Weekly Report September 09 to September 16

Cabaret Massacre Leaves Over 40 Dead as Haiti Faces Escalating Gang Violence

At least 42 people were killed in Labodrie, a fishing community between Cabaret and Arcahaïe, in one of the deadliest massacres to strike Haiti this year. The attack, carried out on September 11 by heavily armed members of the “Viv Ansanm” criminal coalition, left families decimated, homes and businesses burned, and survivors fleeing in fear of further assaults.

Local officials reported that the massacre was a reprisal following the September 7 killing of a gang leader known as Vladimir, a figure within the Cabaret faction of Viv Ansanm. According to Baptiste Joseph Louis, president of the local communal council (CASEC), residents were accused of passing information to self-defense brigades in Arcahaïe. Witnesses described indiscriminate gunfire against women, children, and the elderly, with some bodies left uncollected and partially consumed by stray dogs.

The Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) issued a note of sympathy on September 15, denouncing the killings as acts of “revolting cruelty” and pledging the deployment of specialized police units to secure the population and track down the perpetrators. Prime Minister Laurent Saint-Cyr described the massacre as “barbarism” and announced reinforced security operations around Cabaret, Arcahaïe, and neighboring areas, including humanitarian and psychological support for survivors.

“The State will stop at nothing. The gangs will be hunted down, neutralized and annihilated. The Republic does not negotiate with terror,” the Prime Minister said in a statement.

The Office of the Protection of the Citizen (OPC) criticized what it called the “laxity” of security officials and demanded that the High Council of the National Police (CSPN) develop a context-specific security plan. The OPC recalled Haiti’s constitutional and international obligations to guarantee the right to life, citing Article 19 of the 1987 Constitution and key instruments of the International Bill of Human Rights.

Pierre Espérance, executive secretary of the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH), linked the killings to a chain of retaliations between gangs and community defense brigades. He reported that bodies remained visible in the streets days after the massacre, underscoring the climate of terror.

The massacre has drawn widespread condemnation abroad. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed “strong indignation,” offering condolences to the families of the victims and urging Haitian authorities to conduct a thorough investigation and bring those responsible to justice. He also called on partner nations to strengthen the struggling Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM).

The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince denounced the attack, describing Viv Ansanm as “terrorist gangs” responsible for “senseless violence.” The European Union delegation, joined by the embassies of France and Spain, urged the Haitian government to create specialized judicial units to prosecute financial crimes and mass atrocities.

Analysis provided by Halo Solutions Firm S.A.

The massacre in Labodrie was rooted in both retaliation and territorial control. The immediate trigger was the assassination of Vladimir, a local Viv Ansanm leader, during a festivity in Cabaret on September 7. His death was seen as both a symbolic and operational blow to the gang, prompting a violent reprisal against civilians accused of collaborating with rival groups and local self-defense brigades in Arcahaïe.

Beyond revenge, the attack demonstrates the coalition’s strategy of using mass violence to instill fear and deter resistance. By targeting an entire community, Viv Ansanm aimed to punish suspected informants, intimidate neighboring towns such as Arcahaïe, and solidify control over strategic routes north of Port-au-Prince.

The incident also reflects the broader dynamics of Haiti’s gang landscape, where criminal groups respond to leadership losses with disproportionate violence to maintain dominance and prevent defections. The killing of Vladimir risked weakening Viv Ansanm’s grip on Cabaret; the slaughter in Labodrie served as a warning that any act against gang leadership would result in collective punishment.

Ultimately, the Labodrie massacre illustrates how gangs weaponize terror not only to avenge their leaders but also to expand and consolidate territorial influence, projecting power in areas where state security forces remain absent or ineffective.

PNH and Brigadiers Begin Clearing Route de Bercy After Days of Paralysis

The Haitian National Police (PNH), supported by local self-defense brigades, launched an operation early Monday that partially cleared the Route de Bercy, the main road linking Cabaret to Arcahaïe. For several days, the strategic corridor had been blocked by large shipping containers used as barricades, paralyzing traffic and isolating thousands of residents and travelers from the Far North.

Authorities confirmed that several of the obstacles were removed, allowing for a gradual resumption of movement. While traffic has not yet been fully restored, police sources said the area must first be completely secured before official reopening. “We want to avoid any recurrence. The priority is to guarantee a sustainable return to normality,” one officer told reporters on condition of anonymity.

