Weekly report September 2 to September 9, 2026

Recent kidnapping activity – port-au-prince metropolitan area and artibonite

Haiti has experienced a renewed concentration of kidnapping activity during the opening days of September, with incidents reported in both the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Artibonite Department. The recent cases demonstrate that kidnapping remains an effective revenue-generating and coercive tool for armed groups despite continuing security operations. Of particular concern is the concentration of incidents along the Delmas corridor, including Delmas 31 and reportedly Delmas 75, while the abduction of senior public figures in the Artibonite highlights the continued expansion of kidnapping activity outside the capital.

On 7 September, attorney and political activist Caleb Jean-Baptiste, Stéphanie Paultre, Director General of the National Office for Partnership in Education (ONAPE), and members of Paultre's police security detail were kidnapped while traveling in the Artibonite Department. Reporting varies concerning the precise location and total number of victims, with accounts placing the incident in or near Gros-Morne and along the Ennery–Gros-Morne axis.

The kidnapping has been attributed in multiple local reports to the Kokorat San Ras gang, which operates throughout portions of the Artibonite. Subsequent reporting indicated that the kidnappers contacted relatives regarding a possible ransom. Other local sources claimed the captives were moved through several communities toward Pendu, in Gros-Morne, demonstrating the ability of armed groups to abduct victims and relocate them through rural territory before security forces can effectively intervene.

Separate reporting alleged that senior figures associated with the Viv Ansanm coalition had contacted Kokorat San Ras concerning Caleb Jean-Baptiste. These claims have not been independently verified and should be treated as unconfirmed intelligence rather than established fact.

The incident is operationally significant because it demonstrates that senior government officials and other prominent individuals remain vulnerable even when traveling with armed police protection. It also reinforces the growing kidnapping threat in the Artibonite, where gangs increasingly employ small, mobile elements to conduct kidnappings, attacks, robberies, road interdictions and other criminal operations without necessarily maintaining permanent control of the affected territory.

Radio/Télé Métropole journalist Wesly Renaud Jean was kidnapped in Delmas 31 during the same period. Reporting differs slightly regarding the precise date, with accounts placing the kidnapping on either 6 or 7 September. Armed individuals reportedly seized the journalist, although the circumstances surrounding the abduction and identity of the perpetrators have not been publicly established.

The kidnapping has generated particular concern because of Renaud Jean's profession. His abduction represents another direct threat to journalists and media personnel operating in Haiti and underscores that public visibility or professional status provides little protection against kidnapping.

The incident also carries broader implications for freedom of the press. Journalists operating in Haiti already work in an environment characterized by gang violence, intimidation, restricted access and significant personal security risks. The kidnapping of a journalist demonstrates that media professionals can be subjected to the same ransom-driven violence affecting businesspeople, government officials and ordinary residents.

The incident is particularly noteworthy because Delmas 31 lies within an established kidnapping corridor extending through portions of Delmas toward Delmas 75. This corridor has repeatedly experienced kidnappings, attempted kidnappings and other violent criminal activity.

On the morning of 9 September, reports indicated that two female students and their driver were kidnapped at approximately 0600 in the Siloé area of Delmas 75, near Arly Market, while traveling to school.

According to preliminary information, one student attended Collège Marie-Anne and the other Collège Saint-Louis de Bourdon. Two individuals operating a motorcycle, reportedly supported by another vehicle, intercepted the group shortly after the students entered their driver's vehicle.

The kidnappers allegedly forced the students from the vehicle and transferred them into another vehicle before departing. The driver was reportedly also abducted, with the perpetrators taking his vehicle.

At the time of this report, the incident should be considered preliminary and pending additional independent confirmation. However, the reported location is consistent with previously documented kidnapping activity along the Delmas corridor.

The apparent targeting of students during a morning school movement is particularly concerning. School transportation creates predictable patterns of movement, including consistent departure times, routes, vehicles and pickup locations. Such patterns can potentially be exploited by kidnapping groups conducting surveillance or identifying vulnerable targets.

