Weekly Report January 14 to January 21, 2026

Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council at the End of Its Mandate: Legal Constraints, International Posture, and Escalating Mobilization Risks

As Haiti approaches 7 February 2026, the legally defined end of the mandate of the Conseil présidentiel de transition (CPT), the country faces a convergence of legal finality, political uncertainty, international pressure, and early signs of street mobilization. This analytical note provides a fact-based assessment of the governing legal framework, evolving political dynamics, the posture of key international partners, and emerging security indicators, particularly in and around Pétion-Ville, to inform diplomatic, institutional, and operational planning.

The Legal Framework

All foundational legal instruments governing the CPT establish a clear, restrictive, and time-bound mandate. The decree of 27 May 2024, published in Le Moniteur spécial No. 23, sets the CPT’s mandate from 25 April 2024 to 7 February 2026 and explicitly prohibits any extension. Article 6.1 leaves no ambiguity, stating that the CPT may not benefit from any extension of its mandate. The same framework bars CPT members and sitting government officials from contesting subsequent elections. From a constitutional and legal standpoint, there is no textual basis for maintaining the CPT, or any materially equivalent governing structure, beyond the stated deadline. Attempts to reinterpret or adapt the mandate lack legal grounding and would constitute a direct violation of the founding decree signed by the CPT members themselves.

Anticipation of Deadlock and Continuity of the State

The decree explicitly anticipated institutional blockage or paralysis. Article 28.1 provides that if the CPT is temporarily unable to exercise its functions, executive authority transfers provisionally to the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. This reflects a core principle of public law, namely that continuity of the State is preserved within the law rather than by violating explicit legal norms. As such, extending the CPT is neither necessary nor lawful to avoid institutional vacuum. Any attempt to prolong the CPT’s mandate would result in manifest illegality, weakened legal certainty, and loss of institutional credibility at both the national and international levels. A transitional authority that self-extends becomes an authority without a legal foundation.

Political Dynamics and Fragmented Dialogue

In the weeks leading up to the deadline, CPT members have intensified consultations with selected political parties and civil society organizations, presenting these engagements as a national dialogue aimed at preventing institutional vacuum. Participation remains partial and fragmented, with several political blocs publicly rejecting CPT-led consultations on the grounds that an outgoing authority lacks the legitimacy to redefine the transition framework. To date, no alternative governance mechanism has emerged that commands broad political acceptance. This increases the likelihood that any post–7 February arrangement would be immediately contested, even if administratively functional.

Speculation Regarding a Five-Year Transition

Speculation regarding a five-year transitional governing arrangement warrants particular scrutiny. Such a horizon lacks any legal foundation in existing Haitian law or transitional instruments and would almost certainly face immediate domestic opposition. From an international perspective, endorsement of a multi-year, non-electoral governance structure appears unlikely, particularly in light of existing sanctions and visa-restriction regimes. While a short and clearly delimited interim mechanism negotiated before the deadline may be conceivable, the probability that Haiti could sustain a five-year transition without elections, absent chronic instability and legitimacy erosion, remains low.

International Posture

The positions of Haiti’s principal international partners are increasingly salient. The United States has signaled limited tolerance for actions perceived as undermining constitutional timelines or democratic processes. Targeted visa restrictions imposed on Haitian political figures, formally justified on grounds related to security, corruption, or alleged links to armed groups, also function as deterrent instruments by increasing the personal and diplomatic costs associated with attempts to prolong transitional authority. Canada has adopted a closely aligned posture, emphasizing the non-extendable nature of the CPT mandate and the necessity of returning to an elections-oriented constitutional framework. Collectively, these signals suggest diminishing international acceptance of any outcome resembling an open-ended or personalized transition.

Security Indicators and Mobilization Risks

As the deadline approaches, early security and mobilization indicators are becoming increasingly visible. Burning barricades and road blockages have begun forming in several areas around Pétion-Ville, reflecting localized mobilization and testing of security-force response. These actions appear decentralized and consistent with historical Haitian protest patterns rather than centrally coordinated by a single political structure. Multiple actors identify the perception that the CPT may seek to remain in power beyond 7 February as a primary trigger. If such actions expand or converge with broader political calls for mobilization, the risk of movement restrictions, economic disruption, and episodic violence in the metropolitan area will increase.