The reopening of Route de Bercy is seen as a critical step toward restoring circulation along the corridor connecting northern Haiti to the capital. Yet uncertainty persists among the population, who fear that without a permanent security presence, the fragile calm could quickly give way to renewed violence.

National Road #1 Reopened After Nine Days of Blockade in Arcahaie

After more than nine days of paralysis, traffic resumed Monday on National Road #1, the main highway linking Port-au-Prince to northern Haiti.

The reopening followed a coordinated operation by the Haitian National Police (HNP), supported by communal crossing guards and local security groups. According to municipal authorities, the effort successfully restored circulation along the critical corridor, which had been blocked by armed groups since early September.

Officials emphasized that the road’s reopening marks a significant step toward restoring order and ensuring mobility between the capital and the northern departments.

Liancourt Police Station Burned in Broad Daylight as Gran Grif Gang Seizes Commune

On September 15, heavily armed men affiliated with the Gran Grif gang from Savien assaulted the police station in Liancourt in broad daylight on Monday. After exchanging heavy gunfire with officers of the Haitian National Police (PNH), the attackers set the police building ablaze. The blaze followed the station’s takeover, as police retreated under the gunfire. No casualties among officers have been reported thus far. Families who had recently returned to Liancourt fled once more, seeking safety from the brutality of gang violence led by the group under Lucson Elan.

The destroyed station represents just one of a series of recurrent attacks in Liancourt and the broader Artibonite region. Earlier in September, a police raid reportedly resulted in the deaths of about ten suspected gang members, with weapons and a motorcycle seized. On July 22, Gran Grif ambushed and killed two officers and two community watch brigadiers, also burning an armored PNH vehicle in the confrontation. Gran Grif, now listed by the UN Security Council as the largest gang in Artibonite, has been responsible for a significant portion of civilian deaths in the region since 2022. Past violent incidents involving Liancourt include a 2023 attack when Gran Grif conducted multiple operations in and around Liancourt. In July 2023, during local festivities, the gang attacked the town, killed self-defense group members, wounded dozens of merchants, and set shops ablaze. Another attack on the Liancourt police station has been documented on February 8, 2023, when Gran Grif carried out at least three assaults on the facility. Analyses by the UN and independent groups have shown that Gran Grif’s modus operandi includes targeting public infrastructure (especially police stations) to undermine state authority and limit government presence.

According to Halo Client Rescue S.A., the repeated attacks on the Liancourt police station reflect a deliberate strategy by Gran Grif to assert control over the Artibonite region and dismantle symbols of state power. By destroying the police station, the gang aims not only to neutralize law enforcement resistance but also to sow fear and demonstrate that the State cannot guarantee security even in its own institutions. The gang’s leader, Luckson Elan, appears to employ a pattern of reprisals and punitive destruction following clashes with security forces. Attacks tend to follow police raids or perceived betrayals, as seen in the February 2023 Liancourt station attacks and in Pont-Sondé. These reprisals are meant to discourage both civilian cooperation and police operations.

Control of Liancourt is strategically important for Gran Grif. The commune lies within Artibonite, a department central to food production, road transport, and trade routes. By disrupting state presence there (police stations, checkpoints and roads), Gran Grif weakens governmental control and interferes with mobility and commerce, which in turn increases the gang’s leverage, whether through extortion, informal tolls, or claims of “governance” by default. The lack of sustained state reinforcements, insufficient fortification of police infrastructure, and reactive rather than proactive security responses all contribute to the gang’s ability to conduct such assaults with impunity. For lasting deterrence, a strategy is needed that combines reinforced security presence, community engagement, preventive intelligence, and infrastructure protection.

PNH Mechanic Killed and Officers Injured in Kenscoff Ambush

The Haitian National Police (PNH) confirmed that one of its armored units came under attack late on the night of September 13 in the commune of Kenscoff, resulting in the death of a police mechanic and injuries to two officers.

According to an official statement released Sunday, heavily armed individuals assaulted a PNH armored vehicle with Molotov cocktails and gasoline in the locality of ObLeon. The attack killed driver-mechanic Texon Mercy, assigned to the SWAT unit, and left two other officers wounded.

Specialized PNH forces responded immediately, engaging the assailants in heavy gunfire.