Other recent cases demonstrate that the current threat extends beyond the incidents reported during the past several days. James Boyard, Chief of Staff to Defense Minister Mario Andrésol, was previously reported kidnapped and remained in captivity into early September, more than a month after his reported abduction.

Another notable case involved Hervé Boussiquot, a former Director General of ONAPE, who was kidnapped in Delmas 75. The fact that both Boussiquot and current ONAPE Director General Stéphanie Paultre have been kidnapped is noteworthy, although there is currently no evidence establishing that the two incidents are connected.

A significantly larger hostage-taking event occurred during the 23 August attack on Kenscoff, when armed groups killed at least 47 people and kidnapped more than 50 others. Women and children were among those abducted. Several hostages were subsequently released following community intervention, but the incident demonstrated the ability of armed groups to conduct mass abductions during coordinated attacks against civilian communities.

The Kenscoff attack also illustrates the increasingly blurred distinction between traditional ransom kidnapping and hostagetaking conducted as part of broader gang operations. Hostages may be used for ransom, retaliation, intimidation, bargaining leverage, protection against security-force operations or a combination of these purposes.

Kidnapping remains a persistent threat throughout Haiti, particularly in the West and Artibonite departments. During the first quarter of 2026, at least 57 people were documented as having been kidnapped for ransom, with the overwhelming majority of those cases occurring in the West Department. Delmas, particularly the corridor extending between approximately Delmas 31 and Delmas 75, emerged as one of the principal kidnapping environments.

During the second quarter of 2026, at least another 81 people were kidnapped for ransom. Most cases continued to occur in the West Department, although a significant percentage were recorded in the Artibonite, with additional incidents occurring in the Northwest and Centre departments.

These figures indicate that at least 138 ransom-kidnapping victims were documented during the first six months of 2026, before the major Kenscoff mass abduction and the recent September incidents.

Kidnappings frequently go unreported because families negotiate directly with perpetrators, fear retaliation, or deliberately avoid publicity that could complicate negotiations.

The latest incidents indicate a renewed period of elevated kidnapping activity, with several developments warranting attention.

First, Delmas remains one of the principal kidnapping environments in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. The kidnapping of a journalist in Delmas 31 and the reported abduction of students and their driver in Delmas 75 fall within a corridor that has repeatedly experienced kidnapping and attempted kidnapping incidents.

Second, kidnapping activity is increasingly geographically dispersed. The abduction of Stéphanie Paultre, Caleb Jean-Baptiste and accompanying police personnel demonstrates the ability of Kokorat San Ras and other Artibonite-based armed groups to target comparatively high-value individuals outside Port-au-Prince and move captives through rural territory.

Third, victim selection remains diverse and frequently opportunistic. Recent victims include government officials, police personnel, journalists, students, professional figures and civilians captured during larger gang attacks. Armed escorts, professional status or public prominence should not be viewed as providing significant insulation from the threat.

Fourth, the reported Delmas 75 incident highlights the vulnerability associated with predictable movement patterns. School runs, employee transportation, regular office arrivals and departures, recurring meetings and routinely used routes can provide kidnappers with opportunities to identify and surveil potential targets.

For organizations operating in Port-au-Prince, the Delmas 31–75 corridor warrants heightened attention, particularly during morning and afternoon commuting periods. Personnel should minimize predictable movement patterns where operationally feasible and maintain awareness of motorcycles or vehicles demonstrating possible surveillance behavior.

In the Artibonite, the kidnapping threat increasingly extends beyond established gang strongholds. Particular attention should be given to intercity movements along routes connecting Saint-Marc, L'Estère, Ennery, Gros-Morne and Gonaïves, where armed groups can exploit limited security-force coverage, rural terrain and secondary road networks to intercept vehicles and rapidly relocate hostages

The recent incidents reinforce that kidnapping remains one of Haiti's most persistent and geographically expanding security threats. The developing pattern indicates a combined urban and rural kidnapping environment characterized by mobile armed groups, targeted vehicle interceptions, possible pre-incident surveillance, exploitation of predictable movements and rapid relocation of victims away from the point of capture.