Outlook and Risk Assessment

Absent a timely and legally defensible political arrangement prior to 7 February 2026, Haiti is likely to enter a period of contested authority. While a nationwide breakdown is not inevitable, the convergence of constitutional constraints, political fragmentation, early street mobilization, and heightened international scrutiny points to a moderate to high risk of localized unrest, particularly in the capital and surrounding communes. From an institutional and international perspective, strict adherence to the mandate endpoint, coupled with a short and clearly defined bridge toward elections, presents fewer long-term risks than attempts to normalize an extended or open-ended transition.

From the perspective of Halo Solutions Firm S.A., the current moment represents a decision point rather than a collapse point. The legal framework provides a viable continuity mechanism that avoids institutional vacuum if respected. However, ambiguity or perceived manipulation around the 7 February deadline materially increases the likelihood of localized unrest, particularly in Pétion-Ville and other political and economic nodes. Historical precedent in Haiti consistently shows that unclear or contested transitions, even when administratively functional, rapidly translate into street mobilization, economic paralysis, and opportunistic violence by armed actors. Conversely, clear timelines, visible adherence to law, and narrowly defined interim arrangements reduce mobilization incentives and allow security forces to focus on containment rather than crowd control. In practical terms, the lowest-risk path remains legal clarity, temporal restraint, and rapid movement toward an elections-anchored framework.

Sustained Security Offensive Signals Tactical Momentum for Haitian Police, but Strategic Impact Remains Uncertain

Since mid-January 2026, the Police nationale d’Haïti (PNH) has intensified a coordinated security offensive across Port-au-Prince aimed at dismantling armed gang structures entrenched in key neighborhoods. Operations have combined ground maneuvers with targeted drone strikes against fortified positions in areas including Bel-Air, Saint-Marten Street, Grand Rue, La Saline, Tokyo, Village de Dieu, and Grand Ravine. Authorities state that the primary objective is to restore public security and reopen major road corridors linking the capital to the north and south of the country ahead of February 7, a date of high political and historical significance.

According to police sources, the use of kamikaze-style drones has degraded gang infrastructure and forced several armed groups to abandon long-held strongholds. In Delmas 6, the base of Jimmy Chérizier, known as “Barbecue” and leader of the Viv Ansanm coalition, was reportedly neutralized following drone strikes that destroyed key residences, compelling gang elements to withdraw toward other areas, including Cité Soleil. Similar tactics were applied in Village de Dieu, where security forces first cleared the Ti Fanny sector to establish a corridor enabling deeper penetration into the neighborhood. Independent security analysis from firms such as Halo Solutions Firm S.A. notes that the sequencing of corridor creation followed by targeted strikes reflects a more deliberate and methodical operational design than seen in earlier campaigns.

A provisional assessment by the NGO Combite for Peace and Development highlights the intensity of the recent confrontations. Over a two-week period in Bel-Air alone, at least 116 deaths were recorded, including individuals identified as gang members and civilians, with dozens more injured. These figures underscore both the scale of the offensive and the persistent risk to non-combatants, a concern repeatedly raised by civil society despite police assurances that efforts are being made to limit civilian harm. Security observers, including analysts associated with Halo Solutions Firm S.A., emphasize that sustaining public support will depend on visible measures to protect civilians and rapidly stabilize cleared zones.

Specialized police units have been central to the campaign. The Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI) has led intelligence-driven operations, while the Unité Tactique Anti-Gang – ÉPINES (UTAG–ÉPINES) has operated on the front lines in high-risk environments. Police leadership has highlighted these units as evidence of a more professionalized posture supported by improved equipment, coordination, and external technical assistance.

From an operational standpoint, the current offensive represents one of the most sustained security efforts undertaken by the PNH in recent years. Unlike previous short-lived interventions, the present campaign is characterized by simultaneous pressure across multiple neighborhoods and a stated intent to maintain control of reclaimed areas long enough to restore freedom of movement along strategic transport routes. This approach has generated cautious optimism among residents, some of whom report reduced gang visibility and a tentative resumption of daily activities.