Several of the attackers were reportedly killed in the exchange. The operation, referred to as “Kilo a Tou Manteg,” highlighted the ongoing risks faced by security personnel in direct confrontations with gangs.

PNH Commander-in-Chief André Jonas Vladimir Paraison expressed condolences to the family of the fallen officer and commended the courage of those deployed in the field. He reiterated the police force’s determination to intensify operations against armed groups across the country.

The Kenscoff ambush underscores how gangs are adapting their tactics to exploit the vulnerabilities of armored police vehicles. By using Molotov cocktails and improvised incendiary devices, the attackers targeted weak points such as engine compartments, fuel lines, and external systems that are not fully protected by ballistic armor. This method is designed to disable mobility and force officers to abandon cover, creating opportunities for direct assault.

The death of the driver-mechanic also highlights the crucial role of technical specialists in sustaining armored deployments. Targeting drivers and mechanics undermines the operational capacity of the units and raises morale risks across the force.

From a strategic perspective, the attack demonstrates a deliberate effort to test the resilience of specialized units deployed outside Port-au-Prince. Kenscoff’s terrain, with narrow roads and limited escape routes, creates conditions favorable to ambushes. By inflicting casualties in such an environment, gangs aim to show that even armored units are vulnerable, thereby eroding public confidence in the state’s ability to project security.

To counter this tactic, reinforced training in convoy operations, fire suppression systems integrated into armored fleets, and advance reconnaissance of deployment routes will be essential. Sustained aerial overwatch and coordination with community watch brigades could also reduce exposure in vulnerable terrain.

Dominican Republic Expels Over 1,300 Haitians Amid Intensified Immigration Crackdown

Dominican authorities announced the arrest of more than 1,100 migrants, the vast majority of them Haitians, during a week of intensified immigration operations. Over 1,000 of those detained have already been expelled to Haiti, underscoring the government’s tougher stance on cross-border migration.

According to the Directorate General of Migration, a total of 1,161 people were detained for irregular status. The Dominican Army intercepted 254 Haitians, the National Police detained 113, and the Specialized Border Security Corps (CESFRONT) arrested 21. Of these, 1,046 were quickly processed and repatriated through official border crossings at Dajabón, Elías Piña, Jimaní, and Pedernales.

The operation reflects the Dominican Republic’s broader policy shift toward stricter migration enforcement, particularly as Haiti’s crisis drives a surge in cross-border movement. In recent months, Dominican authorities have reinforced checkpoints, expanded deportation programs, and tightened border controls. These measures have drawn criticism from human rights groups, who argue that mass expulsions often occur without adequate due process or humanitarian safeguards.

Officials in Santo Domingo, however, defend the operations as necessary to preserve national security, control illegal migration, and ease pressure on public services. The actions come amid escalating tensions between the two countries, with the Haitian government struggling to contain gang violence and displacement that have fueled large-scale migration flows.

The Dominican Republic’s accelerated expulsions highlight both security and humanitarian concerns along the Haitian border. The return of over 1,000 Haitians in a single week adds pressure to communities already destabilized by gang violence, food insecurity, and internal displacement. Many of those expelled lack immediate access to shelter, medical care, or income opportunities, increasing the likelihood of secondary displacement inside Haiti.

From a security perspective, the mass repatriations risk further destabilizing areas already contested by gangs, especially in Ouanaminthe, Belladère, and Malpasse, where displaced populations are vulnerable to recruitment, extortion, or violence. Dominican officials frame these measures as a national security necessity, but the lack of coordination with Haitian authorities and international agencies raises concerns about border-area volatility.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that unless binational dialogue and humanitarian mechanisms are reinforced, continued large-scale expulsions will exacerbate instability. The likelihood of rising humanitarian needs, coupled with increased tension in border towns, makes this a critical flashpoint for both security actors and aid providers operating in northern and central Haiti.

Twenty-Five Haitian Soldiers Deployed to Martinique for Training Under Franco-Haitian Partnership

A new contingent of 25 members of the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD’H) departed on Sunday for Martinique to take part in a two-week training program. The announcement was made by France’s Ambassador to Haiti, Antoine Michon, through a statement on his official X account.

