Weekly Report November 11 to November 18, 2025

PNH Joint Operations in the Eastern Port-au-Prince Corridor

Security conditions across the eastern Port-au-Prince plain deteriorated sharply between November 13 and 14 as coordinated police, taskforce, and military operations advanced through Morne Cabrit, Santo, Parc Hudson, Tabarre, and adjacent sectors of the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac. The combined efforts of the Haitian National Police (PNH), the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd’H), and associated task-force elements resulted in significant confrontations with armed groups, the neutralization of critical gang capabilities, and a series of high-visibility incidents that underscored the volatility of the operational environment.

A major event occurred on November 14 when an Aérospatiale Alouette-series light utility helicopter supporting operations over the Morne Cabrit ridge became inoperable. Reporting remains divided between hostile gunfire and a mechanical malfunction. The aircraft conducted a forced landing in Santo 10, a zone heavily influenced by gang activity. Two pilots were injured—one suffering a gunshot wound to the arm and the other sustaining shrapnel injuries—and both were evacuated for medical treatment. Separately, two Salvadoran task-force personnel were also wounded by gunfire and are being treated.

Security forces attempted to recover the immobilized aircraft using a crane truck and trailer, but sustained gunfire and deteriorating security conditions rendered extraction impossible. At approximately 13:00, the PNH destroyed the helicopter in place to prevent its capture. The action was later confirmed in an official communiqué. Multiple videos subsequently surfaced on social media showing masked gang members and local residents surrounding the wreckage, accelerating rumor activity and heightening civilian anxiety.

Parallel to the aviation incident, police forces executed a large-scale, intelligence-driven operation on November 14 targeting senior figures and armed factions of the 400 Mawozo network along National Road 3 (RN3). During these engagements, several members of the gang were killed or wounded. According to multiple circulating reports in local press and gang-affiliated channels, Ti-Lion, allegedly the number two commander of 400 Mawozo, was among those killed.

Security forces achieved additional operational gains, dismantling fortified positions, blocking points, and critical gang infrastructure. Police recovered the gang’s improvised armored bulldozer at Rue Grande Plaine and RD-303, used to barricade roads and damage public infrastructure. One of the most significant recoveries was a .50-caliber Barrett anti-materiel rifle, an American-manufactured weapon with a range of up to 2,800 meters and demonstrated capability to penetrate steel plates and disable armored vehicles. The rifle had been featured prominently in gang propaganda, and its loss reduces the group’s standoff fire capability.

Gunfire and armed movement escalated across Santo 9-10-11, Parc Hudson, Tabarre, and surrounding neighborhoods. Armed groups attempted to block RN1 near Canaan using seized freight trucks. Schools in Thomazeau and nearby communities closed abruptly, and residents were instructed to remain indoors. Fires continued in sections of Santo, and the APAID industrial facility was set ablaze, intensifying instability in the corridor.

Gang Threats by “Barbecue” and “Krisla” Paralyze Port au Prince

Activities were severely disrupted on Monday, November 17, 2025, throughout the metropolitan region of Port au Prince after two of Haiti’s most influential gang leaders, Jimmy Chérisier known as Barbecue and Christ Roi Chéry known as Krisla, released a series of threatening online videos urging residents to remain inside their homes. Their messages warned that armed groups would be present across key corridors, and once these videos spread rapidly through WhatsApp, TikTok, and Facebook, the city reacted immediately.

Embassies, including the United States Embassy, along with numerous international organizations, shifted to essential staff operations and suspended all noncritical movement. Schools and universities announced closures. Parents chose to keep children at home. Many businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and clinics also halted operations. Even commercial areas that usually remain active during periods of tension showed very little movement as fear spread across the population.

The Haitian National Police responded by canceling all leave and ordering every officer in the country to report for duty. Reinforced patrols were deployed across Delmas, Tabarre, Croix des Bouquets, Christ Roi, and the main arteries of the Cul de Sac plain. Police commanders increased the readiness posture and placed rapid response units on alert in anticipation of possible coordinated gang activity.

This situation illustrates how Barbecue and Krisla have become highly effective at using digital intimidation to influence the entire capital. Their videos are short, forceful, and designed to generate immediate reaction. They function as psychological tools that can immobilize a city of more than two million residents without the use of direct violence. These gang leaders understand that the population is exhausted after months of kidnappings, armed confrontations, and repeated blockades. As a result, they have learned that controlling public messaging can be just as powerful as controlling physical territory.

