security support mission approved in September 2025, MOPAL expresses skepticism over its delayed deployment and limited impact, asserting that Haiti can no longer depend primarily on external interventions to restore order.

The movement situates its appeal within the fragile political context, warning of heightened instability as February 7, 2026, approaches, the date marking the theoretical end of the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council. MOPAL cautions that the absence of a clear transition framework risks creating another institutional vacuum, further compounding insecurity. Since mid-2025, it reports having engaged in consultations with political parties, civil society organizations, and other national stakeholders to identify a Haitian-led pathway out of the crisis.

Founded in 2023, MOPAL, translated as the “Patriotic Movement for Life” is a nationalist and reform-oriented political movement led by former deputy Ulrick Saint-Cyr and supported by a provisional executive structure composed largely of former elected officials and senior public figures. While it does not publish verifiable membership figures or operate as a mass political party, MOPAL has established a visible role through public advocacy and participation in the Coalition Nationale des Forces Progressistes. At the outset of 2026, the movement has issued a call for unity among progressive and patriotic forces, arguing that restoring security is a prerequisite for credible elections and the reestablishment of state authority.

Anti-Corruption Journalists’ Network Calls for Adherence to the February 7 Transition Deadline

The Haitian Network of Anti-Corruption Journalists (RHAJAC) has issued a public statement opposing any initiative that would extend the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council beyond February 7, 2026. The organization expressed concern over what it characterizes as political maneuvering by the leadership of the transition, including actions attributed to Laurent Saint-Cyr, to remain in office past the established deadline.

In its statement released in Port-au-Prince on January 3, 2026, RHAJAC emphasized that the current transitional framework provides no basis for prolonging the tenure of the Council, either collectively or individually. The organization asserted that all members serving as president-advisors are expected to relinquish their responsibilities at the conclusion of the mandate, without exception, political accommodation, or legal reinterpretation.

RHAJAC argued that any attempt to extend the transition would undermine public confidence in the political process and deviate from the commitments made at the outset of the interim arrangement. The network maintains that the purpose of the Transitional Presidential Council was to stabilize governance and prepare conditions for a return to constitutional order, objectives it believes have not been sufficiently met to justify a mandate extension.

Concluding its statement, RHAJAC called for strict respect for the February 7, 2026, deadline and reiterated the need for transparency and accountability regarding the management of the transition. The organization indicated that its position reflects a broader demand within Haitian civil society for clarity, institutional legitimacy, and adherence to agreed political timelines, without prescribing a specific alternative transition mechanism.

Interfaith Peace March Draws Thousands to the Streets of Delmas

Several thousand citizens participated in a large, peaceful interfaith march for peace in Delmas on Saturday, signaling growing public concern over the country’s persistent insecurity. Under clear morning conditions, participants from Delmas and neighboring Pétion-Ville marched together, united by a shared call for an end to violence and a restoration of public safety.

Men, women, youth, and children took part in the procession, carrying placards and chanting messages advocating peace and security. Common slogans such as “Nou bouke” (We are exhausted) and “Lapè pou Ayiti” (Peace for Haiti) reflected widespread public frustration with ongoing instability. The demonstration was organized with the support of a collective of religious leaders representing multiple faith traditions, including Protestant and Vodou communities, underscoring the cross-cutting nature of the appeal.

According to organizers and local observers, participation was estimated at between 3,000 and 5,000 people, making it one of the more significant civic mobilizations in recent months. Through this interfaith initiative, organizers sought to amplify a message of national awareness, emphasizing that Haiti’s recovery depends on dialogue, unity, and reconciliation across social, religious, and political lines.

Speakers associated with the march stressed that the current moment calls for collective action rather than division, particularly in light of the country’s strained social fabric. They urged public authorities to take heed of the population’s concerns and to implement concrete measures aimed at restoring security and safeguarding human dignity. In a highly tense national context, the march stood out as a visible expression of civic engagement, illustrating that despite fear and hardship, Haitian society continues to mobilize around a shared aspiration for peace.

