Weekly report September 30 to October 7, 2026

Government plans major fad'h expansion to 15,000 personnel within three years

Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé has announced that the Haitian government intends to increase the strength of the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H) to approximately 15,000 personnel within three years, representing one of the most ambitious military expansion plans since the force was remobilized.

The expansion is being supported by infrastructure rehabilitation and accelerated recruitment. According to reporting attributed to a Ministry of Defense source, the Anacaona military base is being rehabilitated to accommodate approximately 700 new recruits. A separate training center is also planned with capacity for approximately 800 additional recruits.

The government is reportedly examining a shortened training cycle as part of an effort to increase personnel more rapidly. The stated objective is to reach approximately 5,000 new soldiers by the end of the next fiscal year. The 2026-2027 national budget also identifies public security and national defense as a principal government priority and supports the gradual expansion of the FAd'H toward the 15,000-person target.

The expansion comes as the FAd'H is already being used to secure critical infrastructure and reinforce operations in contested areas. The previous HALO weekly report identified military deployments at Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Carrefour Drouillard/Rika, Kenscoff/Obléon, Boutilliers, Malpasse, Péligre, Marion, the National Port Authority, the BRH/Bicentenaire area and several locations in downtown Port-auPrince. Military patrols have also contributed to security along the Gressier-Merger corridor.

Anacaona is particularly relevant to the forcegeneration effort. Ministry of Defense reporting earlier in 2026 indicated that rehabilitation of the base was intended to increase reception and training capacity toward approximately 600-700 personnel. The base was also designated as one of the West Department locations for the June 2026 national FAd'H recruitment campaign.

HALO ASSESSMENT: The announced 15,000- person target represents a major potential change in Haiti's domestic security architecture. The most important near-term indicators will be the number of recruits actually entering training, completion rates, the duration and content of any shortened training program, equipment delivery, development of additional training infrastructure and the pace at which newly trained personnel can be integrated into operational units.

REFERENCES

• Government/Ministry of Defense reporting, October 2026 - announced FAd'H expansion objectives.

• 2026-2027 Haiti national budget reporting - support for gradual FAd'H expansion toward 15,000 personnel.

• Ministry of Defense 100-day report, 2026 - rehabilitation and increased capacity at Anacaona.

• HALO Weekly Report, September 25-October 2, 2026 - current FAd'H deployment baseline.

Carrefour gangs impose parallel property 'taxation' as criminal governance expands

Armed groups in Carrefour are reportedly imposing compulsory payments on property owners, illustrating the continued development of parallel systems of control in areas where state authority is limited.

Reporting concerning the network led by Christ-Roi "Krisla" Chéry indicates that homeowners in several sectors have been ordered to make payments described locally as taxes or property assessments. Reports vary regarding the exact amounts, with figures beginning at several thousand gourdes and increasing according to the property and circumstances.

Residents have also reported that homes were catalogued or numbered before collection efforts began. In some cases, tenants or relatives of absent property owners were reportedly instructed to notify owners of the required payment. Such practices indicate a level of organization extending beyond opportunistic street extortion.

The significance of the reported system is not limited to revenue generation. By identifying properties, setting payment requirements and enforcing compliance, armed groups are assuming functions normally associated with municipal or state authority. Similar coercive systems can reinforce territorial control by making residents economically and administratively accountable to the armed group controlling the area.

International sanctions records identify Christ-Roi Chéry as the leader of the Ti Bwa gang, affiliated with the Viv Ansanm coalition, and associate him with criminal activity in Carrefour.

Gros-morne violence displaces more than 5,200 residents across artibonite

More than 5,200 people have been displaced following the September 28 armed violence in Gros-Morne, highlighting the growing humanitarian impact of deteriorating security conditions in northern Artibonite.

According to figures provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 5,254 people representing 1,214 households were forced from their homes following the violence.

Most of those displaced have not entered formal displacement sites. IOM reported that approximately 92 percent are staying with host families, while the remaining 8 percent have taken refuge at two displacement sites established following the attacks.

The displacement has primarily affected Gros-Morne and neighboring Gonaïves. Approximately 51 percent of those displaced remained within the commune of GrosMorne, while another 44 percent relocated to Gonaïves, demonstrating the wider regional consequences of the violence.

Communities particularly affected include Péletier, Carnifice and Centre-Ville, located in the third communal section of RivièreBlanche; Kamas, in the sixth communal section of Savane-Carrée; and Dosny, in the seventh communal section of Moulin.

The displacement follows the September 28 violence in Gros-Morne, where armed attacks and subsequent security developments significantly affected communities across the commune. The scale of the resulting population movement demonstrates that the security deterioration is extending beyond immediate casualties and property damage, placing additional pressure on families and communities already absorbing displaced populations.

The concentration of displaced residents in Gros-Morne and Gonaïves will be an important indicator to monitor, particularly if continued insecurity prevents families from returning home or generates additional displacement.

The displacement of more than 5,000 people following a single period of violence demonstrates the significant civilian impact of continuing insecurity in northern Artibonite. Of particular concern is that 92 percent of displaced residents are being accommodated by host families, potentially placing additional economic and humanitarian pressure on communities in Gros-Morne and Gonaïves. Further violence or retaliatory attacks could generate additional population movements and complicate security operations throughout the RN5/Gros-Morne corridor.