For security managers, school leaders, business owners, and parents, the decision making environment becomes extremely difficult under these conditions. Any movement on a day marked by gang issued threats can expose people to unpredictable encounters, abrupt road closures, or active clashes. Families cannot assume that the usual routes are safe. Organizations cannot justify placing staff on the streets when the threat level is both credible and constantly shifting. In such an environment, caution becomes the only responsible choice.

The result is a troubling reality in which armed groups influence daily life through communication alone. Each time the population complies with gang instructions, the perception grows that figures such as Barbecue and Krisla can determine when the city opens, when it closes, and how it functions. Their influence extends well beyond the neighborhoods they physically control and into the digital space where fear spreads quickly.

Reversing this dynamic will require far more than tactical police operations. Haiti will need a coordinated strategy to reclaim control over the public information space, restore confidence in state institutions, and reduce the ability of gang leaders to shape behavior through fear. Until these conditions are met, short video messages released by Barbecue or Krisla will continue to dictate the rhythm of life in Port au Prince.

U.S. Embassy Takes Hard Line Against Gangs Around its Facilities

A detachment of U.S. Marines assigned to protect the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince exchanged fire with armed attackers near an embassy housing compound on November 13, marking the most serious direct threat to the mission this year and underscoring the volatile security environment surrounding Tabarre. No American personnel were injured, but the brief and controlled engagement sent a clear and powerful message across the capital.

According to Marine Corps spokesperson Capt. Steven J. Keenan, the Marines “were supporting embassy security operations when they came under fire from a group of suspected gang members.” He said the Marines responded with disciplined, proportional force in accordance with established defensive protocols for U.S. diplomatic facilities. Officials did not confirm the number of assailants or whether they suffered casualties, but the confrontation triggered heightened security measures and reinforced the Embassy’s readiness posture.

Across Port-au-Prince, the response from ordinary Haitians was immediate and overwhelmingly positive. Many have openly praised Ambassador Wooster, the U.S. Marines and his security team for taking a firm, unambiguous stance.

For a population exhausted by violence and desperate for stability, the decisive posture of the Marines and Embassy leadership is being interpreted as a long overdue and welcome shift. Haitians on radio call-ins and social media channels have expressed broad support applauding the Embassy for showing that its personnel will not be intimidated, threatened, or placed in harm’s way. The Embassy’s strong response has been widely described as a message that armed groups have overstepped and that the U.S. Mission will defend its facilities, its personnel, and its operational freedom with clarity and resolve.

The Embassy compound at Tabarre 41, Boulevard du 15 Octobre, now sits inside one of the most contested urban corridors in the capital. Rival armed groups including factions tied to 400 Mawozo, Chen Mechan, and elements of the broader Viv Ansanm structure that operate within short distances of the Embassy perimeter. These groups routinely attempt to influence or control access routes linking Tabarre, Croix-des-Bouquets, Clercine, Bon Repos, and the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac.

Over the past months, gangs positioned in Tabarre 17, Tabarre 27, Santo, Lilavois, and surrounding zones have mounted roadblocks, ambushes, and armed patrols in close proximity to the Embassy. As the PNH continues counter-gang operations across the metropolitan area, the Embassy increasingly finds itself operating inside a fluid, high-risk battlespace where armed movements occur within a few hundred meters of diplomatic boundaries.

On Monday, November 17, 2025, the U.S. Embassy announced the arrival of an additional contingent of U.S. Marines to reinforce the mission. The Embassy noted that the new personnel will ensure the continuity of essential operations and strengthen long-standing support for the Haitian National Police.

Haitians have widely welcomed this reinforcement, viewing it as a clear confirmation that the United States is no longer willing to tolerate escalating gang aggression near its diplomatic facilities.

Haiti Pledges Fast Port-Security Reforms After U.S. Warning

The Director General of the National Port Authority (APN), Jean Evens Charles, says Haiti will move quickly to correct security deficiencies after the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) formally determined that the country is not meeting international port-security standards. The U.S. warning states that Haiti is not substantially implementing the ISPS Code and gives authorities about 90 days to show measurable progress. While Haiti has not yet been placed under “Conditions of Entry” (COE), this is the final step before restrictions that could increase delays, inspections, and costs for vessels calling at Haitian ports.