Historical precedent, however, tempers expectations. Past anti-gang offensives in Haiti have often delivered short-term gains that proved difficult to sustain once security forces redeployed or political focus shifted. The durability of the current momentum will hinge on the PNH’s ability to hold territory, coordinate effectively with judicial authorities, and prevent gangs from reconstituting or relocating. While the recent operations mark a notable shift in tempo and capability, their long-term impact will depend on whether tactical successes are consolidated into lasting security governance.

ANMH Warns of Authoritarian Overreach in CPT Decrees Threatening Press Freedom

The National Association of Haitian Media (ANMH) condemns recent decrees issued by the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) regulating freedom of expression and press offenses, arguing they undermine a core democratic gain achieved since the end of dictatorship. ANMH highlights that, for the first time in Haitian law, press-related offenses carry prison sentences of six months to three years and substantial fines, with penalties doubled for online or social media expression, potentially exposing citizens to up to ten years of imprisonment.

ANMH asserts the decrees are discriminatory, as they provide heightened protection to public officials and members of the security forces while treating ordinary citizens as second-class under the law. The association further warns that vague definitions risk conflating illicit content with legitimate criticism, creating powerful legal tools to suppress dissent and institutionalize impunity.

The statement also denounces the CPT’s quiet adoption of a separate decree reorganizing the High Court of Justice without public consultation, arguing that together the two texts reinforce impunity while silencing accountability. ANMH characterizes the decrees as authoritarian, anti-democratic, and self-serving, and calls for their immediate repeal, while committing to sustained advocacy for solutions that protect freedom of expression and the rights of journalists and citizens alike.

PNH Expand Coordinated Offensive on Gang-Held Areas, Targeting Delmas 6

The Police nationale d’Haïti (PNH) continues its offensive against neighborhoods controlled by armed criminal groups in Port-au-Prince. On Wednesday, January 14, 2026, police authorities announced a major operation in Delmas 6, a stronghold associated with Jimmy Chérizier, also known as “Barbecue,” leader of the Viv Ansanm coalition. According to official police communications, the operation is being conducted jointly with the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH), a task force structure, the Gang Suppression Force (FRG), and entities identified as PMC, or private military contractors. This represents the first public acknowledgment by the PNH of private actors participating alongside state forces in active security operations.

Multiple explosive drones reportedly detonated during the middle of the day in lower Delmas, accompanied by sustained gunfire across the area. Images circulating locally show significant structural damage, including destroyed homes in Delmas 6. As of this reporting, authorities have not released an official assessment of casualties, arrests, or material losses.

The operation is part of a broader security campaign launched in late December 2025 aimed at reclaiming territory long held by criminal groups. Government-linked sources cited in local reporting indicate advances in several zones, including the Bastia Corridor, and suggest that certain gang structures have been weakened or displaced. Some gang leaders formerly active in Bel-Air, Rue Tiremasse, and La Saline are reported to have withdrawn toward Cité Soleil, while elements affiliated with Viv Ansanm there are described as reluctant to engage directly with police forces.

In parallel, security units are working to establish a temporary buffer zone to secure the movement of fuel trucks to and from the Varreux petroleum terminal and the Port-au-Prince port, both critical to the capital’s energy and supply chains. While authorities point to incremental gains, the overall situation remains fluid, with no comprehensive public accounting yet of the operational impact on gang leadership or territorial control.

PNH Leadership Urges Armed Groups to Surrender as Security Operations Intensify Nationwide

The Director General of the Police nationale d’Haïti (PNH), André Vladimir Paraison, has issued a public call for armed gangs to lay down their weapons and surrender voluntarily. Speaking during a collective interview on Tuesday, he stated that the police now possess the operational capacity to pursue criminal groups across the entire national territory and to restore public security.

According to the PNH chief, the option of voluntary surrender is intended primarily to reduce the loss of life, both among law enforcement personnel and within the civilian population. He explained that armed individuals willing to surrender may contact the police directly or present themselves at neutral locations, including churches or vodou temples, to ensure a secure and controlled process.

Paraison emphasized that individuals who choose to surrender will be handed over to the competent judicial authorities to answer for their actions, in accordance with established legal procedures. He reaffirmed the state’s determination to reassert its authority and restore public order throughout the country.

Surrounded by members of the PNH high command, the Director General also highlighted a strengthened operational posture in recent weeks. He referenced multiple recent interventions that resulted in the neutralization of armed individuals and the dismantling of criminal bases, underscoring what he described as the growing effectiveness and reach of the national police.