GSF weekly security update

Executive Summary

The Gang Suppression Force (GSF/FRG) demonstrated a noticeably more assertive operational posture during the reporting period, conducting significant security operations in Tabarre and Cité Soleil on 5–6 October while maintaining its developing presence in the Artibonite. The operations involved hundreds of personnel, armored vehicles and aviation support and resulted in arrests, gang casualties, weapons seizures and the removal of barricades.

The force nevertheless remains substantially below its authorized ceiling of 5,500 uniformed personnel plus 50 civilian personnel. AP reported on 1 October that approximately 1,600 personnel were currently deployed, compared with 1,213 uniformed personnel officially documented as of 31 August. The UN expects deployments to accelerate during the coming months.

Importantly, GSF personnel were not involved in the latest Kenscoff operations. The 6 October operation that recovered Belot was conducted by the Haitian National Police (PNH), supported by the Haitian task force. This corrects earlier reporting that associated the GSF with Kenscoff operations.

Major GSF Operations — Tabarre and Cité Soleil

The most important operational development occurred on 5 October, when hundreds of GSF personnel conducted an operation in Tabarre supported by armored vehicles and helicopters.

GSF elements moved beyond vehicleaccessible areas into narrow passages and abandoned structures believed to have been used by gang members. Security forces removed barricades and recovered improvised explosive devices. Gang elements reportedly withdrew following engagements with GSF personnel.

During the early hours of 6 October, the GSF conducted an intelligence-led search-andclear operation along Route Soleil 9 in Cité Soleil. According to the GSF, two suspected gang members were apprehended, two were killed and several others were critically wounded. Three firearms, ammunition, magazines, a radio, two motorcycles and other equipment were seized.

The GSF stated that it intends to maintain an enhanced presence following these operations rather than simply withdrawing after clearing gang positions. This is operationally significant because the ability to hold recovered terrain has consistently been one of the principal weaknesses of previous counter-gang operations.

Artibonite / Gonaïves Axis

The GSF continues to expand activity outside metropolitan Port-au-Prince, particularly through the Sri Lankan contingent operating from the Gonaïves/Artibonite deployment area.

Immediately before the current reporting period, Sri Lankan GSF personnel operating near Gros-Morne encountered members of Kokorat San Ras while attempting to clear an illegal checkpoint affecting the road between the Artibonite and Northwest departments. Gang members reportedly fired on the GSF patrol, prompting an engagement in which suspected gang members were killed.

The incident subsequently produced serious retaliatory violence against civilians. At least 11 civilians were reportedly killed in the Gros-Morne area following the confrontation.

The episode illustrates the continuing difficulty facing the GSF in the Artibonite: clearing transportation corridors can produce immediate tactical gains, but persistent security positions and follow-on PNH presence will be necessary to prevent gang reoccupation and retaliation against communities.

Force Strength and Composition

The most recent comprehensive UN reporting recorded 1,213 uniformed personnel from six countries as of 31 August:

Official UN figure as of 31 August; these numbers do not incorporate all subsequent arrivals. More recent reporting places the total force at approximately 1,600 personnel, meaning the GSF is now above its initial 1,500-person operational threshold but remains far short of the 5,500-person authorized ceiling.

The UN's earlier deployment plan called for more than 5,000 personnel by mid-January 2027, making force generation during October–December particularly important.

A significant development this week was the formal continuation of El Salvador's participation in the GSF. The Salvadoran Legislative Assembly approved legislation authorizing military and civilian personnel, aircraft and other resources to participate in the mission. The authorization took effect 2 October 2026 for an initial 12-month period, with provisions for extension.

El Salvador already provides an important aviation capability to the force. The official August force structure identified approximately 125 Salvadoran personnel supporting four medium utility helicopters.

The UN Security Council has formally extended the GSF mandate through 31 March 2027 under Resolution 2829 (2026). The resolution passed with 12 votes in favor and three abstentions and continues UN logistical and operational support through the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH).

The extension removes an immediate political uncertainty surrounding the force and provides additional time for troopcontributing countries to deploy pledged personnel and equipment

The reporting period represents one of the clearest indications to date that the GSF is beginning to transition from force generation and limited patrol activity toward larger intelligence-led counter-gang operations.

The Tabarre and Cité Soleil operations are particularly noteworthy because they combined manpower, armored mobility, aviation, intelligence, dismounted operations and follow-on presence. This represents a more sophisticated operational model than routine vehicle patrols.

The Artibonite remains considerably more difficult. The confrontation with Kokorat San Ras and subsequent killing of civilians demonstrate that tactical success against gang positions can expose nearby communities to retaliation unless security forces can immediately establish persistent control.

The separation between the GSF effort and Haitian-led operations in Kenscoff is also important. Recent territorial gains in Kenscoff should not be interpreted as evidence of geographic GSF expansion. They instead demonstrate that the PNH and Haitian task force continue conducting independent offensive operations while the GSF concentrates significant resources in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Artibonite.

Overall Assessment: Improving operational capability, but insufficient force density. The GSF is displaying increased offensive capacity and greater ability to conduct coordinated operations. However, with approximately 1,600 personnel against an authorized ceiling of 5,500, the force remains too small to simultaneously conduct sustained offensive operations, hold recovered territory, secure strategic roads and infrastructure, and maintain a persistent presence across the Ouest, Artibonite and other contested departments.