Carrefour–Port-au-Prince Corridor Disrupted as Drivers Protest Proliferation of Illegal Toll Points

Public transportation drivers operating along the Carrefour–Port-au-Prince corridor suspended services on Monday, January 5, 2026, in protest against the installation of a new illegal tollpoint on Rue du Magasin de l’État by an armed group. The newly established barrier reportedly brings the total number of extortion checkpoints along this critical roadway to 10, further constraining movement on one of the capital’s most heavily used transport routes.

According to corroborated local reporting, these illegal toll points are controlled by multiple armed groups operating across several neighborhoods, including Fontamara, Martissant, Bizoton, and Grand-Ravine. At each checkpoint, drivers are compelled to pay fees in order to pass without harassment or attack, effectively transforming the route into a series of extortion sites and significantly increasing operational risks and costs for transport operators.

Drivers described the security environment as untenable and stated that they are unwilling to continue operating under conditions that place their lives and livelihoods at constant risk. They called on public authorities to intervene urgently to dismantle the illegal toll infrastructure and restore freedom of movement along the corridor, which is essential for daily commuting and commercial activity.

As a result of the work stoppage, traffic was severely disrupted throughout the southern approaches to Port-au-Prince, leaving thousands of passengers stranded across multiple arterial roads linking Carrefour to the city center. The incident underscores the growing impact of gang-imposed road controls on urban mobility and highlights the broader security challenges affecting daily life in the capital.

United States Reaffirms Commitment to Haiti on 222nd Independence Anniversary

On January 1, 2026, marking the 222nd anniversary of Haiti’s independence, the United States reiterated its support for the Haitian people amid ongoing security, political, and institutional challenges. In a statement conveyed by the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized Washington’s solidarity and its intention to continue working with Haiti to restore stability and promote long-term development.

The statement highlighted continued U.S. backing for efforts to counter armed gangs, including support for a specialized force intended to work alongside Haitian security institutions to address widespread violence and insecurity. U.S. officials underscored the importance of improving security conditions as a foundation for broader national recovery.

On the political front, the United States welcomed progress made by Haiti’s transitional authorities and the Provisional Electoral Council in preparing national elections scheduled for 2026, the first in a decade. Washington reaffirmed its commitment to supporting a credible and secure electoral process that would allow Haitians to choose their leaders freely.

Concluding the message, the Secretary of State paid tribute to the resilience of the Haitian people and reaffirmed the United States’ continued engagement with Haiti, framing the anniversary as both a moment of commemoration and a renewed pledge of partnership.

Haitian Police Union Calls for Comprehensive Vetting to Strengthen Institutional Integrity

The union representing members of the Haitian National Police, SPNH-17, has called for the implementation of a broad vetting process within the Haitian National Police (PNH) aimed at identifying and removing officers implicated in corruption or deemed unfit for service, particularly within the senior ranks.

In a statement reported on December 30, 2025, the union argued that structural reform is essential to restoring the credibility and effectiveness of the police institution. According to SPNH-17, a significant portion of the force estimated by the union at more than half of current personnel—may be affected by issues related to corruption, misconduct, or professional incapacity. The organization maintains that these internal weaknesses undermine operational performance and public trust.

The union further asserted that improvements in equipment, resources, or external support will be insufficient to defeat armed gangs if internal accountability challenges remain unaddressed. From its perspective, a rigorous vetting and accountability mechanism is a prerequisite for meaningful progress in combating insecurity.

SPNH-17 concluded by urging authorities to adopt urgent measures to reinforce integrity, professionalism, and discipline within the police force, framing internal reform as a necessary step toward strengthening the PNH’s capacity to fulfill its public security mandate.

Delmas 40A Double Homicide: Police Officer Identified as Suspect as Local Tensions Raise Security Concerns

The Haitian National Police announced on January 2, 2026, that it has formally identified the suspected perpetrator of a double homicide that occurred in the Delmas 40A area on the afternoon of January 1, 2026. According to a press release issued by the Police Communication Directorate, the suspect is an active-duty police officer from the 25th graduating class of the PNH. Authorities confirmed that the case has been referred to the appropriate judicial bodies for further action.

Police sources identified the suspect as Nelson Prud’homme, noting that while his alleged involvement has been established, details regarding the precise circumstances of the incident and the identities of the victims have not yet been made public. The case has been transferred to the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police and the Directorate of General Intelligence, which have been tasked with locating and apprehending the suspect, who remains at large. Legal proceedings are underway to secure his arrest.