Reiterating that the fight against insecurity remains an absolute priority, Paraison stressed that voluntary surrender represents the most viable option for armed groups seeking to avoid confrontations with potentially severe consequences. The most recent police report indicates that six armed individuals were killed and five drones, along with weapons and ammunition, were seized during an operation in the Tokyo area targeting an individual known as “Chalè.”

Questions Surround Recruitment Process as Haiti Rebuilds Its Armed Forces

The recruitment process for new soldiers within the Forces armées d’Haïti (FAD’H), launched in 2024, is facing growing scrutiny amid procedural changes, delayed notifications, and allegations that some enlistments may have occurred outside the publicly announced framework. An initial call for applications issued by the Ministry of Defense on August 2, 2024 outlined a six-stage selection process, after which an official list of 1,071 validated candidates was published on October 18, 2024 from roughly 8,000 applicants, according to figures presented to Parliament by then–Prime Minister Garry Conille.

Implementation has since been uneven. In 2025, only 150 candidates were sent abroad for training, primarily to Mexico, without a clear timetable for others. Later that year, 350 recruits began training at the Clercine base, but authorities did not clarify whether they were drawn exclusively from the validated list or which criteria governed their selection. Concerns deepened in December 2025 when 571 previously approved candidates were required to repeat medical and psychological exams more than a year later, with some disqualified without detailed explanations or formal appeal mechanisms. Reports also persist of recruits admitted outside any public call, though officials have not confirmed or denied these claims.

The FAD’H were formally dissolved in 1995 following decades marked by military coups, human rights abuses, and repeated political intervention. This decision occurred in the context of strong international pressure, particularly from the United States, which had restored President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994 and conditioned continued security assistance, training, and financial support on the dismantling of the Haitian military. Washington, alongside multilateral partners, viewed the armed forces at the time as incompatible with democratic consolidation and encouraged a security model centered on a civilian national police force. For more than two decades thereafter, Haiti relied almost exclusively on the police for internal security. As the armed forces are gradually reconstituted today with a mandate focused on border control, disaster response, and national sovereignty, transparency in recruitment is widely seen as essential to ensuring the new institution does not replicate the political role or practices of its predecessor and can regain public and international confidence.

Police Seize Weapons in Grand’Anse Following Arrest of Alleged Gang Leader

The Police nationale d’Haïti (PNH) has reported the seizure of weapons and ammunition in the Grand’Anse department following the arrest of Misnord Jean, also known as “Fado,” described by authorities as a senior figure in a gang operating in the Simon Pelé area.

According to a statement released on Saturday, January 17, by the PNH Communications Directorate (DICOP), the seizures were carried out during searches conducted by the Grand’Anse Departmental Judicial Police. The operations were based on information provided by the suspect after his arrest.

Items recovered include an AR-15–type automatic rifle, a magazine containing nine rounds, two mobile phones, identification documents in the suspect’s name, and jewelry. Police indicated that all seized materials have been secured as evidence.

The PNH also reported a second operation in the locality of Beaumont, where an additional firearm was seized. Further operations may follow, particularly in the Cassanette area, as authorities seek to locate other possible weapons caches.

Barricades and Heightened Tensions Paralyze Parts of Port-au-Prince Following Political Developments

Several areas of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan region awoke on Wednesday, January 21, 2026, to a tense security environment marked by road barricades and burning tires. The disruptions significantly affected mobility and daily activities across multiple neighborhoods of the capital.

Traffic disturbances were reported in Bourdon, Delmas 103, along the Kenscoff road near Pèlerin 4, at the entrance to Morne Calvaire, in Montagne Noire, and in Juvenat. In these locations, movement was rendered nearly impossible for motorists and pedestrians alike. Reports from the ground also indicated gunfire in the areas of Pèlerin and Torcel, further exacerbating the climate of insecurity and contributing to the paralysis of normal activity.

These incidents occurred one day after the conclusion of a dialogue process led by the Conseil présidentiel de transition (CPT), a process that proceeded despite significant contestation from political actors. In the aftermath of the talks, several political blocs publicly called for the resignation of Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, adding a political dimension to the security-related disruptions observed across the capital.