The key indicators for the coming weeks will be additional troop arrivals, expansion of persistent positions following the Tabarre/Cité Soleil operations, additional operations in the Artibonite, security of RN1 and other national transportation corridors, and evidence that recently cleared areas remain under government control after GSF maneuver elements depart.

Assessment: MODERATE CONFIDENCE — Force-strength reporting continues to lag actual deployments, and several recently announced contingents have not yet been reflected in consolidated UN force tables.

Kidnappings rise 42 percent as gangs expand targeting across Haiti

Kidnapping remains one of Haiti’s most significant security threats, with United Nations data documenting a sharp increase during the second quarter of 2026 and more recent incidents indicating that kidnapping networks continue to retain substantial operational capability.

According to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), at least 81 people were kidnapped for ransom between April 1 and June 30, 2026, compared with 57 during the first quarter—an increase of approximately 42 percent. BINUH cautions that the documented figure likely represents only a portion of the actual number of victims because families frequently avoid reporting kidnappings to authorities and instead negotiate directly with abductors. Families may fear retaliation or believe that involving authorities could complicate negotiations and delay the victim’s release.

The geographic distribution demonstrates that kidnapping remains concentrated in metropolitan Port-au-Prince but is not limited to the capital. BINUH recorded approximately 63 percent of victims in the West Department, followed by 27 percent in Artibonite, 7 percent in the North-West and 3 percent in the Centre. More than one-third of the documented victims were therefore abducted outside the West Department.

Two significant kidnapping peaks were identified in metropolitan Port-au-Prince during the quarter, occurring between April 1–18 and June 1–15. Particularly affected areas included Delmas 20–40, Bourdon, Avenue Panaméricaine, Meyotte, Péguy-Ville and Place Boyer.

The circumstances surrounding many incidents are operationally significant. Victims were frequently intercepted while traveling in private vehicles to work, returning home or conducting routine daily activities. UN investigators reported indications that some victims may have been identified and monitored before their abduction. Business owners, senior government personnel and off-duty police officers were among those targeted.

BINUH attributed approximately 53 percent of documented kidnappings during the quarter to Grand Ravine and Village de Dieu. Other cases were associated with Canaan, Chen Mechan and Kraze Baryè in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras in Artibonite.

Kidnapping methods also vary geographically. In metropolitan Port-auPrince, incidents frequently involve vehicle interceptions and, in some cases, apparent surveillance of selected victims. Outside the capital, particularly in Artibonite, Centre and North-West, victims have been abducted while traveling in public transportation, working in agricultural areas or during broader armed attacks against communities.

Of particular concern is the documented use of clothing resembling lawenforcement uniforms during some kidnapping operations. On June 11, the chief of staff of Haiti’s Minister of Defense and three members of his family were reportedly kidnapped in Bourdon after their vehicle was intercepted by two vehicles occupied by individuals wearing uniforms resembling those of the PNH’s Departmental Unit for the Maintenance of Order (UDMO).

The tactic complicates threat recognition for both civilians and protective-security personnel. Individuals approaching a vehicle in apparent police uniforms cannot automatically be assumed to represent legitimate law enforcement, particularly during unplanned roadside stops or interceptions.

Kidnapping activity has continued beyond the UN’s April–June statistical period. More recent incidents have involved government officials, security personnel, students, journalists and other civilians. The diversity of victims indicates that kidnapping networks are not operating against a single demographic or professional group.

Foreign nationals are also exposed. BINUH documented the May 1 kidnapping of two foreign crew members from a vessel in Port-au-Prince Bay, demonstrating that kidnapping exposure is not confined to conventional road movements.

The threat should increasingly be considered within the context of gang expansion outside metropolitan Port-auPrince. Research published by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime indicates that armed groups have increasingly extended operations into rural areas and transportation corridors, employing kidnapping, roadblocks, extortion and other coercive activities. This potentially exposes communities and travelers in areas where state security coverage is considerably thinner than in the capital.

The official kidnapping figures should therefore be treated as a documented minimum rather than a comprehensive national total. Kidnapping remains particularly difficult to quantify because negotiations frequently occur privately. Families may deliberately avoid publicity, police involvement and media reporting while attempting to secure a victim’s release. Consequently, changes in officially recorded kidnapping numbers may reflect both actual changes in criminal activity and variations in reporting.

HALO ASSESSMENT: The 42 percent quarterly increase demonstrates that kidnapping remains a persistent and adaptive threat despite increased securityforce activity. Particularly concerning indicators include apparent surveillance of selected victims, daytime interceptions, operations involving multiple vehicles, the use of police-style uniforms and continued geographic expansion beyond traditional metropolitan kidnapping areas.

For organizations operating in Port-auPrince, predictable movement patterns remain a significant vulnerability. Repeated routes, consistent departure times, identifiable residences and workplaces, and routine movements can provide criminal networks with opportunities for surveillance and targeting.

The threat should also no longer be considered exclusively a Port-au-Prince problem. BINUH’s geographic data indicate meaningful kidnapping activity in Artibonite, Centre and North-West, while broader gang expansion into rural Haiti increases exposure along transportation corridors and in communities with limited security-force presence.