Charles said the APN is already assessing deficiencies and bringing in experts to address them, emphasizing that improvements will be made before the deadline. He noted that the APN has long-standing experience implementing the ISPS Code since 2004 and urged partners not to panic. According to him, communication between Haiti and U.S. maritime-security programs was disrupted for several years due to insecurity, which may explain why previous warnings were not received. Senior Haitian officials are now directly involved in coordinating the response and engaging with U.S. counterparts.

Despite these assurances, Haiti’s ports still face serious security gaps, including weak perimeter control, outdated security plans, limited access-control systems, and gang-contested access roads. These vulnerabilities were detailed in the USCG’s White Paper. If COE is imposed, vessels that recently visited Haiti could face offshore inspections, added security measures, and delays before entering U.S. ports are steps that often prompt major carriers to reduce or suspend service and reroute cargo through Dominican Republic ports.

Shipping lines, NGOs, and multinationals are being urged to prepare for potential disruptions, review supply-chain timelines, and consider routing alternatives. While the APN reports that security patrols and corrective actions are already underway, the U.S. determination signals a high-risk operating environment in the near term. Without rapid and verifiable improvements, maritime regulators and carriers may begin adjusting operations in anticipation of possible U.S. entry restrictions.

Haiti Sets August 2026 Target for Long-Delayed Elections, But Security Threats Loom

Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) has submitted a full election calendar to the government, proposing August 30, 2026, as the date for the first round of nationwide voting which is a major step toward restoring democratic governance after years without elections.The plan outlines a detailed, month-by-month path leading to the inauguration of a new president on February 7, 2027. But officials caution that the timeline is not guaranteed, as progress depends heavily on improved security, stable funding, and the government’s approval of a new electoral decree. This is Haiti’s most concrete electoral roadmap since the period before the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in 2021.

The CEP says it has completed or launched several key tasks, including:

• Recruiting staff for Departmental Electoral Offices

• Registering over 200 political parties

• Assessing voting centers nationwide

• Signing a broadcast agreement with the national television network

The CEP warns that elections cannot proceed unless:

• The draft electoral decree is officially published

• Security improves in gang-affected regions

• Full funding is secured

• Technical and logistical systems stay on schedule

Despite support from Haitian authorities and international partners, officials say the roadmap can move forward only if these conditions are met.

Key Dates at a Glance

• Political party registration: Jan 7–31, 2026

• Candidate registration: Feb 9–Mar 13, 2026

• Voter registration: Apr 1–Jun 29, 2026

• Campaign (Round 1): Mar 14–Aug 29, 2026

• Election Day (Round 1): Aug 30, 2026

• Runoff election: Dec 6, 2026

• New president sworn in: Feb 7, 2027

While the announcement marks significant progress, Haiti’s ability to hold a nationwide vote will depend largely on stabilizing the security environment, especially in areas controlled or contested by armed groups. For now, the calendar offers something Haiti has not had in years: a clear, if fragile, path back to elections.

Red Shirts for “The People’s Commissioner”: Massive Pro-Muscadin March in Haiti as UN Details Alleged Executions

Thousands of Haitians dressed in red flooded the streets of Miragoâne and surrounding communes today in a highly organized show of support for Government Commissioner Jean Ernest Muscadin, just as the United Nations and human-rights organizations continue to accuse him of a string of serious abuses, including extrajudicial executions and systematic violations of due process. The demonstration, described by local observers as one of the largest in recent years in Nippes, drew participants from Miragoâne, Petit-Trou, Paillant, Anse-à-Veau and nearby rural areas. Protesters marched in coordinated red shirts, riding in moto and vehicle convoys behind sound trucks, carrying placards that hailed Muscadin as “the defender of the South” and “the people’s commissioner.”

Chants and homemade banners targeted both his critics and the United Nations. Messages circulating in the crowd rejected the latest UN human-rights report and portrayed the international community as out of touch with daily life in Haiti’s southern peninsula.

“We are here in red to say that Muscadin protects us and we will not abandon him,” one protester said, standing along the coastal road as the crowd thickened. “The UN does not live what we live. They talk about procedures. We are trying to stay alive.”

The visible display of loyalty comes against the backdrop of detailed accusations from the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and Haitian rights groups. In recent human-rights reporting, BINUH has placed Muscadin at the center of several categories of alleged violations. UN monitors say Muscadin himself has claimed responsibility for killing at least two dozen people he identified as gang members or criminal suspects, in incidents that did not involve arrest, formal detention or judicial proceedings. These killings are described in UN documents as extrajudicial executions carried out in a context of total impunity.