Proposed Border and Port Security Contract and Related Private Security Engagements

The Haitian government has initiated a contractual process to strengthen border control, port security, customs operations, and immigration systems through an international consortium reportedly led by Evergreen, alongside Alex Stewart International, ENSE Group, and SecuriPort. The agreement, estimated at approximately USD 500 million over a ten-year period, is currently under review by the Superior Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA), as required for large-scale public contracts.

According to information cited in Haitian press, the project is intended to provide Haitian Customs with infrastructure, equipment, and systems to improve control over land borders and maritime ports. This includes reinforcing the Border Police (PoliFront) and expanding deployments beyond official crossing points, particularly along the Haiti–Dominican Republic border, which has long been described as porous despite limited state presence at formal entry points.

The proposed contract also includes an immigration-management component. Under this element, SecuriPort would reportedly be responsible for systems related to passport verification, immigration processing, and the management of entry and exit from Haitian territory, based on models the firm operates at certain international airports. In parallel, the government has indicated its intention to conclude a memorandum of understanding with the Association of Haitian Industries (ADIH) and the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIH) to streamline customs procedures for domestic businesses.

As of mid-January 2026, the financial, technical, and legal details of the consortium’s contract have not been publicly released. Outstanding elements include compensation arrangements, the level of state control over deployed systems, and data governance provisions. Public reporting has also noted that Haitian Customs recently recorded unusually high revenue levels during a period of widespread insecurity, an outcome that has been referenced in discussions surrounding the scale and timing of the proposed contract.

Separately, Haiti has already entered into a long-term security agreement with Vectus Global, a firm associated with Erik Prince. According to prior Reuters reporting, Vectus Global secured a ten-year contract, reportedly valued at approximately USD 10 million per year, to support operations against armed gangs and, at a later stage, assist with restoring revenue collection at ports and land borders. Details of this agreement have not been publicly disclosed, nor has the Haitian government clarified how it interfaces with the proposed Evergreen-led initiative.

Taken together, these arrangements indicate an expanding role for foreign private firms in border security, customs administration, and immigration management. As the contracts move through administrative review, key factual questions remain regarding oversight, data hosting, and the respective responsibilities of the Haitian state and contracted entities.

Labadee Cruise Suspension Extends Economic Strain on Northern Haitian Community

Royal Caribbean Group has announced that it will not resume cruise stops at Labadee, its private beach destination in northern Haiti, through the end of 2026, citing ongoing security concerns. The decision prolongs a suspension that began in 2024, briefly lifted in early April 2025 before being reinstated as violence escalated in Port-au-Prince. The continued halt has effectively cut off a primary source of income for the coastal community near Cap-Haïtien, despite the area itself remaining largely unaffected by the gang violence prevalent elsewhere in the country.

According to local authorities from the Communal Section (CASEC), approximately 1,000 residents remain without cruise-related employment. Before the suspension, an estimated 800 residents were directly employed by the Labadee operation, while many others depended on selling crafts, food, and artwork to visitors or working as security guards, servers, and maintenance staff. With cruise activity halted, many former workers have turned to fishing, carpentry, and short-term security jobs, which provide significantly lower and less stable income. Residents report that while food remains accessible, daily living conditions have become increasingly difficult.

The prolonged shutdown has renewed concerns about Labadee’s heavy dependence on a single foreign employer and the limited economic alternatives available when operations cease. While Royal Caribbean has reportedly provided periodic food assistance to residents, the loss of wages has had a lasting impact on household stability and the local economy. Some community members continue to hope for an earlier return of cruise ships, while others argue the situation underscores the need for diversified investment and sustainable local development so that the community’s future is not determined by a single corporate decision.

Port-de-Paix Prosecutor Launches Night Patrol Brigade Amid Rising Insecurity

Amid growing insecurity in Haiti’s provincial cities, Port-de-Paix Government Commissioner Jéir Pierre has established a special nighttime security brigade operating under his direct authority. The initiative, launched in late December 2025, follows a series of armed robberies, assaults, and reported sexual violence that unsettled residents and curtailed nighttime activity in the capital of the Northwest Department. The approach has drawn comparisons to the hard-line security model implemented by Miragoâne prosecutor Jean Ernest Muscadin.