The principal indicators to monitor during the remainder of 2026 include kidnapping activity along the Delmas–Pétion-Ville corridor, the use of police-style uniforms and vehicles, expansion into previously lower-risk neighborhoods, incidents involving foreign or high-profile personnel, and displacement of kidnapping networks into provincial areas as security pressure increases in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

REFERENCES

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) / Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) — Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, April– June 2026. Documents 81 kidnapping victims during the second quarter, a 42% increase from the previous quarter, as well as geographic distribution, kidnapping methods and groups implicated.

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) — Haiti: At Least 1,408 People Killed and 656 Injured During the Second Quarter of 2026, August 25, 2026. Summary of violence, kidnappings and human-rights violations recorded between April and June 2026. BINUH Quarterly Security and Human Rights Update.

BINUH / OHCHR Human Rights Service — Second-quarter 2026 incident data concerning kidnapping patterns in the West, Artibonite, North-West and Centre departments, including reported incidents involving Grand Ravine, Village de Dieu, Canaan, Chen Mechan, Kraze Baryè, Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) — September 2026 reporting and analysis concerning the expansion of Haitian armed groups beyond metropolitan Port-au-Prince, including increased criminal activity along rural transportation corridors and the use of kidnapping, roadblocks and other coercive practices.

Reuters — September 7, 2026 reporting on the expansion of Haitian gang operations into rural areas and the evolving security environment outside metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Reuters — Haiti gangs shift operations into countryside.

Associated Press — October 2026 reporting on continuing kidnappings in Haiti involving government officials, attorneys and other prominent individuals, providing additional context on kidnapping activity beyond the April– June BINUH reporting period.

UN panel identifies political, security and financial networks sustaining Haiti’s gang crisis

On 7 October 2026, the United Nations publicly released the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti (S/2026/714), providing one of the most detailed assessments to date of the political, financial and security networks sustaining Haiti’s armed gangs. The report was submitted pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2794 (2025), with the Panel’s investigations covering developments through 10 July 2026.

The timing of the report is particularly significant as Haiti prepares for an eventual electoral process while Haitian security forces and the newly expanded Gang Suppression Force (GSF) attempt to recover territory from armed groups.

The Panel concludes that Haiti’s security crisis extends well beyond the gang organizations operating on the streets. It describes an interconnected system involving political actors, corrupt members of the security services, financial intermediaries, illicit arms and ammunition suppliers, and individuals who allegedly use armed groups to advance political and economic interests.

The findings challenge the assumption that Haiti’s crisis can be resolved solely through military and police operations against gang strongholds. According to the Panel, gangs continue to benefit from political relationships, corrupt security personnel, illicit financing and access to weapons and ammunition. Unless these support networks are disrupted, tactical gains by Haitian security forces and the GSF risk remaining temporary.

Political-Gang Nexus Remains a Major Security Threat

One of the Panel’s central findings is the continued relationship between armed groups and political actors. The Panel warns that these relationships can be exploited to mobilize supporters, intimidate political opponents, consolidate territorial control and potentially influence future elections.

The Panel expressed particular concern over alleged collusion between gangs and elements of local government. In Cité Soleil, an individual identified by the Panel as an active member of the Brooklyn gang led by Gabriel Jean-Pierre, alias “Ti Gabriel,” was appointed in May 2026 to a newly established municipal commission. The Panel assessed that such relationships could strengthen gang territorial control while simultaneously creating political influence ahead of eventual elections.

This issue has potentially significant implications for Haiti’s eventual return to elected government. Although the electoral framework bars individuals under UN sanctions from becoming candidates, the Panel concluded that this restriction will have limited effect because the majority of individuals involved in supporting gangs and destabilizing the country have not been designated under the UN sanctions regime.

Kenscoff: Former Deputy Accused of Supporting Gang Operations

The Panel devoted considerable attention to the violence in Kenscoff, identifying former Deputy Alfrédo Junior Antoine as an alleged major facilitator of armed groups operating in the commune.

According to the Panel, Antoine had allegedly armed and supported youth groups since at least 2016 as instruments of political influence. Some subsequently developed into gangs or became affiliated with established criminal organizations. The Panel identified Antoine as one of the alleged principal sponsors of the 27 January 2025 attack on Kenscoff, which resulted in more than 100 deaths as well as reported rapes, robberies and widespread destruction of homes.

The Panel further alleges that Antoine maintained communications with members of Viv Ansanm, had connections with intermediaries including Magalie Habitant, and maintained close ties with Kraze Baryè leader Vitel’homme Innocent. It also identified him as an alleged supplier of firearms, ammunition and financial resources to Viv Ansanm through an intermediary. Antoine denied his alleged connections to gangs.

These findings provide important context for the repeated violence in Kenscoff. Rather than viewing the fighting exclusively as territorial expansion by Portau-Prince gangs, the Panel’s findings indicate that political sponsorship and longstanding local armed networks contributed to conditions that enabled gang penetration of the commune.

Artibonite: Political Support and Gang Development

The Panel also examined relationships between political actors and armed groups in the Artibonite Department, where Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras and other organizations have become major security threats.

The Panel linked former lawmaker Prophane Victor to the development of Gran Grif and alleged that former Senate President Youri Latortue supported armed groups including Roboteau and Kokorat San Ras. According to the Panel, Latortue subsequently turned against Kokorat San Ras after its leader publicly accused him of founding the gang. Latortue has repeatedly denied gang affiliations.