The reports allege that Muscadin has operated outside normal chains of command, personally directing or taking part in armed operations, intervening directly in cases and at times removing suspects from formal police or judicial procedures. According to the UN and Haitian rights organizations, individuals labeled as suspected bandits were not brought before a court, were not granted defense rights, and were not processed through the criminal-justice system. Families were often left without official notification or clear information on what happened to their relatives. Rights groups have documented public statements in which Muscadin is alleged to have threatened to kill suspected criminals entering Nippes and to have used media platforms to reinforce a message that bandits would be executed rather than tried.

The UN has urged the Haitian state to open credible investigations, reassert government oversight over the Miragoâne prosecutor’s office and ensure that the right to life and fair trial are respected. Haitian organizations have gone further, calling for his removal from office and warning that his example reinforces a wider culture of impunity.

On the ground in southern Haiti, however, these allegations have not eroded Muscadin’s position. They have helped transform him into a symbol of resistance for many communities that feel abandoned by central authorities and threatened by gangs.

• In 2022 and 2023, large demonstrations in Miragoâne rejected any attempt to transfer or discipline Muscadin, with crowds insisting he remain in place.

• In late 2023, thousands again took to the streets after a formal reprimand from the Ministry of Justice, turning the protest into an overt show of defiance toward Port-au-Prince.

• In 2024, marches in Miragoâne and public events in Les Cayes explicitly framed support for Muscadin as a response to UN and human-rights criticism, portraying him as the only official effectively blocking gang expansion into the Grand Sud.

The November 17, red-shirt protest was a continuation of that pattern, but on a visibly larger scale. Businesses temporarily closed so employees could join the march. Church groups and youth organizations walked side by side with moto-taxi unions and market women. Vehicles honked in solidarity as they passed, and families watched the procession from balconies and rooftops. For many in the crowd, the UN reports and legal language carry little weight compared to their perception of immediate security. “When the gangs advance, it is not BINUH that stands in front of them,” said a local transport worker who joined the march. “Here, people see Muscadin standing there. That is why we are in the street.”

The confrontation around Muscadin now illustrates a deepening fault line in Haiti. On one side, the UN and rights organizations insist that even in a security crisis, state officials cannot bypass the law, kill suspects without trial, or operate outside judicial oversight. On the other side, large segments of the population in Nippes and the southern peninsula argue that, in the near total absence of effective state protection, they will support anyone who holds the line against gangs, even if his methods violate formal norms.

For the Haitian government, the dilemma is acute. Acting on UN recommendations and moving against Muscadin would likely trigger even larger demonstrations in the South and risk further alienating communities already skeptical of Port-au-Prince. Ignoring the allegations, however, deepens concerns about impunity and places Haiti at odds with its international human-rights commitments.

What the protests made clear is that Jean Ernest Muscadin’s support base is not shrinking. It is organized, vocal and ready to mobilize whenever his position appears threatened. As long as that remains true, any attempt to resolve the UN’s allegations will also mean confronting the political cost of acting against one of the most popular and polarizing figures in southern Haiti.

Amnesty International Challenges Dominican Claims on Haitian Impact to Healthcare System

A new Amnesty International report released on November 17, 2025, disputes longstanding political claims in the Dominican Republic that Haitian migrants are overwhelming the country’s public hospitals. The report, titled “Health Without Stigma,” concludes that the strain on the healthcare system is driven primarily by chronic underinvestment rather than by migrant demand. Citing data from the World Health Organization, Amnesty notes that the Dominican Republic allocates only 2.7 percent of its GDP to public health, one of the lowest levels in the region.

The organization expresses concern over a protocol introduced in April 2025 that requires foreign patients to provide visas, work permits, and proof of residence before receiving treatment, with noncompliance exposing them to potential arrest and deportation. Amnesty characterizes the measure as discriminatory and warns that it discourages vulnerable people from seeking care, especially along the border where Haitian populations are most present. Official figures included in the report show that Haitian migrants represent fewer than eight percent of public hospital consultations and less than fifteen percent of hospitalizations nationwide, far below levels that would explain overcrowding.