The mission forms part of the Sabre partnership, a military cooperation initiative between France and Haiti designed to strengthen the operational and professional capacities of the FAD’H. According to Ambassador Michon, the training aims to support the ongoing process of professionalization and to enhance the role of the Haitian military in ensuring national security.

This deployment follows a similar mission earlier in the summer, when approximately thirty Haitian soldiers traveled to Martinique on July 21 for training sessions that focused on operational readiness, intervention techniques, military discipline, leadership, and crisis management.

Top U.S. Diplomat Warns Haitian Politicians and Gang Leaders of Consequences for Blocking Transition

In a video message released on the U.S. Embassy’s official X account, Chargé d’Affaires Henry Wooster delivered one of Washington’s strongest statements to date on Haiti’s crisis, warning that unelected politicians and gang leaders who obstruct the political transition will face “consequences.”

Wooster said that both groups had undermined governance and security in Haiti for far too long and emphasized that the United States would hold accountable not only gang leaders but also the arms traffickers, financiers, and political figures who enable them. “We are taking action against criminals who ship weapons to Haiti and those who support terrorist gangs,” Wooster declared, noting that the United States had recently carried out military strikes against the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, which, like Haiti’s Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif coalitions, is now designated a foreign terrorist organization.

The diplomat also revealed that Washington has revoked U.S. residency permits for individuals linked to Haitian gangs. “If you support violent organizations, you will not be allowed to remain in the United States, including your family members. The era of impunity is over,” he stated. “If you hinder Haiti’s security or political transition, expect consequences.”

Wooster stressed that U.S. policy is guided by the principle that Haitians should determine their own future, but he acknowledged widespread skepticism. “I assure you today that we want Haitians to write the future of Haiti,” he added, pledging continued engagement with citizens and civil society.

On the security front, the chargé d’affaires underscored that Washington’s top priority is stabilizing Haiti, describing current measures as insufficient. He outlined U.S. support for a new multinational Gang Suppression Force, to be authorized under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which allows enforcement action including the use of force. The proposed force, he said, would number more than 5,000 personnel, five times the size of the current Kenya-led mission and would be fully funded to ensure its sustainability.

“Security is essential for the stability of the state and indispensable for legitimate governance,” Wooster said, welcoming recent efforts by Haitian authorities to retake and rebuild areas previously controlled by gangs.

Henry Wooster’s remarks mark a significant escalation in U.S. messaging toward Haiti’s political and criminal actors. By equating unelected politicians with gang leaders, Washington is signaling that obstruction of the political transition will be treated as a direct threat to U.S. security and diplomatic objectives in the Caribbean. This framing broadens accountability beyond armed groups to include elites accused of financing or shielding them.

The announcement of U.S. residency revocations for gang-linked individuals reflects a shift toward using immigration law as a tool of coercive diplomacy. This measure is designed not only to punish offenders but also to deter others in the political and business classes who may see cooperation with gangs as a survival strategy.

The reference to Chapter 7 authorization for a 5,000-strong Gang Suppression Force represents the clearest indication yet that the United States views the current Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) as insufficient. By pushing for a larger, better-funded force with enforcement powers, Washington is preparing for a more assertive approach, potentially involving U.S. logistical and intelligence support even if American troops do not deploy directly.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that this message serves three purposes: first, to warn Haitian politicians that obstruction will carry personal costs; second, to reassure civil society that international engagement is intensifying; and third, to lay the groundwork for international consensus on a more robust intervention. The risk, however, is that gangs and political spoilers may accelerate their campaigns of violence to undermine the transition before such a force is deployed. The months leading up to the proposed transition deadline therefore represent a period of elevated threat, requiring close monitoring and proactive planning.

Haitian Coast Guard Engages Gonâve Island Authorities on Maritime Security

The Haitian National Police (HNP) announced that the head of the Coast Guard, Jean Pedro Mars, held a meeting on September 8 with local officials on Gonâve Island to address growing concerns over maritime security. The session provided an opportunity for local authorities to raise issues affecting maritime activity in the region, including the safety of cargo vessels, fishing boats, and passenger transport. According to the HNP, the meeting concluded with commitments to strengthen patrols and implement measures aimed at deterring attacks on ships operating near the island. The announcement comes amid broader concerns about the vulnerability of Haiti’s maritime routes, which are vital for commerce, fishing, and civilian mobility.