The findings reinforce the assessment that gang expansion in the Artibonite is not solely a product of criminal opportunism. Political patronage, weapons distribution and the use of armed organizations for influence have contributed to the development of groups that subsequently acquired increasing autonomy and territorial power.

Police Corruption and Ammunition Diversion

One of the most consequential findings of the UN Panel of Experts concerns the apparent diversion of ammunition from official Haitian security-force inventories into the hands of gangs and other armed actors. The Panel's investigation indicates that gang ammunition supplies are not derived exclusively from weapons trafficking from the United States and other foreign sources. A portion is being diverted domestically from ammunition originally controlled by Haitian state security institutions.

The Panel documented 1,158 rounds of ammunition seized between October 2025 and February 2026 from gangs operating in Kenscoff, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas 2 and Bel-Air. The recovered ammunition included 5.56×45 mm, .223 Remington, 7.62×39 mm, 7.62×51 mm, .308 Winchester and .50-caliber ammunition. The rounds originated from more than 30 manufacturers in approximately 20 countries, illustrating the diversity of supply channels available to Haitian armed groups.

Of particular concern, the Panel determined that all of the gang ammunition samples examined contained some components associated with PNH ammunition stocks, while diversion was especially pronounced among 7.62×51 mm rounds. The Panel described diversion from PNH inventories as a longstanding problem that continues despite the arrest of several police officers accused of corruption.

The investigation identified one mechanism through which ammunition may leave official inventories: police officers allegedly collecting unused ammunition and subsequently reselling it on the illicit market. According to the Panel, recipients have included gangs, selfdefense groups, private security companies and private individuals seeking weapons or ammunition for protection. The Panel also documented ammunition originally donated by international partners to the PNH that was recovered from a trafficker in the Artibonite in 2025.

The problem may extend beyond PNH inventories. The Panel documented boxes and individual 5.56×45 mm rounds manufactured in 2024 in the possession of gangs operating in Bel-Air and Kenscoff, as well as 400 Mawozo. Lot-number characteristics were consistent with ammunition procured by the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd’H) from Brazilian manufacturer Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC). Brazilian authorities confirmed to the Panel that Haiti's Armed Forces had signed a contract in July 2023 to purchase 1.5 million rounds of this ammunition. The Panel did not establish the precise chain of custody by which the ammunition ultimately reached armed groups.

The ammunition analysis also revealed evidence of common supply chains or transfers between gangs. Approximately 50% of the types of 5.56×45 mm ammunition examined from gangs operating in Kenscoff, Bel-Air and Delmas 2 shared the same headstamp types. Those groups included elements of 5 Segond and Grand Ravine in Kenscoff, Jamesley's group in Bel-Air and Krache Dife in Delmas 2. The Panel assessed that this similarity suggests the gangs are either exchanging ammunition among themselves or drawing supplies from common sources.

The ammunition is also relatively new. Among 510 rounds of 5.56×45 mm ammunition for which production dates could be established, more than 80% had been manufactured between 2022 and 2024. The Panel characterized this short interval between manufacture and criminal use as evidence of continuing diversion cycles and repeated violations of the arms embargo.

The Panel additionally identified ammunition apparently originating from the Dominican Republic. Among a sample of 89 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition recovered from a gang in 2025, 25 carried Dominican Army markings and another 16 bore markings consistent with ammunition previously investigated as having been diverted from Dominican police stocks. Dominican authorities separately reported the December 2025 arrest of an army officer and a Haitian national allegedly transporting 1,516 rounds of ammunition in San Juan de la Maguana Province.

The ammunition findings represent a potentially serious vulnerability in Haiti's counter-gang strategy. International efforts have traditionally concentrated heavily on stopping firearms and ammunition entering Haiti from abroad. The Panel's investigation demonstrates that international trafficking is only one component of the supply chain. Diversion from PNH and potentially other government-controlled inventories may provide armed groups with an internal source of ammunition that cannot be addressed through border interdiction alone.

This is particularly concerning because ammunition, not necessarily firearms is increasingly a critical logistical requirement for gangs facing sustained PNH, FAd’H and GSF operations. Existing weapons can remain operational for years; their continued effectiveness depends on a reliable ammunition supply. Consequently, leakage from government stocks can directly undermine security operations by effectively returning ammunition intended for state security forces to the armed groups those forces are fighting.

The findings also raise concerns regarding inventory accountability, ammunition issuance procedures, recovery of unused ammunition following operations, storage security, personnel vetting and chain-ofcustody controls within Haitian security institutions. International partners supplying ammunition to Haitian forces will likely require increasingly stringent end-use monitoring and inventory controls to ensure donated materiel does not enter illicit markets.

Importantly, the evidence does not establish that Haitian security institutions as organizations are intentionally supplying gangs. Rather, the Panel identifies diversion, corrupt individual officers, illicit resale and weaknesses in ammunition accountability as continuing vulnerabilities. That distinction should be maintained.

The operational implication is significant: disrupting gang ammunition supplies will require simultaneous action against international trafficking, domestic diversion, corrupt security personnel and inter-gang ammunition transfers. Without stronger controls over government ammunition stocks, increased international provision of ammunition to Haitian security forces could unintentionally expand the pool of materiel available for diversion.