Amnesty also warns that these policies risk worsening public health conditions for all residents. Fear of arrest is pushing some Haitian women to avoid hospitals and give birth at home, increasing risks of maternal and infant mortality. The report argues that stigmatizing migrants diverts attention from serious structural failures in funding, planning, and disease prevention. Amnesty urges President Luis Abinader to repeal the protocol, end collective expulsions, and ensure that all people have access to essential healthcare without discrimination.

Airlink to Grand’Anse Collapses Again Amid Renewed Gang Threats

Sunrise Airlines abruptly cancelled its planned Port-au-Prince–Jérémie flight on Monday, November 17, after receiving direct threats from armed groups aligned with the Viv Ansanm coalition. The decision, taken despite heightened security measures around the capital’s airport, underscores the persistent vulnerability of Haiti’s air corridors and the continued disruption of essential services by armed actors. For Grand’Anse residents, who rely almost entirely on air travel due to gang-controlled roadways, the cancellation extinguished hopes of reconnecting with the rest of the country.

The flight had been expected to mark a cautious return to regular service following months of suspension linked to violence around Toussaint Louverture International Airport. However, intelligence indicating possible attempts to interfere with airport operations forced Sunerise to halt the resumption. “We cannot risk the lives of our passengers and staff,” a company representative said, capturing the broader climate of uncertainty surrounding aviation operators in Haiti.

The repercussions are immediate and severe. Merchants in Jérémie now face renewed shortages, students and families remain separated, and residents describe their department as effectively isolated. With no new date announced for a restart, the population of Grand’Anse waits anxiously for improvements in security conditions, the essential prerequisite for restoring the region’s only reliable lifeline.

Assessment of the PNH’s Renewed Offensive and Emerging Operational Momentum

PNH Director General André Jonas Vladimir Paraison’s November 16 declaration of a renewed offensive posture marks a significant moment for the Haitian National Police. Its importance stems not from new rhetoric, but from how closely it aligns with the tangible operational gains achieved over recent months. His announcement reflects an institution working to rebuild national confidence at a time when public trust remains fragile. Unlike earlier declarations, this one is supported by measurable improvements within the PNH’s specialized units, giving real weight to the offensive direction he described.

A major factor behind these gains is the sustained support provided by the U.S. Embassy’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) program. INL-funded equipment, mobility platforms, communications systems, weapons, and protective gear have significantly strengthened key tactical units such as UDMO, SWAT, BOID, UTAG and other specialized teams. These upgraded units now operate with more capability, structure, and discipline than in previous years. Equally important is the integration of front-line medical and tactical medical (TACMED) components into these forces, including advanced trauma kits, IFAKs, hemorrhage-control tools, extraction litters, and personnel trained in Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC). These medical enhancements have improved survivability, boosted confidence, and reduced operational hesitation during prolonged engagements.

INL support has also expanded the PNH’s air medical evacuation options, providing rapid casualty extraction capabilities that allow specialized units to maneuver aggressively in high-threat areas while maintaining continuity of operations. The combination of TACMED-equipped ground elements and reliable air-medical evacuation platforms has created a more resilient and professional force, capable of sustaining pressure under complex and hostile conditions.

Embedded INL-funded Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) further reinforce this progress. Their real-time advisory assistance, operational planning guidance, and technical oversight have improved targeting accuracy, enhanced discipline, and strengthened the command and control of multi-unit operations. This comprehensive model has shifted pressure onto armed groups in Delmas, Croix-des-Bouquets, Morne Cabrit, and the Artibonite, where gangs have been forced to retreat, abandon terrain, or disperse. Although gains remain uneven and the environment remains fluid, this represents the strongest operational momentum the PNH has generated in more than a year.

Sustaining this momentum remains the core challenge. The elevated performance of PNH Specialized teams depends heavily on continued INL-backed logistics, medical sustainment, air-medical support, mobility, and structured planning. Without this ongoing reinforcement, recent advances could weaken. Gangs still possess financial resources, weaponry, and tactical adaptability that allow them to respond quickly to police pressure. Political dynamics also continue to shape or restrict operational decisions in ways that fall outside the PNH’s direct control.

Paraison’s November 16 announcement should therefore be understood as both a strategic message and an operational signal. It seeks to reassure the public, project institutional resolve, and demonstrate to armed groups that the PNH is increasingly capable and increasingly confident. Whether this moment becomes a lasting turning point or simply another cautious step forward will depend on sustained operational pressure and continued support. What is clear is that INL-funded upgrades, integrated front-line medical and TACMED capabilities, improved air-medical evacuation, embedded SME guidance, and the growing effectiveness of units such as UTAG have given the PNH tools and confidence it has not possessed in years, and these elements are now reshaping the tactical environment across multiple fronts.