The Haitian Coast Guard, a small component of the Haitian National Police, plays a disproportionately critical role in national security given Haiti’s geography. With nearly 1,100 miles of coastline and reliance on maritime routes for food supply, trade, and fuel imports, securing these waters is a strategic priority. Yet the Coast Guard faces serious structural difficulties. It operates with a small fleet of aging patrol boats, many of which suffer from poor maintenance and intermittent fuel shortages. International donations, including vessels provided by the United States and Taiwan in past years, have improved capacity somewhat, but operational readiness remains inconsistent. The lack of spare parts, trained technicians, and logistical support undermines sustainability.

The Coast Guard’s limited assets cannot adequately cover vast coastal areas, particularly vulnerable points such as the Gulf of Gonâve, the Windward Passage, and northern smuggling corridors. This leaves maritime routes exposed to banditry, trafficking networks, and piracy-like attacks on fishermen and small vessels. Smuggling of arms, narcotics, and fuel across Haiti’s porous maritime borders is a persistent issue, with criminal networks exploiting weak monitoring to move contraband from Jamaica, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic into Haiti. The rise of heavily armed gangs onshore has also increased the threat of maritime extortion and attacks on coastal communities.

Compounding these challenges is the institutional weakness of the Coast Guard, which reflects broader issues within the HNP, including limited budgets, understaffing, and overlapping jurisdictional mandates. Without a clear strategic plan and reliable international assistance, the force risks being reactive rather than preventive in its operations. The Gonâve Island meeting demonstrates recognition of maritime security as an urgent concern. However, without substantial investment in training, fleet modernization, and logistical sustainability, the Haitian Coast Guard will struggle to meet rising threats. For Haiti, maritime insecurity is not only a sovereignty issue but also a humanitarian one, as it directly impacts food imports, fishing livelihoods, and the safe movement of people between islands and the mainland.

Regional comparisons underscore how far Haiti lags behind its neighbors. The Bahamas, with fewer than 400,000 residents, maintains a Coast Guard supported by U.S. and British partnerships, with high-speed interceptors and integrated radar systems to deter trafficking and piracy. Jamaica’s Coast Guard operates from Kingston with a modest but functional fleet of offshore patrol vessels, backed by training and equipment agreements with the United States Southern Command. Even the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s immediate neighbor, has invested in a naval force capable of enforcing maritime law, interdicting narcotics shipments, and deterring irregular migration.

These models suggest that effective maritime security in the Caribbean depends less on size than on sustained investment, international partnerships, and a clear doctrine of operations. For Haiti, replicating such structures would require a phased approach: first, restoring operational readiness of existing vessels and ensuring fuel and maintenance supply lines; second, establishing coastal radar and communications systems to improve situational awareness; and third, creating structured agreements with partners such as the U.S. Coast Guard, France, and CARICOM states to expand training and joint patrols.

Without these reforms, the Haitian Coast Guard will remain unable to counter the growing threats posed by smuggling, piracy, and gang-linked maritime operations. The Gonâve Island meeting reflects an awareness of these risks, but only long-term investment and external support will allow Haiti to transform its maritime security posture from reactive to preventive.

Port-au-Prince Security Operation Disrupts City as Citizens Turn to Sea Routes

The Haitian National Police (HNP) launched a major operation on Monday morning in downtown Port-au-Prince aimed at limiting the influence of armed groups, particularly the Viv Ansanm coalition active in several districts of the capital.

According to initial reports, traffic was heavily restricted around the National Palace and adjacent areas, with vehicles barred from circulating and citizens forced to move on foot. The operation significantly disrupted economic and administrative activities in the city center.

Amid the tightened security presence, the city continues to experience signs of systemic strain. Armored vehicles assigned to the HNP for counter-gang operations have been observed transporting civilians between Champ de Mars and the National Port Authority.

At the port itself, large crowds seek passage to southern towns such as Miragoâne, Petit-Goâve, and Les Cayes. With land routes under the control of armed groups, maritime transport has become an alternative for many families. Boats capable of carrying dozens of vehicles now serve as improvised ferries, with costs ranging from $500 for small cars to over $2,000 for larger trucks.

These developments highlight the pressures on Port-au-Prince as security operations intensify, and citizens increasingly rely on maritime routes to bypass gang-controlled roads.