Alleged Intermediaries Between Gangs, Government and Business

The Panel’s investigation of former Arcahaie mayor and businesswoman Rosemila Petit Frère provides one of the clearest examples of what the UN describes as the criminal-politicaleconomic nexus surrounding Haiti’s gangs.

The Panel alleges that Petit Frère maintained longstanding relationships with Viv Ansanm leaders and provided financial and logistical assistance while serving as an intermediary between gangs and political, economic and security actors. Two UN member states reportedly corroborated elements of the Panel’s information.

More seriously from a security perspective, Petit Frère allegedly transmitted confidential information concerning impending police operations to Grand Ravine leader Renel Destina, alias “Ti Lapli,” and other Viv Ansanm members. The Panel also alleges that corrupt police officers provided her with sensitive investigative reports concerning individuals under investigation, which were subsequently passed to interested parties.

Petit Frère denied the allegations. The Panel reviewed her response and stated that it stood by its findings.

Nenel Cassy and Alleged Armed Political Networks

Former Senator Nenel Cassy is also prominently identified in the report.

The Panel alleges that Cassy supported armed groups to further political objectives and controlled an armed criminal organization known as “BLTS” in the Miragoâne area. According to the Panel, the organization has been associated with firearms offenses, killings, kidnapping for ransom, sexual violence, truck hijacking and armed robbery.

The Panel further alleges that Cassy contributed to the creation of Fantôme 509 and planned attacks against airport infrastructure in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien. It also alleges that meetings organized by Cassy contributed to attacks intended to destabilize Kenscoff in coordination with Viv Ansanm.

Cassy was arrested in August 2025 on accusations including conspiracy against state security and financing criminal organizations but was released 17 days later. According to sources cited by the Panel, the case was subsequently dropped despite official statements that it was being reconsidered.

UN Sanctions Having Limited Financial Impact

The Panel also delivered a critical assessment of the implementation of the UN sanctions regime.

At the time of its investigation, nine individuals were subject to UN sanctions. Yet the Panel found that only accounts belonging to Kempes Sanon and Prophane Victor had been frozen, and the balances were extremely small. Victor’s frozen funds reportedly totaled less than US$1,000, while no fixed assets belonging to him had been identified and frozen.

The Panel warned that delays by Haitian financial institutions and authorities in implementing asset freezes created opportunities for sanctioned individuals to transfer assets or conceal them under third-party names.

More broadly, the Panel concluded that sanctions have not prevented designated individuals from continuing activities associated with serious human-rights abuses and organized crime. It also stressed that the majority of individuals supporting gangs have not been placed on the UN sanctions list.

Implications for the Gang Suppression Force

The 7 October release has direct relevance to the international effort to expand the Gang Suppression Force (GSF).

The Panel’s findings indicate that increasing the number of international personnel and conducting more aggressive counter-gang operations may improve the government’s ability to clear gangcontrolled territory. However, additional troops and offensive operations alone will not dismantle the networks sustaining Haiti’s armed groups.

Political facilitators, financial intermediaries, corrupt members of the security services and weapons and ammunition supply networks represent an important second layer of the threat. Unless these networks are disrupted, gangs that suffer tactical losses may retain the ability to regenerate, rearm and reestablish influence.

Halo Assessment

The 7 October 2026 UN Panel of Experts report represents an important development in the assessment of Haiti’s security environment because it provides additional evidence that the country’s crisis cannot be understood solely as a struggle between the government and geographically based armed gangs.

The operational threat posed by Viv Ansanm, Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras, Kraze Baryè and other armed organizations is sustained by a broader ecosystem involving alleged political patronage, corruption, illicit financial activity, weapons and ammunition diversion, compromised members of the security services and institutional weakness.

This has significant implications for current counter-gang operations. Territorial recovery by the PNH, FAd’H and GSF can reduce gang freedom of movement and disrupt command structures, but such gains are unlikely to become durable unless accompanied by investigations and prosecutions targeting individuals and networks providing gangs with financing, intelligence, weapons, ammunition and political protection.

The reported diversion of ammunition from Haitian security stocks is particularly concerning because it potentially creates a direct resupply mechanism from the institutions responsible for combating the gangs. Strengthening inventory controls, ammunition accountability, personnel vetting and internal-affairs investigations should therefore be viewed as an operational security requirement rather than simply an anti-corruption measure.

The Panel’s findings regarding Kenscoff and the Artibonite are equally important. They indicate that violence in these areas cannot be understood exclusively as gang territorial expansion. Longstanding relationships among political figures, local armed groups and criminal organizations have contributed to environments in which gangs can establish influence and subsequently operate with increasing independence.

The approaching electoral process introduces an additional security risk. Armed organizations controlling territory could potentially be used to intimidate voters, suppress political opposition, mobilize constituencies or influence access to polling locations. The Panel’s finding that many alleged gang supporters remain outside the UN sanctions regime means restrictions on sanctioned candidates alone are unlikely to eliminate this vulnerability.

Overall Assessment: The UN Panel’s findings indicate that Haiti’s security crisis should increasingly be viewed as a networked political-criminal-security threat, rather than simply a collection of geographically based gangs. Counter-gang operations remain essential, but sustainable security improvements will require simultaneous action against gang leadership, political and financial facilitators, corrupt security personnel, arms and ammunition supply chains, and institutional mechanisms that permit influential actors to avoid accountability.