The kidnapping of public officials traveling with police protection, a journalist in Delmas 31, and the reported abduction of students during a morning school movement demonstrate the breadth of the current threat environment. Meanwhile, the continued activity of Kokorat San Ras in the Artibonite and the mass hostage-taking during the August Kenscoff attack indicate that kidnapping is increasingly integrated into broader gang operations rather than functioning exclusively as a conventional ransom enterprise.

Gang attack at bercy kills boid officer as armed groups pressure arcahaie

Armed gang members attacked Bercy, between Cabaret and Arcahaie, on the evening of September 6, killing a Haitian National Police (PNH) officer and wounding another officer and several members of a local self-defense group. The attack represents another attempt by armed groups operating north of Port-au-Prince to pressure the approaches to Arcahaie and the strategically important RN1 corridor.

The PNH identified the officer as Queturah Saint-Jour, an Agent I assigned to the Departmental Operations and Intervention Brigade (BOID) and a member of the PNH's 34th graduating class. Saint-Jour was struck in the head during the attack and later died from her injuries after being evacuated for medical treatment.

The fighting reportedly began at approximately 1900 hours as heavily armed men moved into the Bercy area. Another police officer and several members of a community self-defense group were wounded during the exchanges, with their conditions subsequently reported as stable.

Reporting on responsibility varies. Some sources attribute the attack broadly to Viv Ansanm, while others identify armed elements associated with the Canaan gang network, which has repeatedly attempted to extend its influence northward toward Arcahaie...

Bercy has become a persistent security flashpoint. Arcahaie interim mayor Wilner René reported that Saint-Jour is the third police officer killed in Bercy since 2024, while approximately 15 members of local selfdefense groups have also been killed during the same period. Following the latest attack, René called for additional PNH reinforcements to prevent further gang advances toward Arcahaie. The security situation also disrupted the scheduled September 7 reopening of schools in the commune.

The attack is significant because Bercy sits along the northern approach to Arcahaie and the RN1 corridor connecting Port-au-Prince with Saint-Marc and northern Haiti. Continued gang pressure in this area presents a threat not only to Arcahaie but also to one of Haiti's most important remaining north-south transportation corridors.

Repeated attacks in Bercy suggest armed groups are continuing to test security defenses and probe northward from the Cabaret/Canaan area. Key indicators include additional PNH deployments, renewed attacks against police or community-defense positions, further gang movement toward Arcahaie, and any disruption to RN1 between Cabaret and Saint-Marc.

Pnh kills six suspected gang members in downtown port-auprince operation

Six suspected gang members were killed during a Haitian National Police (PNH) operation near Stade Sylvio Cator in downtown Port-au-Prince on the evening of Sunday, September 6. The operation represents another indication of continued PNH efforts to maintain pressure on armed groups operating in and around the capital's downtown corridor.

According to the PNH, officers recovered five long guns/rifles and additional equipment during the operation. Police have not released the identities of those killed, their suspected gang affiliations, the specific PNH units involved, or detailed circumstances surrounding the engagement.

The Stade Sylvio Cator operation occurred as Haitian security forces continued operations on several fronts. On the same day, the PNH and Task Force conducted operations against Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras in the Artibonite, particularly around Jean-Denis, where security forces reportedly destroyed 11 concrete barricades and filled trenches constructed to prevent police armored vehicles from entering gang-controlled areas.

HALO Assessment: The operation is tactically significant because of its location in central Port-au-Prince and the recovery of five long guns. More broadly, it indicates that the PNH continues to conduct offensive operations against armed groups while simultaneously committing forces to the Artibonite and other contested areas. The principal indicator to monitor is whether these operations develop into sustained efforts to hold and secure recovered terrain, rather than isolated raids followed by gang re-infiltration.