The HNP’s downtown operation demonstrates both the state’s intent to regain control of critical areas and the extent to which daily life in Port-au-Prince has been reshaped by insecurity. The heavy restrictions near the National Palace illustrate the tactical focus on protecting government institutions, yet they also reveal how limited mobility directly disrupts commerce and administration.

The parallel use of armored vehicles as improvised public transport highlights the strains on institutional resources. Assets intended for counter-gang operations are being diverted into civilian use, a sign of both public demand and the difficulty of maintaining operational discipline in the face of humanitarian needs. This diversion, however, reduces the capacity of the HNP to sustain security operations at the level required to confront heavily armed groups.

The shift toward maritime routes underscores a broader adaptation by the population. With gangs exerting control over major land corridors, sea transport has emerged as the only viable alternative for moving people and goods between Port-au-Prince and the south. The unregulated and costly nature of this traffic creates risks for safety, extortion, and further criminal exploitation of maritime corridors.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that the combination of intensified police operations in the capital and the reliance on maritime transport reflects a transitional stage in Haiti’s security landscape. While the HNP can mount limited operations in urban centers, gangs retain strategic dominance over key supply routes. Unless sustained international support and coordinated security planning are applied, the gap between state presence in symbolic locations and gang control of vital infrastructure will continue to widen.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. Analysis: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Proposed UN Resolution for Haiti

A draft resolution currently under consideration by the United Nations Security Council proposes establishing a United Nations Haiti Support Office, known as BUNAH, tasked with providing financial, administrative, and logistical support to a new 5,500-member Gang Repression Force. This force would succeed the Multinational Security Support Mission and be granted authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to neutralize armed groups, secure critical infrastructure, and restore public order.

The draft envisions assessed contributions to finance core support functions, alongside a voluntary trust fund to cover personnel costs. Key partner states including the United States, Canada, Kenya, and several Latin American and Caribbean countries are expected to hold strategic decision-making authority. The draft also incorporates provisions on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as public health oversight to mitigate the risk of cholera, reflecting lessons learned from previous international operations in Haiti.

From a legal perspective, the hybrid architecture of BUNAH and the Gang Repression Force represents a significant innovation. By combining United Nations logistical structures with an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII, the proposal seeks to address the shortcomings of the Multinational Security Support Mission, which has so far struggled to reach operational capacity. The reliance on assessed contributions is a notable shift, as it would compel member states to provide resources on a predictable basis rather than leaving the mission vulnerable to inconsistent voluntary support.

The resolution also raises questions about sovereignty and legitimacy. While Chapter VII authorization provides international legal grounding for enforcement action, Haitian consent remains crucial for domestic acceptance and long-term sustainability. Past experiences with international missions in Haiti demonstrate that ambiguity in mandates often fuels mistrust and creates risks of overreach. Explicit safeguards regarding the role of Haitian institutions, jurisdictional authority, and accountability mechanisms will be necessary to avoid repeating the problems seen in earlier interventions.

The proposed governance structure, which gives partner states a direct role in decision making, could help distribute responsibility but also risk creating coordination challenges. Different actors may hold diverging priorities or rules of engagement, which can complicate unity of command. Clear chains of accountability and transparent oversight mechanisms will be required to ensure operational coherence and legitimacy.

The inclusion of normative guarantees, particularly concerning sexual exploitation and health protections, reflects an awareness of past failures. Ensuring these guarantees are not only included in the resolution but also actively enforced in practice will be critical to maintaining credibility.

Operationally, the greatest risk remains underfunding and slow deployment. Even with Chapter VII authority, the force will require reliable equipment, supply chains, and sufficient personnel to cover not only Port-au-Prince but also vulnerable areas in the Artibonite, Central Plateau, and border regions. If the mission lacks the resources or willingness to confront gangs entrenched outside the capital, its impact will be limited.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that the resolution, if finalized with clear legal language, robust financing, and firm oversight, has the potential to reshape international engagement in Haiti. If it falls short in these areas, it risks becoming another limited intervention that neither restores stability nor strengthens Haitian sovereignty. The months ahead will determine whether this initiative marks a turning point in the struggle against armed groups or another cycle of incomplete measures that leave Haiti’s population in a state of insecurity.