Without progress in these areas, even successful PNH, FAd’H and GSF operations risk producing temporary territorial gains while leaving intact the networks capable of financing, arming and regenerating armed groups.

PNH expands kenscoff offensive, retakes belot and consolidates recovered areas

The Haitian National Police (PNH) reported a significant advance in its continuing counter-gang offensive in Kenscoff on 6 October, announcing that security forces had regained control of Belot, a strategically important locality that had repeatedly changed hands since armed groups expanded into the mountainous commune in early 2025.

The operation forms part of a broader PNH campaign to progressively recover territory occupied by armed groups affiliated with the Viv Ansanm coalition.

Multiple Haitian sources confirmed the recovery of Belot, while Le Nouvelliste reported that the PNH also reestablished control over the Le Montcel ranch, the site of the former hotel complex burned by gang members in April 2025.

Reporting indicates that PNH units encountered armed resistance while advancing into Belot. The operation was conducted with security personnel employing tracked armored vehicles to negotiate difficult terrain and reduce their vulnerability while advancing into gangheld positions. Separate local reporting claimed that explosive or “kamikaze” drones were employed against gang positions, although the PNH has not publicly released a detailed operational account confirming the extent of drone use. No authoritative casualty figures from the latest fighting have been released. The recovery of Belot appears to represent the latest stage of a sustained offensive rather than a single tactical operation.

On 7 October, Kenscoff Mayor Masillon Jean reported that, following more than two weeks of operations, security forces had regained control of Viard 1, Viard 2, Terre-Rouge, Godet, Dépensé, Bois-d’Avril, Morne Zombie, Nan Croupi and Belot. The recovered positions reportedly also improve the ability of security forces to monitor Boucan and surrounding areas.

The PNH had previously announced the recovery of Bois-d’Avril on 25 September, following operations conducted during September in Viard 1 and 2, Godet, Nan Croupi, Belot and other sectors. The sequence suggests that police are attempting to establish interconnected security positions rather than conducting short-duration raids followed by withdrawal.

This distinction is important. The principal challenge will now be whether the PNH can hold and consolidate the recovered terrain, prevent gang reinfiltration and create sufficient security for displaced residents eventually to return.

Belot has been contested repeatedly since the initial gang offensive against Kenscoff began on 27 January 2025. During that offensive, armed elements associated with several gangs, including Grand Ravine, Ti Bois and Village de Dieu, attacked Belot, Bongard, Bois Major, Carrefour Bête, Furcy and other communities. Security forces initially pushed armed groups out of Belot on 28 January, but gangs subsequently returned and again occupied the locality on 26 February 2025, while simultaneously establishing positions in Bois-d’Avril, Godet and Morne Boucan.

The broader offensive had devastating consequences for the civilian population. According to the joint BINUH/OHCHR investigation cited in current reporting, violence in Kenscoff between January and March 2025 resulted in at least 262 people killed and 66 injured, approximately 200 homes destroyed or burned, and more than 3,000 residents displaced. Investigators also documented killings of civilians in their homes and while attempting to flee, as well as sexual violence.

The renewed government presence in Belot therefore carries significance beyond the immediate tactical value of the locality. Maintaining control would further reduce the freedom of movement available to armed groups operating across the mountainous approaches to metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

On 5 October, acting PNH Commander Vladimir Paraison, accompanied by senior police officials, visited Kenscoff to assess operations and security arrangements in recently recovered areas including Boisd’Avril, Godet, Viard 1 and Viard 2. Senior Gang Suppression Force leadership also participated in that assessment and coordination visit.

There is an important distinction for reporting purposes: available reporting attributes the Belot combat operation itself to the PNH with support from the Haitian Task Force. The presence of senior GSF personnel during the preceding coordination visit should therefore not be characterized as evidence that GSF units participated in the Kenscoff offensive.

The recovery of Belot represents another measurable territorial gain by Haitian security forces in Kenscoff and, when viewed alongside the reported recovery of Bois-d’Avril, Godet, Viard, Nan Croupi and other locations, suggests that the PNH is conducting a sustained clearing and consolidation campaign rather than isolated operations.

The development is operationally significant because Kenscoff's mountainous terrain, limited road network and dispersed communities have historically complicated security-force mobility while providing armed groups with opportunities to disperse, establish defensive positions and subsequently reinfiltrate cleared areas.

The critical indicator over the coming weeks will therefore not simply be additional territorial announcements, but whether the PNH can maintain permanent or persistent security positions in Belot and the other recovered localities.

Gang displacement should also be monitored closely. Sustained pressure in Kenscoff could force armed elements toward neighboring mountain corridors or cause them to consolidate around remaining strongholds rather than producing their immediate destruction. Increased gang activity outside the currently contested areas could therefore accompany continued PNH success inside Kenscoff.

The reported recovery of multiple localities nevertheless represents one of the more substantial improvements in the Kenscoff security environment since the gang offensive began in January 2025. If security forces can retain these positions and continue extending government control, the current campaign could materially reduce gang freedom of movement in the commune.

Fuel tank damaged at terminal varreux

WINECO / Terminal Varreux reported that a petroleum storage tank at its facility was damaged during an incident on the morning of 6 October, raising renewed concerns over the vulnerability of one of Haiti's most strategically important fuel facilities.