Haiti Deepens Security Cooperation with Colombia as 23 PNH Officers Begin Advanced Training in Bogotá

Twenty-three officers from the Haitian National Police have departed for Bogotá to begin a five-week intensive training program led by Colombian security specialists. The curriculum focuses on intervention tactics, investigative methods, and intelligence operations, and includes participants from units such as the BRI, BLVV, and DCPJ. This diverse delegation, ranging from officers to inspectors, will receive advanced instruction designed to strengthen Haiti’s capacity to confront complex criminal networks.

The training forms part of an expanded bilateral cooperation framework launched during President Gustavo Petro’s official visit to Port-au-Prince in July 2025. During that visit, President Petro announced a comprehensive initiative to train up to one thousand members of both the Haitian National Police and the Armed Forces of Haiti. He also underscored the historical ties connecting the two nations, highlighting symbolic contributions such as the role of Haitian women in the creation of the Colombian flag and emphasizing a shared commitment to resilience and freedom.

OAS and PNH Conclude Six-Week Program to Strengthen Police Instructor Corps

The Organization of American States and the Haitian National Police have completed a six-week instructor development program at the National Police Academy, supported through funding from the Government of Canada via Cowater International. This initiative, part of the broader RANP project valued at 10.5 million Canadian dollars, focuses on modernizing the academy, improving teaching methods, and creating updated training modules centered on human rights and inclusion. The goal is to professionalize internal training, enhance supervision of new recruits, and reinforce the PNH’s institutional autonomy.

According to the OAS representation in Haiti, the successful completion of this program marks a significant step toward expanding the PNH’s training capacity and preparing a new generation of qualified instructors. The graduates of this course will now be responsible for training future classes of police officers, contributing to a more capable, standardized, and resilient police force.

International Security Developments in Haiti: November 11–18, 2025

Between November 11 and 18, 2025, developments surrounding the United Nations-authorized Gang Suppression Force (GSF) revealed a growing sense of urgency but little tangible progress in mobilizing the manpower and resources required to operationalize the mission. On November 16, a newly released UN report highlighted that gang control in Haiti is no longer confined to Port-au-Prince but is expanding into rural regions, deepening the complexity of the security crisis and raising immediate concerns regarding the scale and type of response the GSF will need to field. The report underscores the deteriorating conditions on the ground, where armed groups continue to consolidate territorial control at a pace that threatens to outstrip the international community’s ability to deploy an effective stabilization force. This expanding geographic footprint greatly increases the operational demands placed on the future GSF, which was originally conceptualized with a strong focus on the capital region.

Regional coordination efforts also featured prominently during this period. Although slightly outside the seven-day window, an OAS update published on November 5 shaped the context for the week by reaffirming the organization’s commitment to supporting UN Security Council Resolution 2793 and urging member states to submit nominations and formal contributions for the GSF. This alignment places the OAS in a central role in standardizing political support and operational guidelines for the mission. However, despite these structural advances, no new countries publicly pledged additional troops, police units, or specialized personnel during the November 11-18 timeframe. This continued absence of force commitments is notable given that the GSF’s mandate authorizes up to 5,500 personnel, a target that remains far from being met. Analysts continue to warn that the mission risks replicating past failures if the gap between authorized capacity and deployed capacity is not closed quickly.

The week also revealed the extent of the mission’s implementation challenges. While the mandate is robust in tasking the GSF with neutralizing, deterring, and containing heavily armed gangs, the force remains largely conceptual. Donor countries have not yet delivered comprehensive deployment timelines, personnel rosters, logistics packages, or funding levels required to operationalize the mission. No updates emerged regarding the establishment of forward operating bases, appointment of senior command staff, or development of a logistical backbone capable of sustaining a multinational deployment. At the same time, policy analysis released within the week reinforced concerns that the UN may be attempting to reinvent peacekeeping in Haiti without securing the foundational resources needed for success. With gang expansion accelerating and donor commitments stagnant, the operational window for meaningful intervention is narrowing. The coming period will be decisive: whether partners translate political will into concrete contributions or whether Haiti continues to face escalating violence while awaiting an international response that has yet to materialize.