Unverified claims raise questions over Haitian asylum cases

Haitian gang figure and former police officer Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier has generated controversy after claiming that some Haitians seeking asylum abroad have arranged for homes in Haiti to be attacked or burned to create evidence supporting immigration claims.

Chérizier alleges that individuals contacted him or associates to arrange property damage and subsequently had a justice of the peace document the destruction. However, he has provided no names, communications, financial records or other evidence, and no independent investigation has substantiated the allegation.

The claims have produced debate within Haiti and the diaspora. Some commentators have repeated the allegations as potential evidence of asylum fraud, while others question the credibility and motives of information originating from a gang figure. Separate social-media claims that Chérizier was paid or encouraged to make the statement are similarly unsupported.

The controversy comes amid increased U.S. immigration enforcement and deportations involving Haitian nationals. Repetition of unverified allegations could contribute to increased skepticism toward legitimate asylum applicants who have fled gang violence, threats or displacement.

Pnh and task force intensify offensive to retake gressier

The Haitian National Police (PNH), supported by the government Task Force, continued a major security operation in Gressier, combining specialized police units, armored vehicles, heavy engineering equipment, helicopter support and explosive drones in an effort to regain territory and restore movement along the strategically important RN2 corridor.

The offensive began on September 4 and initially targeted areas occupied by armed groups, including Belvi and the Bakòp San Fwontyè headquarters area. Security forces subsequently advanced on foot while armored vehicles and heavy equipment dismantled barricades and opened routes toward Monvil and the heights of Morne Monvil.

By September 7, operations had expanded into additional contested areas. The PNH reported recovering positions around Rue Apollon, Parc Saint-Jean, the Gressier police station and Bethel Evangelical Church, while barricades along RN2 were dismantled to improve freedom of movement.

The operation also includes a significant aerial component. Helicopters are supporting police advances into elevated terrain, while explosive drones have been employed against suspected gang positions. Circulating video from the Gressier operation shows explosive-drone strikes, and Haitian media have separately reported Task Force drone attacks against suspected members of the 103 Zombies/San Fwontyè network. Local reporting indicates multiple gang casualties, although no official casualty count has been released.

The PNH reports that several suspected gang members were wounded and others fled during the offensive. More importantly, police say they have established a permanent presence at Monvil, particularly in the Leteca area, suggesting an effort to hold recovered terrain rather than conduct another temporary clearing operation.

The operation is strategically important because Gressier controls the principal RN2 corridor connecting metropolitan Port-auPrince with Haiti's southern departments. Restoring sustained government control would improve access to the southern peninsula while disrupting an important gang-controlled approach to the capital.

The Gressier offensive represents a coordinated combined ground-and-air effort involving specialized PNH units, armored mobility, engineering equipment, helicopters and explosive drones. The reported establishment of a permanent police presence at Monvil is particularly significant. Previous operations have displaced gang fighters only for them to return after security forces withdrew. If the PNH can clear, hold and maintain freedom of movement along RN2 and the surrounding high ground, the current operation could represent a more consequential shift in control of Gressier rather than another temporary tactical success.

Gsf continues force buildup as Haiti's gang threat expands beyond port-au-prince

The Gang Suppression Force (GSF) entered September, still substantially below its authorized strength as international partners continue efforts to expand the multinational force and transition it toward broader counter-gang operations. Approximately 1,000 personnel are currently deployed against an authorized ceiling of 5,500 uniformed personnel plus 50 civilian staff, leaving force generation one of the principal constraints on the GSF's ability to expand operations beyond its current footprint.

Preparations for additional international deployments continue. Guatemala has been completing arrangements for deployment of a military police contingent, while personnel from Chad, Mongolia, Sri Lanka and Peru have also been incorporated into, or identified for, the expanding force structure. These additional contingents are intended to increase operational capacity and eventually permit a broader geographic presence, including increased support to the Haitian National Police (PNH) outside metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Deployment timelines remain fluid, however, and the arrival of pledged personnel and equipment will determine how quickly the force can transition toward sustained operations.