Pierre has positioned the brigade as a complement to the Haitian National Police rather than a replacement, stating that the unit patrols neighborhoods, alleys, and high-risk areas each evening to ease the police workload. Members of the brigade are recruited locally, a choice Pierre says allows for better identification of known criminals. He has emphasized that the initiative is intended to improve public safety rather than serve as a personal security detail.

Unlike formal police units, the brigade operates without an official state budget. Pierre has acknowledged that its activities are financed through donations from residents and supporters. This funding structure, similar to that used in Miragoâne, has prompted concerns among legal observers and human rights advocates regarding oversight, accountability, and the blurring of boundaries between judicial authority and law enforcement functions.

Residents report mixed outcomes. Some say nighttime movement has increased, and businesses feel safer staying open later, while insecurity has not been eliminated. The brigade itself has come under fire; during a patrol in late December, armed attackers shot and wounded one of its members. As prosecutor-led security initiatives expand in the absence of robust policing capacity, the model is increasingly reshaping local responses to violence, while raising broader questions about legality, governance, and the long-term implications for Haiti’s security architecture.

Haiti Launches Mobile Justice Initiative to Address Prolonged Pretrial Detention

On January 18, 2026, the Haitian government, through the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, launched a pilot program titled the “Mobile Initiative for Reducing Prison Overcrowding and Prolonged Pretrial Detention.” The initiative is intended to address longstanding delays in judicial processing that have contributed to severe prison overcrowding nationwide.

The pilot phase began at the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance under the supervision of Dean Bernard Saint-Vil. During the initial session, the court reviewed the cases of 20 detainees who had been held for several years without trial for minor offenses. Proceedings were conducted under Haiti’s Habeas Corpus Act, resulting in the granting of habeas corpus relief for all 20 individuals, who are expected to be released shortly. The Public Prosecutor’s Office was represented by Chief Government Commissioner Patterson Dorval, assisted by Deputy Commissioner Choubert Baptiste.

Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé characterized prolonged pretrial detention as a violation of human dignity and a dysfunction of the justice system, stating that the government intends to correct these practices through lawful and rights-based measures. Available data indicate that approximately 80 percent of Haiti’s prison population is currently composed of individuals awaiting trial.

The project was designed by the Ministry of Justice and is being implemented by the Center for Analysis and Research in Human Rights in partnership with the Mobile Institute for Democratic Education, with financial support from the United Nations Development Programme in Haiti. The mobile initiative is scheduled to operate for an initial five-month period and will be deployed across the jurisdictions of Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, and Les Cayes

United States Expands Rewards Program Targeting Major Gang Leaders in Haiti

The United States Embassy in Haiti announced on January 15, 2026, an update to its rewards campaign targeting individuals identified as leading figures in organized criminal networks in Haiti. The initiative falls under the U.S. Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program and offers financial incentives for information leading to the arrest or conviction of designated gang leaders operating in the country.

According to materials released by the embassy, rewards totaling up to USD 8 million are available. The largest amount, USD 5 million, is offered for information concerning Jimmy Chérizier, also known as “Barbecue,” who is identified by U.S. authorities as a gang leader accused of serious human rights violations and acts designated as terrorism. A reward of USD 2 million is offered for Vitel’Homme Innocent, sought for kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking conspiracies, and attempted kidnappings resulting in death. An additional reward of up to USD 1 million targets Joseph Wilson, also known as “Lanmò San Jou,” described as another key actor in Haiti’s armed violence.

The embassy has encouraged individuals with relevant information to use secure reporting channels, including the international hotline of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and online platforms designed to allow anonymous tips. These mechanisms are intended to protect the identity of informants while facilitating cooperation with U.S. law enforcement authorities.

Despite the longevity and scale of these reward offers, no publicly reported breakthroughs have resulted. Several factors help explain this outcome, including the high risk of retaliation against informants in areas under gang control, limited confidence in witness protection or relocation mechanisms, and deep-seated distrust toward both national and international institutions. In addition, many Haitians express skepticism that rewards would ever be paid in practice. Commonly cited concerns include the belief that investigative and judicial processes would take years, that informants could be killed long before any case concludes, and that even if a reward were approved, the final amount could be reduced or withheld by U.S. authorities. These perceptions further diminish the incentive to cooperate and contribute to the limited practical impact of the rewards program.