Information circulating locally indicates growing concern in the area where the suspect is believed to reside. According to these accounts, he is reportedly still present in his neighborhood. Residents fear that any attempt by authorities to apprehend him could prompt a reaction from members of his local brigade seeking to protect him, potentially escalating tensions. There is concern that such dynamics could contribute to the formation of a new armed group if not carefully managed. These reports remain unconfirmed by official police sources.

In its statement, the Haitian National Police reaffirmed its commitment to combating impunity, including within its own ranks, and emphasized that preserving institutional integrity remains a priority. The case unfolds against a broader backdrop of persistent insecurity and public concern regarding accountability within security institutions, renewing scrutiny of internal oversight, discipline, and enforcement mechanisms as violence continues to affect several neighborhoods in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

Bahamas Defence Force Training Highlights Longstanding Capacity Challenges Facing Haiti’s Coast Guard

The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) concluded a two-week maritime capacity-building program for 20 members of the Haitian National Police Coast Guard, reinforcing regional cooperation and addressing critical operational gaps. Delivered by RBDF specialists and coordinated through the Port Patrol Unit’s Engineering Section, the program combined classroom instruction with hands-on training across navigation, seamanship, docking maneuvers, vessel handling, and the use of navigational aids, as well as search and rescue techniques and onboard emergency procedures.

A central focus of the training addressed marine engineering and maintenance—an area that has historically constrained the Coast Guard’s effectiveness. RBDF engineers provided advanced instruction in mechanical diagnostics, fuel system troubleshooting, analysis of outboard motor ignition and electrical circuits, gearbox inspection, and propulsion optimization. Participants were also introduced to digital diagnostic tools and modern remote-assistance practices, enabling real-time collaboration between Bahamian and Haitian technicians to support fleet maintenance beyond the training period.

The initiative responds directly to longstanding structural challenges faced by the Haitian Coast Guard. Historically, the unit has operated a small and aging fleet with limited preventive maintenance capacity, irregular access to spare parts and fuel, and uneven technical training pipelines. These constraints have reduced patrol availability, limited sustained coastal coverage, and increased dependence on external assistance. Additional challenges have included gaps in maritime command-and-control, exposure to corruption risks in coastal and port environments, inadequate search-and-rescue infrastructure, and the growing scale of maritime criminal activity along Haiti’s extensive and lightly monitored coastline.

As an integral component of the PNH, the Haitian Coast Guard is responsible for maritime law enforcement, coastal security, and search-and-rescue operations. It operates approximately twenty small patrol vessels, primarily fast boats, with bases in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, and Jacmel. Capacity-building initiatives such as the RBDF program are viewed as essential to improving technical reliability, operational sustainability, and regional interoperability, while incrementally addressing the systemic limitations that have historically constrained Haiti’s maritime security capabilities.

Haiti’s Electoral Transition Advances as Women’s Political Representation Remains Below Constitutional Threshold

Haiti’s political transition, underway since July 2021, continues to move toward national elections scheduled for 2026 under a revised electoral calendar issued by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). While the updated timetable marks progress in the electoral process, levels of women’s participation in governance and electoral institutions remain below the constitutional benchmark of 30 percent.

Current figures indicate that women occupy approximately 22.22 percent of ministerial or senior government positions and 11.11 percent of seats within the Presidential Transitional Council, where they serve in a non-voting, observer capacity. Within the electoral administration, women account for about 27 percent of personnel at the departmental and municipal levels. These figures underscore persistent structural and institutional barriers to achieving gender parity in political decision-making.

Despite these limitations, Haitian women, led by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and supported by UN Women, played an active role in the constitutional review discussions prior to the suspension of the referendum process by transitional authorities. During these consultations, women’s organizations advocated for enforceable mechanisms to safeguard the constitutionally mandated minimum quota for female representation.

Although the constitutional review process was halted, the CEP incorporated gender-related provisions into the draft electoral decree. These include the rejection of any electoral list that fails to meet the 30 percent minimum threshold for women candidates, as well as the establishment of a supplemental public funding mechanism for political parties presenting candidate lists composed of more than 50 percent women. Together, these measures aim to promote greater inclusion within the electoral framework as Haiti prepares for its next electoral cycle.