There was no clear indication during the reporting period that the GSF had begun sustained, large-scale independent offensive operations. The force continues to emphasize cooperation with the PNH while developing the logistics, mobility, command-and-control and medical support infrastructure required for wider operations. The United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) remains central to this effort, providing accommodation, transportation, aviation, fuel, communications, medical support and other logistical capabilities necessary to sustain the multinational force. Camp Vertières remains the principal operational hub, with preparations continuing for additional forward operating locations.

The slow buildup comes as Haiti's gang threat is becoming increasingly geographically dispersed. Recent assessments indicate that armed groups are expanding operations beyond their traditional strongholds in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and increasingly employing smaller, mobile formations in rural areas. These groups can conduct kidnappings, raids, roadblocks, livestock theft and attacks against isolated communities before withdrawing without attempting to permanently occupy territory. The tactic allows gangs to generate instability across a much larger area while forcing Haitian security forces to disperse limited personnel and resources.

The 23 August attack in Kenscoff remains an important example of this evolving threat. Approximately 150 heavily armed gang members were reportedly involved in the operation, which killed at least 47 people and resulted in more than 50 kidnappings. The attack demonstrated the ability of armed groups to concentrate on significant numbers of fighters outside their traditional strongholds, strike vulnerable communities and subsequently disperse. It also highlighted continuing gaps in intelligence, early warning and rapid-response capabilities.

The increasing mobile gang threat presents a significant challenge for the GSF while it remains well below authorized strength. A force of approximately 1,000 personnel has limited capacity to simultaneously support security operations in metropolitan Portau-Prince, Kenscoff, the Artibonite and other areas experiencing increased gang activity. Expanding operations outside the capital will require not only additional personnel but also armored mobility, aviation support, intelligence collection, communications and forward logistics capable of sustaining forces over considerably greater distances.

International funding and commitments remain another potential vulnerability. Although significant financial and material support has been pledged, international officials continue to acknowledge that commitments involving personnel, equipment and logistical assistance have not materialized at the pace required to rapidly bring the GSF to full operational capability. Attention is also increasingly focused on renewal of the force's international mandate, which is expected to generate additional scrutiny regarding force generation, financing and measurable operational progress.

The GSF remains primarily in a forcegeneration and capability-building phase rather than a mature counter-gang campaign. The widening gap between the geographic scope of gang activity and the force's current operational capacity represents the principal near-term concern. Armed groups increasingly appear capable of conducting distributed operations without permanently controlling territory, forcing the PNH and GSF to defend a larger operational environment while maintaining pressure on established gang strongholds.

The next several weeks will be important in determining whether the GSF begins transitioning from a limited multinational security presence into a more capable operational force. Key indicators will include the arrival of additional international contingents, deployment of GSF personnel beyond Port-au-Prince, establishment of additional forward operating locations, increased joint GSFPNH operations and delivery of mobility and enabling equipment. Until those capabilities materially increase, the GSF will remain constrained in its ability to conduct sustained operations across multiple gang-affected regions simultaneously.

Cap-haïtien and north department weekly security update

The security environment in Cap-Haïtien and the North Department remained comparatively stable this week, with no indication of organized gang formations establishing a significant presence in the city. The Haitian National Police (PNH), however, increased fixed and mobile patrols and security operations in Plaisance, Petit-Anse, Plaine-du-Nord, Limonade, Quartier-Morin and Limbé, resulting in several arrests and increased checkpoint activity along key transportation corridors.

Security operations also extended to CapHaïtien's transportation facilities. On 5 September, BLTS and Haitian Customs personnel arrested a man at the CapHaïtien terminal after reportedly discovering a 9mm pistol and ammunition. The interdiction highlights continued efforts to control weapons movement through northern transportation hubs.