Solino Residents Return Home After Months of Gang Displacement

After months of forced displacement, residents of Solino have begun returning to their neighborhood in Port-au-Prince, marking a fragile but hopeful step toward recovery. Supported by the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, community members launched a large-scale cleanup operation this week to clear debris, repair damaged homes, and begin restoring normal life.

The return follows a video released by the G9 gang, which previously held sway over the area, indicating that families in Solino and Delmas could go back to their homes. Although the situation remains uncertain, this signal has allowed displaced residents to re-enter their community after months of exile.

For many, the return carries deep emotional weight. One resident, who has lived in Solino since 1974, described the anguish of being uprooted from the home where he raised his children. Another, a Vodou priest and community leader, recounted nine months away from the neighborhood where he was born and raised. Both spoke on condition of anonymity due to ongoing security concerns.

The broader context remains volatile. Last month, the U.S. Department of State offered a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest of Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, the G9 leader sanctioned for serious human rights abuses including the 2018 La Saline massacre. Vitelhomme Innocent, another gang leader aligned with the Viv Ansanm coalition, is also under U.S. and UN sanctions and has been placed on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list for his alleged role in the kidnapping and murder of American citizens.

Despite these challenges, the partnership between Solino residents and public works officials underscores a determination to rebuild. The cleanup effort represents a significant step toward reclaiming the community, with residents demonstrating resilience and commitment to restoring the vitality of one of Port-au-Prince’s emblematic neighborhoods.

Haiti’s Former Prime Ministers Warn of Institutional Crisis as 2026 Deadline Nears

Haiti’s Forum of Former Prime Ministers (FAPM) has warned of a looming political crisis, cautioning that the country could face an institutional vacuum when the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) ends on February 7, 2026. In a public statement issued on September 9, the group described the date as a critical juncture that could plunge the nation into paralysis if elections or a legitimate transitional arrangement are not in place.

The warning comes at a time of deepening instability. Haiti continues to be paralyzed by gang violence, economic collapse, and international isolation. The closure of the border with the Dominican Republic and the suspension of international flights have compounded the crisis, leaving the population increasingly vulnerable. The Forum argues that the CPT has little chance of completing its assigned mission to organize a constitutional referendum and general elections, and that failure could push the country further toward anarchy.

To avert this outcome, the FAPM recommends invoking Article 136 of the Constitution, which would permit the CPT to convene an “inclusive national assembly.” Such a gathering would bring together political parties, civil society, religious institutions, the private sector, youth and women’s groups, and representatives of the Haitian diaspora to draft a national agenda beyond February 2026. The Forum insists that this approach must be Haitian-led, warning against repeating patterns of dependency on external actors whose interventions have historically produced limited results.

Still, the credibility of the Forum’s message is complicated by the political records of its members. Several of the former prime ministers who signed the appeal once governed under heavy international influence and failed to deliver stability during their own terms in office. Their renewed calls for sovereignty carry the weight of an implicit acknowledgment of those shortcomings.

Despite this baggage, the statement has resonated as a clear signal of urgency. Observers note that the risk of February 2026 arriving without a transition framework is real and widely recognized. In the context of pervasive mistrust of political elites, any effort to maintain continuity will require broad participation and transparency if it is to avoid fueling further polarization.

From an analytical perspective, the warning highlights several risks. The absence of a credible authority would deepen perceptions of state collapse and embolden armed groups such as Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif to expand territorial control. A leadership vacuum would also strain the Haitian National Police, which is already overstretched, and could discourage international donors from sustaining security or humanitarian programs. Political factions may seize the moment to push for self-serving interim arrangements, while grassroots groups and diaspora organizations are likely to demand representation in any dialogue.

The international community is unlikely to tolerate a complete vacuum. The United Nations, the United States, CARICOM, and the OAS would almost certainly intervene diplomatically to press for a consensus framework, even as they emphasize the principle of Haitian-led solutions. Yet without a domestic process that secures legitimacy, external mediation alone will not restore confidence.

Halo Solutions Firm S.A. assesses that February 7, 2026, represents a high-probability flashpoint for institutional breakdown. An inclusive national forum, whether organized under the CPT or a neutral convening authority, remains the only viable mechanism to prevent competing claims of power and a further erosion of state authority. International partners will likely condition their support on the existence of such a roadmap. Failure to produce one risks not only internal collapse but also external disengagement at a time when Haiti faces record levels of violence and displacement.