According to WINECO, the incident caused material damage but resulted in no injuries, fatalities or loss of petroleum products. The company also stated that existing fuel stocks were unaffected and that teams were working to resume deliveries on Wednesday, 7 October. The company did not publicly identify the cause of the damage.

The incident occurred against a backdrop of persistent armed violence around Cité Soleil and the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac. BINUH documented fighting between armed groups spreading toward Terminal Varreux earlier this year, at times disrupting fueltruck movements. Between March and July, violence in Cité Soleil and the surrounding area resulted in at least 613 deaths and 375 injuries, according to UN reporting.

This is also not the first time in recent months that the terminal's storage infrastructure has reportedly been struck. In August, local reporting indicated that several Varreux storage tanks were hit by projectiles during armed violence in the surrounding area, resulting in product leakage.

The strategic significance of the facility makes any such incident noteworthy. UN reporting has previously described Varreux as Haiti's largest fuel depot, holding approximately 70 percent of the country's bulk fuel supply. Armed groups have historically targeted the terminal and the transportation corridors serving it for attacks, looting and extortion.

The October 6 incident highlights the continuing vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure located adjacent to areas affected by armed-group activity. Although the latest event did not result in casualties, product loss or an immediate fuel shortage, damage to a petroleum storage tank demonstrates the potential for a considerably more serious incident.

The principal concern is not only disruption of fuel distribution but the potential consequences of repeated gunfire or armed activity around large petroleum-storage facilities. A successful penetration of a tank containing flammable product could create fire, environmental and operational hazards and potentially interrupt national fuel distribution.

At present, there is no indication of a nationwide fuel shortage resulting from this incident, and WINECO has stated that available stocks remain unaffected.

Haiti surpasses 2,000 newly trained police officers under p4000 program

The Haitian National Police (PNH) has surpassed 2,000 newly trained officers under the P4000 program, marking an important milestone in efforts to expand and strengthen Haiti's national police force.

The P4000 initiative seeks to recruit and train approximately 4,000 additional police officers, increasing the manpower available to conduct counter-gang operations, reinforce recovered areas, protect critical infrastructure and provide conventional policing services.

Two major classes have already contributed 2,069 officers to the program. The 35th PNH promotion graduated 877 officers in January 2026, followed by 1,192 members of the 36th promotion on 29 May, including 238 women. A further class entered training in June as the PNH continued toward the P4000 objective.

The expansion of the PNH has been supported significantly by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which has maintained a longstanding policedevelopment and security-assistance program in Haiti.

INL assistance has supported PNH recruitment and training capacity as well as specialized instruction, equipment, infrastructure and logistical requirements. U.S.-funded assistance has also supported specialized PNH capabilities intended to improve operational effectiveness against heavily armed criminal organizations.

The broader U.S. assistance effort is designed not simply to increase police numbers, but to improve the PNH's ability to train, equip, deploy and sustain personnel in the field. This has become increasingly important as newly trained officers enter a security environment requiring simultaneous counter-gang operations, protection of strategic infrastructure and reinforcement of territory recovered from armed groups.

The P4000 program therefore represents both a significant Haitian police expansion initiative and an important component of the broader international effort— supported substantially by INL and other international partners to develop a larger, better trained and more operationally capable Haitian National Police. With more than 2,000 officers now trained under P4000 and additional recruits progressing through the academy, the program has passed the halfway point toward its initial 4,000-officer objective.

Royal Caribbean says return to labadee remains uncertain as Haiti suspension extends into 2027

Royal Caribbean International President and CEO Michael Bayley said on October 6, 2026, during a question-and-answer session aboard Icon of the Seas, that the cruise line has no firm timeline for returning to Labadee, Haiti, as continuing instability and violence remain a concern for the company.

Bayley explained that Royal Caribbean has operated at Labadee for approximately 30 years and has suspended operations during previous periods of instability. However, he described the current situation as significantly more prolonged and dangerous than previous disruptions.

“We have gone through periods before where we had to leave Labadee until things stabilized. This time, the situation is simply lasting much longer, and it is far more violent and dangerous.”

Royal Caribbean suspended calls at Labadee in April 2025 and has since extended the suspension through June 2027. As a result, no Royal Caribbean ships are currently scheduled to return before July 2027 at the earliest.

Importantly, Bayley emphasized on October 6 that July 2027 should not be interpreted as a confirmed reopening date. The company will resume operations only when it determines that security conditions are sufficiently stable to safely return passengers and crew.

The prolonged suspension continues to have economic consequences for communities surrounding Labadee and Cap-Haïtien, where cruise operations have historically generated employment and income for employees, vendors, artisans and businesses connected to tourism.

Bayley also addressed this issue during his October 6 remarks, describing the situation as a tragedy and noting that Royal Caribbean continues to support its Labadee employees with reduced compensation despite the absence of cruise ships.

The company continues to maintain its Labadee property, indicating that Royal Caribbean has not abandoned the destination and retains the ability to resume operations when conditions permit.

For now, June 2027 represents the minimum duration of the suspension rather than a reopening deadline. Bayley's October 6 comments make clear that Royal Caribbean's eventual return will depend primarily on improvements in Haiti's security environment.