Cap-Haïtien International Airport (CAP/MTCH) continues to grow in strategic importance as insecurity and aviation restrictions affect Port-au-Prince. CAP is supporting domestic and international passenger movements as well as U.S. deportation operations. On 3 September, another U.S. removal flight carrying 101 Haitian nationals arrived in Cap-Haïtien, marking the third consecutive week of deportation flights. Continued weekly arrivals could place additional demands on airport security, immigration processing, transportation and reception capabilities.

The airport is also receiving increased government attention. Haitian authorities are pursuing modernization and expansion initiatives intended to increase passenger capacity and improve airport infrastructure. CAP's published operating hours remain 0600–2000 local, with tower services available from sunrise to sunset. As the airport's national importance increases, security of the airport perimeter and the principal ground approaches into Cap-Haïtien will become increasingly important.

Elsewhere, a fuel tanker explosion in Hautdu-Cap on 3 September reportedly killed at least two people and seriously injured another. Although not security-related, the incident highlighted emergencyresponse challenges within the metropolitan area.

HALO Assessment: Cap-Haïtien remains one of Haiti's more permissive major urban operating environments. The primary concern is not currently an established gang presence in the city, but the potential migration of instability toward the North through mobile criminal groups and key transportation corridors. RN1 through Plaisance, the Limbé approach, and the Limonade– Ouanaminthe corridor warrant continued monitoring. CAP's expanding aviation role also makes the airport and its access routes increasingly important critical infrastructure.

Outlook: No immediate major deterioration in Cap-Haïtien is anticipated. HALO will continue monitoring PNH activity, principal road corridors, airport operations and deportation flights, and any indications of organized armed-group movement toward the North.

Maritime interceptions increase along Haiti–turks and caicos route

Authorities in the Turks and Caicos Islands and The Bahamas have intercepted four migrant vessels carrying a combined 617 people since September 2, highlighting continued maritime departures from Haiti toward the northern Caribbean.

On September 8, Turks and Caicos authorities intercepted an overcrowded wooden vessel carrying 93 Haitian migrants in territorial waters. The passengers were brought ashore safely and transferred to the Border Force for immigration processing.

The operation followed the interception of another vessel carrying 207 migrants on September 7. Earlier, on September 2, the Royal Turks and Caicos Islands Police Force intercepted a vessel carrying 171 migrants near Northwest Point, Providenciales, after it was detected by coastal radar.

The activity has also extended into Bahamian waters. On September 3, the Royal Bahamas Defence Force intercepted a 45-foot vessel carrying 146 Haitian migrants, including five children, approximately 17 miles northeast of Great Inagua. The passengers were transported to Matthew Town for processing.

The four interceptions involved 617 migrants in seven days, including 471 intercepted by Turks and Caicos authorities. Authorities now report approximately 1,375 Haitians have attempted to enter the Turks and Caicos Islands irregularly since the beginning of 2026.

The concentration of interceptions since September 2 indicates sustained maritime migration activity along the Haiti–Turks and Caicos–Bahamas corridor. The repeated use of overcrowded wooden vessels represents a significant maritime safety concern. Continued insecurity, economic pressure and limited opportunities in Haiti are likely to sustain attempted departures, while increased maritime surveillance and coastal radar coverage may contribute to additional interceptions.

Suspected anthrax cases reported in dame-marie, grand’anse

Haitian health authorities are investigating a suspected anthrax outbreak in Baliverne, Dame-Marie, Grand’Anse, after reports of human illness and livestock deaths. The investigation began following an official alert on August 26.

Authorities have identified approximately 13 suspected human cases, two deaths, and at least 20 animal deaths. Health teams have conducted house-to-house surveillance and community outreach in affected areas, while local monitoring mechanisms have been established.

The Ministry of Public Health and Population has warned residents not to handle, slaughter, sell, or consume animals found dead or suspected of infection. Human infection can occur through contact with infected livestock, animal products, or contaminated meat.

The incident currently appears localized to the Dame-Marie area. The primary risk is exposure through handling or consuming infected livestock. Additional human cases, livestock deaths outside the affected communities, or contaminated meat reaching local markets would indicate a significant escalation.